TOPICS OF THE DAY.
RUSSIA AND JAPAN. THIS Japanese imbroglio, which has not ended yet, as most of our contemporaries seem to fancy, reveals in a strong light the immense weight of Russia in the diplomacy of Europe. The Treaty of Simonoseki, which did not affect either this country or France or Germany, inflicted, as we have always candidly pointed out, a grave incidental injury on Russia. It practically barred her access by railway to the port on the North Pacific which is absolutely essential to her plan for the commercial and agricultural as well as administrative development of her vast Asiatic dominion. Under the Treaty, to obtain her port Russia must fight both Japan and China,— the former already a great Power, the latter with easy access to Russia in Asia along a line of three thousand miles. The Asiatic Department of St. Peters- burg, which is a separate bureau exceedingly well informed and permanently ambitious, perceived this at once, and was furious, but a remedy was not easy to devise. The Russian fleet is not strong enough to be sure of beating the Japanese, and though the munitions stored at Vladivostock are immense in quantity, part of them are necessarily out of date, and no sufficient army could at present be collected there without a frightful expenditure both of treasure and of life. The Depart- ment hesitated, when suddenly the German Emperor, though he is absolutely unaffected by the Treaty, in his eagerness to conciliate Russia, sprang forward with an offer of active assistance by sea. This was accepted with gladness, and immediately the French Government, frightened to death lest Codlin should be regarded in St. Petersburg as the friend instead of Short, made a similar offer. That was accepted, too, doubtless with many smiles, and Count Ito suddenly found himself confronted with an unexpected danger. If his master kept the peninsula of Liau-tung as ceded by the Treaty, he might have to face three Powers at sea, Powers whose combined reserves were potentially far greater than his own, and who, if he fired on them, would use their re- sources to the utmost. In the collision China was certain to break faith, and Japan might lose her indemnity, her repute, and her control of the water all together. There was no chance of securing an ally for America, though friendly to Japan, was not dispose to fight for her, and Britain, though indifferent as to the Treaty, was deter- mined in almost any contingency to watch and wait. She does not want Russia to be supreme on the North Pacific, or an over-victorious Japan either.
The risk to be run was therefore tremendous, and Count Ito, who understands international resources just as well as his rivals, resolved not to run it. His people being excited almost to madness, there were terrible Parlia- mentary difficulties in his way ; but the semi-sacred authority of the Mikado might overcome them, and he decided to recede just so far as to dissolve the alliance. He therefore resolved, if the three Powers would force China to increase her indemnity by ten millions, to "surrender all claim to the definitive possession of Liau-tu.ng," and content himself with holding Port Arthur only until the indemnity was paid, which if the Powers exert themselves to facilitate a great Chinese loan, need not be a very long period. These terms did not suit the Asiatic Department in St. Peters- burg, which is in consequence sulkily commencing another Press war on Japan ; but they did suit France and, as we imagine, Germany also. M. Hanotaux is in a horrid mess. The French statesmen and soldiers perceived clearly that they wou'd get nothing out of any modification of the Treaty, not even right of trade in Yunnan, which is not within the extended area of Free-trade in China, the Colonial party became uneasy at the interruption to their projects for the conquest of Madagascar, and the electors asked on all sides what on earth their rulers meant by joining Germany. Had they spent two hundred millions in twenty years to gain such a re- sult as that ? M. Hanotaux is doubtful of his vote in the Chamber, doubtful of the next election, and eager to be out of the scrape wilhout any visible indignity or breach of faith with Russia. Count Ito's offer gives him the opportunity of saying that France has helped Russia to a great success ; and the Foreign Office Press, at all events, has accepted it with a chorus of admiration at the "good sense" and "political moderation" of the Japanese. The journalists, indeed, are so delighted, that they even pardon Great Britain, whose calm aloof- ness struck them at first as eminently suspicious. It is probable that the Kaiser will take the same line. He acted at first with his usual impulsiveness, and it must be acknowledged with some astuteness, but his people have not followed his lead, and would dislike active war for the benefit of Russia very much indeed. It is probable,. therefore, that he also will accept the Japanese offer, and then Count Ito will find himself in this position. He will have lost the right to annex Liau-tung permanently, or to hold Port Arthur for ever ; but he will have gained ten millions sterling, with an improved guarantee for the whole indemnity ; he will retain Port Arthur for a time,. which, if Japan can double her Fleet, may be protracted, like the French occupation of Tunis or our own of Egypt,. and he dissolves the ligatures which bind the "European alliance" against Japan. It is not, of course, certain that this will be the precise result of the negotiations, because the German Kaiser has not yet announced his decision ; but it is probable, and if so, it can hardly be denied that the Japanese Bismarck has got out of a most difficult situation very cleverly. He stands, in fact, once more opposed to Russia alone.
