Govern or get out

Ilichard Cecil i irheiere are two courses and only two, in regard to one would be to govern Ireland. Where our ; al lticians fall into the mess in which they are n„‘!lays floundering over Irish affairs is that they will rf Itner come away nor will they govern. They are faivaYs attempting some middle course which is

1 to the continued prosperity of Ireland herself ', the safety of the Empire.

if 141 th f —Sir Henry Wilson, 1921 it the itek •ollowing year Sir Henry was murdered by on the steps of his house in Eaton Square ir mon, i h IsaPPointing though it may be, to some 1 0 aLa.dline writers, I am not a good hater. rve tZtuyed a deep affection for Ulster where, . "nutside the main trouble areas, the people are to°t„ablY kind and hospitable. If my Ulster III Is' "ars have given me any bitter feeling then it ,,it wt, stronger than average dislike of violence. is (tern urging a tougher line, I mean a more III, ba,e6rmined and consistent anti-terrorist drive 11'; vo-e"ed by a more robust philosophy. I &le' he ate tougher interrogation methods but 0 w,ver brutality and the line between the two

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L , clearly drawn by the Cornpton Report. ike , stet, most soldiers who have served in UlI Lifl kit know the dangers of swinging the ollus.titarV sledge-hammer too wildly — the nut ot", ,rows bigger and tougher. a,'' tion`rtnaPs one reason for the sceptical reac'`itirru.' rhY prOposals is that they come at a 10 theof unrelieved gloom and pessimism — m 10ne must 8e something cranky about 1)1anyr,that'ne with enough crazy optimism to say Ilsolt„here is a quick and relatively painless 11" s'i"cm to the Ulster conundrum. ;Dart'!Ice 1969 the politicians of both major Ilit;111eylehs have the upheld the same policy. r th, aye tried to contain the violence by the ' lliat'isil Possible military action, in the hope t politi`ue resulting calm waters will hatch a ! %Jai settlement. After four years, several lhaliosand casualties and endless political NI euvres, the government still sticks to the 01 to e Po

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an eY like shipwrecked sailors clinging IA Th uPturned boat. 'Plii terro7 seem to believe that by pursuing the epeath,,18,1s too fiercely they will alienate the ' aet 4—te minority. But the Provisional IRA are lise.hoble band of liberals fighting for a just tibuTheY would not, in any normal society rou(4 any position of influence. The present reati's have given them great power and „ard — and they enjoy them. A few lige lle Provisionals will remain active until illecrire either captured and convicted or hese t": a gun battle. But the majority of e 22 rrorists would fade away as soon as larn-,-rtle ceased to be a low-risk, highSport. The basic error of the eli Merit at Westminster has been their efth ovisi, at waving a big stick at the ath,,, — nals is the same as waving it at the 1,1 -tices h minority. The violent men of both Der ave the willing support of at the most h) t. cent of the total population. 1th 'et, the IRA now rule the Catholic areas 4iied:c.ities by intimidation as effectively as 10ti `t",;c1 through overt patrols before OperaCivilians. It is unjust for Mr Rees to ,",e civilians. The cities are enmeshed, tect,:' by fear, Both sides run crippling „4°111 rackets, rightly confident that the see'',.anliot touch them. Attempts to laps"te the murderers and intimidators ,,INIaj because few civilian witnesses are "tlity b"latienoUgh to testify. A recent Cornet:11

e ons report estimated that 60,000 ' °r 12 per cent of the population of Greater Belfast have been forced to leave their homes because of intimidation.

The inconsistency of the Government's military policy has aggravated this state of affairs and has •placed the Roman Catholic areas in an impossible position. The initiation of anti-terrorist operations or the taking of a firmer line seems to be brought about now, as it has always been, by an increase in violence and casualties.

The institution by the army of a period of `low-profile' is easily brought about by local propaganda against the army or the disproportionate discrediting of a regiment over some small incident. Again and again I have seen operations with a good chance of success abandoned as a result, in effect, of the propaganda of the IRA themselves.

During the periods of 'low-profile' the terrorist has the chance to rearm and regroup. He also tightens his grip of intimidation on the Catholic areas. When the security forces return to counter increased violence, the ordinary people are torn between their fear of the IRA and their natural longing for peace. It is small wonder that the Catholic strongholds in the cities are so embittered: they are between the proverbial devil and the deep blue sea.

Westminster has assumed direct control of the province — it must be the responsibility of the security forces to break the vicious circle of intimidation, for until this is done, the civilian population will not be free to reject the terrorists, neither will Catholics be able to join the RUC and the UDR, and ultimately only a local force can keep the peace.

Apart from the bloody score-board of Ulster violence to date, our policy has had two other dangerous effects. It has allowed a terrorist organisation to achieve its declared aims through a campaign of violence (direct rule; fighting between Protestants and British troops; and a growing clamour by the British public for the withdrawal of the army from Ulster). Secondly it has brought the Protestant population to a state of fury and frustration and has increased their distrust of Dublin and Westminster to the point where , they treat all political initiatives as attempts to 'sell them down the river.' When I talked recently to senior members of the United Unionist Party they were seriously worried about whether Protestant extremists could be held in check much longer. A united Ireland has never been more remote.

Sir Henry Wilson, writing over fifty years ago, said that we have only two alternatives — to govern or get out. I believe that that is equally right today.

What would happen if we did withdraw our troops? I was in Belfast at the time of Roy Mason's speech on withdrawal. For the first time I heard senior officers in the RUC, quiet and moderate men, talking of civil war. Was Roy Mason's speech the ill-disciplined gaffe that it was made out to be? Or is there some truth in the rumour that senior members of the Labour Cabinet are pressing for the withdrawal of the troops? It it was a deliberate 'testing of the water', then I can assure Mr Mason that the water is very hot.

The consequences of withdrawal are unthinkable. We must govern in Ulster.

Lord Richard Cecil was a captain in the Grenadier Guards until November 1973. He did three tours of duty in Ulster.