The Chunnel

Too many eggs in one basket

John Szemery

So the Government has decided to go ahead with the Channel Tunnel. Yet in ten to fifteen years' time we could well be isolated and impoverished as a result.

One aspect that has hardly been considered — and was barely touched on in the Second Reading last week — was security. It is just not possible to keep a foolproof twenty-four hour security check on everyone and everything that will go through the Chunnel. Sabotage attempts are bound to be made — and some will succeed.

The world, conditioned to accept terrorism, arson and murder, will just shrug its shoulders. But for Great Britain, which will be relying on the Channel Tunnel for an increasing proportion of its trade — exports and imports — destruction of the Chunnel will spell disaster. This is because many of the 130-odd regular shipping services that presently link the UK and the continent are liable to disappear once the Chunnel becomes operative. The same applies — but to a lesser extent — to the 195,200 commercial flights and thousands of charter flights that fly every year between UK and continental airports.

Of course, this is progress. And, granted, the Chunnel is a national investment. But one fanatic or madman is all that is needed. A billion pounds' worth of tunnel and railways — not to mention the passengers and goods who might be passing through at that moment — could be wrecked in an instant.

The full implications of such destruction have not yet been fully considered, let alone appreciated. Passenger traffic (with and without cars) is expected to increase by over 8 per cent per year in the next ten years, and freight will more than double between the UK and the continent.

Despite this, several routes and services will have to be substantially reduced or closed down because of the Channel Tunnel. But if the Chunnel is suddenly destroyed, these routes cannot suddenly be reopened to take the passengers and freight that have been stranded.

For example, the 231,000 passengers without cars using the Newhaven/Dieppe ferry in 1971 will reduce to 106,000 by 1980 if the Chunnel is built, and to 84,000 by 1990. In 1971, some 95,000 accompanied vehicles travelled on the Harwich/Hook of Holland or Harwich/Belgium sea ferry. This is estimated to increase to 218,000 by 1980 without the tunnel, but it will decrease to 94,000 with.

So tar so good. Passengers and freight switch to the Channel Tunnel. What happens if and when the Chunnel is blown up?

Services that have been closed down cannot be started up at a moment's notice. Ships that have been scrapped cannot be rebuilt over night. Ships and planes that have been sold or transferred on to other routes can only be taken off these routes at a price and at the risk of disrupting other services. Britain could find itself almost isolated from the rest of Europe. Many operators will just cock a snook and say "Hard cheese!" Why should they take ships off profitable routes just because the

British have not provided for this emergency? Cargo space will have to be rationed on the Sew available ships and aeroplanes. Non-essential passenger traffic will be banned. The cost of food — one of our major imports —

will rocket. Goods that cannot be shipped will pile up on the quays and in factories. Companies which cannot get rid of their products will go on half time. Cash will stop flowing. Firms will go bankrupt. Unemployment will shoot up. We will have a major economic crisis on our hands.

The White Paper touched on this. "The possibility of sabotage cannot be excluded," it said, complacently adding that this was a risk taken by "other modes of transport and other major civil engineering works."

It omitted to mention that there are 130 shipping services, each operated by an average of three ships, and nearly 200,000 flights to the continent per year from over two dozen airports. But there will only be one Channel Tunnel. Sabotaging one ship out of 300, one out of 200,000 flights, one of two dozen airport control towers, or even an entire port will not have the same effect as cutting off the one and only Chunnel.

This is no scaremongering. Security cannot be foolproof. Drive-on-drive-off ferry trains are planned to run every four minutes in peak hours. So will frequent passenger and container trains. It will not be physically possible to inspect every car, every lorry, every container and every suitcase or parcel before departure. Nor can it be assumed that vehicles or containers which have been sealed at an inland depot have not been tampered with. If eleven Asians could get into a customs-sealed container last summer, then so can a bomb. Three tunnels each thirty-two miles long, cannot be watched continuously.

So what is the alternative? To keep several of the air and sea services going that might otherwise be forced to close down. This might mean a subsidy, or taking legal powers to force traffic on to uneconomic routes. Whichever solution is preferred, the result must be the same: we must have an adequate alternative means of getting freight and passenger transport to and from the Continent in case the Channel Tunnel is disrupted or destroyed. If this alternative is not acceptable, then we cannot afford to risk putting so many eggs into one basket by building the Channel Tunnel.

John Szemery, a Tory candidate in the last election, is now a senior executive of the European Commission.

Broadcasting