11 MAY 1974, Page 9

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wit,is Mr Heath's tragedy that his only dream the Common Market, and that the British Den i ,-13,e would not share that dream. Expensive MPaigns with specious statistics fell on cold :arSi but costs in tradition and traditional kets, registered. So did the idea of a iferendum, so far denied to us but granted to lorvvay. till°rwegian experience is particularly perLIalis_ent to Britain today: for there it was a tta,`).°Lir government, favourable to the EEC, oQuich first negotiated terms; a Labour 1°,vkeroment which offered the referendum; a zi"311r government which resigned when an,; Membership was rejected, 56.5 to 43.5; go'' after a short coalition, another Labour Iv.eroment now faces the aftermath. to I is a pragmatic government, not in thrall s„s ideological left wing like our own, or Ject to union control. It is indeed affecPapsilatelY called the Royal Norwegian Labour jo-IY. Non-economic factors played their part 4 "°rwegian rejection of the Common a arket, quite as much as the fish and Ofculture vote. For Norway, after 400 years stv4ss0ciation with Denmark followed by sov:deo, only acquired her separate ger`reignty in 1905 and it was again endanC-(1,,eu by German occupation in 1940. thenic advantages did not appear worth 41,1:Price of national freedom to a country of itclualists, from Ibsen and Amundsen to .?,,r Heyerdahl. Ilat!le closelyknit Nordic Council provides tpliZnal assurance; membership of NATO, 4i the OECD and SNAKE sufficient treaPean co-operation. Moreover, the 1973 'e 'Y ciWith the EEC with its strong economic , vii-lti .nert,„ PriarY clause' provides continuing and Stior;'strig association with the EEC. In the winril.. ter..._ , m of course, Norway was thrown Wilios'r18 cards in terms of a world shortage 131.6 enabled her to maintain her share in Ete,PaPer and aluminium exports against oil, `ariffs. And there was the final bonus of The Still , Powerful Norwegian Export Council Nlareearris for membership of the Common 0154 h' for the purpose of decision-making, lover liere joins hands with the Labour reter4.nrnent. Yet it is agreed that another ' resoi,`,r1.1,11ro now would again result in a prosb-e-,,".1g 'No.' For Norway is currently %it' -1.11s, with an inflation rate of only 9 per :ctt iah'ugh savings and investment, the tight`rdde—',°Lir market since the war and a total Year, viricrease of over 30 per cent since last serf.en shipping, which greatly feared flag ueteellootion, since it operates so much

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With n foreign ports, has not suffered, and ili: ,the fourth largest merchant fleet (eight idteora-lebril et itoern

of World tonnage) this is a conin Norway's GNP.

tktedth oil and immigration issues vitally ate th .rttiri„referendum, in particular an unLightsq`e Brussels speech indicating EEC oil tiort,%, Which creates as much umbrage in ',,,itilierjaY as Scotland. Scotland, so like and so i'lLatior c,ould still learn from Norway in the „'Ile jcip,°` oil. The Norwegian government, by itr—fli° royal decree, has maintained strict Zel -104,Over the method and rate of oil nt, and, indeed, none is yet allowed (111illion e 62nd parallel. Since over 5,000 ,astry, Kroner is already invested in the in'''r cen,the government share in tax and a ten LAli '-, royalty is no mean one. °11 business activities, including the

shore-based subsidiary industries are being deliberately geared to fit a small town pattern (maximum twenty thousand) of social life. Stavanger, Norway's oil capital, is determined both locally and nationally not to become another Houston. No land in that area may be sold to foreigners, and all leases to oil concerns, such as the vast drydocks developments, are on very short term lease. The current intention is to end these in favour of tourism, so that oil installations shift north to Bergen and Trondheim. There is a deliberate policy of preventing population concentration, by bringing industry to small towns; and to prevent redistribution of income, by clamping down on get-rich-quick private companies.

If the Crimean war was won in the Baltic, by the British Navy at Kronstadt, it seems likely that the Indian Ocean war will be lost in the Arctic at Spitzbergen, with oil as the trigger. Norwegian foreign policy is based on the lessons of the second world war; that neutrality is not enough for a weak state. She therefore adheres closely to NATO with special links to Britain. But with over 100 miles of frontier with the USSR she stands strategically exposed and treads very delicately, especially on the question of foreign troops in time of peace. Even the NASA polar-tracking station is closing down this year.

Norway's whole situation is epitomised in Spitzbergen, largest island of the Svalbard (cool coast) archipelago, stretching 400 miles north of the mainland. Sovereignty was awarded to Norway by treaty in 1925, a treaty giving open-door equal access to all the signatories. Only Russia has dug in, so that now there are 2,000 Russians mining coal on Spitzbergen as against 1,000 Norwegians, though a third mine opening this year may increase Norway's proportion. American and French concessions are long abandoned. It was just after the war in 1946, that Stalin propositioned Norway's foreign minister in Moscow, Trygve Lie, that mutual development should de facto replace treaty rights. Refused by Lie, Russian policy has not encouraged international access and actively opposed Norway's proposed airstrip on the grounds that Article Nine forbade militarisation. Somewhere between a threat to build their own strip at Barentsburg and demands for joint control of the Norwegian strip, an uneasy compromise has been reached with Russians looking after their own traffic within the Norwegian airport. Any such Russian rights, as also their fishing boat rights, cannot but be a NATO worry. For though some NATO powers were also signatories to the Spitzbergen Treaty, including Britain, it would be hard for them to start new activities on the' island without Soviet cries of militarisation. But much nearer at hand than NATO there is in the Kola peninsula region a large Soviet amphibious force, about 500 vessels and nobody knows how many submarines. Nobody could defend Spitzbergen for five minutes if Russia thought it worthwhile to move in. Detente in Europe has very little relevance to Arctic activity. For this reason the coming negotiations between Norway and Russia concerning the Barantsee line of control may be vital, not least for the suspicion of oil in the region. Hottest is the question of whether Spitzbergen lies on the Norwegian shelf (claimed by Royal decree in 1963) or not. Norway claims that the Barantsee convention of 1958 clarified her rights; but if the opposing Russian view were upheld, then a free-for-all oil hunt round Spitzbergen could make a tricky strategic situation, which would be far beyond the Norwegian Governor at Longyearbyen to solve. As Herr Scheel told NATO last month: we are not living in an age of disarmament and détente, but facing Russian global power and her three navies stationed round Europe, in the Arctic, the Baltic and Mediterranean; the scales have tilted against NATO.