It is reported on good authority to be a Japanese idea that this will be their permanent position in foreign affairs, and we can readily believe it. Taking very adroit advantage of a European accident—namely, the desire of the German Emperor to establish easier relations with the Czar—the Russian diplomatists have secured a concession from Japan, which soothes the offended pride of their master, and enables him to pose as victor before his people, but they have not altered the great facts of the situation. It is a horrid nuisance for them that a new Power should have arisen in the Far East with a fleet equal to their own, and able, therefore, to prevent a sudden maritime descent on China. It is a worse nuisance that they should be compelled for the next five years to fortify Vladivostock, which they hope one day to abandon ; and to keep in Eastern Siberia, a costly and useless garrison, with which, hitherto, they have been able so completely to dispense, that they could not without heavy reinforcements place 20,000 regulars on any point of the lower waters of the Amour. And it is the worst nuisance of all, that in order to carry out their great railway project, which has become vital to their Asiatic position, they may have to fight or bribe two Powers instead of one, one of the two being active, mobile, and well armed. Any one who looks at the map will see that, in order to reach Port Lazareff—that is, remember, to reach the only possible safe port for the debouchure of their railway—they must obtain a grand slice of Eastern Manchuria and a whole section, quite a fourth, of the Kingdom of Corea. Formerly, they could have obtained them easily enough, as we can all now see, for China could no more have defeated Russia than she could defeat Japan, and Corea was a fos- silised and wholly powerless little State. Now, however, there is China to be coerced, probably just after she has reformed her Army, or, if she does not reform it, she can appeal to Japan, and Corea has become a Japanese dependency. In the best event the effort required -will be much greater, and Russia is no more fond of great efforts than any other State ; and in the worst, she might, if her fleet were defeated or her army driven back, suffer exceedingly serious disaster. We all know what a. serious defeat would mean to us in India ; and it would be nearly, if not quite, as dangerous an event for Russia in Asia, for though her subject population is far less, it is more restless, and quite as desirous, if it saw a chance, to throw off the European yoke. The position, therefore, has grown most unpleasant, so un- pleasant that it will be most difficult for the Russian statesmen by and by to avoid a war with Japan. They can have little hope of conciliating her, or they would not have put the present affront upon the Japanese people, who remembered their expulsion from Corea for three hundred years, and at last avenged it; and unless they conciliate her, they have to extort a free hand in Manchuria and Corea, from an active and vigilant Power which has an ironclad fleet, at sea, and can mobilise a hundred and fifty thousand very good soldiers, supplied with the Murata rifle and an improved Gatling-gun. We can easily conceive that the Asiatic Department is not content, and that, if its allies would stand it, it would like to utilise their assistance in ordering Japan to retire at once both from Port Arthur and Corea. The allies, however, will hardly go that length ; and if they recede, there will probably be an uneasy peace for five years, during which Japan will have forty millions to spend in bringing her sea-power up to a level at which it will seem formidable even to a coalition. Mark as symptomatic the Russian desire, revealed in the telegrams, that Spain, which has had nothing to say in this war, should have a leading place in arranging the new negotiations. Spain, as owner of the Philippine Islands, has much to fear from Japan, and could help Russia in a Japanese war most materially.
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