TOPICS OF THE DAY.
THE RELIEF OF LADYSMITH.
AT the present moment the most impor'ant problem of the war is how to relieve Ladysmith. It is not of course the only problem, for the defeat of the Boer armies in the field, their destruction as fighting forces, and the occupation of Bloemfontein, Pretoria, and. Johannes- burg are as much as ever the ultimate and essential aims before the British Government and nation. But in order that these aims can be accomplished, and therefore prior to them, there is a military necessity in the shape of the relief of Ladysmith. Kimberley and Mafeking may be left to the fate of war, and their relief must not interfere with the prosecution of our main designs, but the force at Ladysmith is too large and important to make it right to run unnecessary risks in that direction. In a word. Ladysmith must be relieved, and our force there secured from danger, before anything else is attempted. Now there are two ways of doing this. To begin with, we can form a new army at Estcourt, and when we have got, say, some fifteen or twenty thousand men there and plenty of supplies we can march to the relief of Ladysmith, and, assisted of course by a simultaneous movement from Ladysmith, take the Boers between two fires. The other plan is to relieve Ladysmith by what Carlyle in his "Frederick the Great calls treading on the dragon's tail in order to bring his head round. If we concentrate an army of fifty thousand men on the frontier of the Orange Free State, say near De Aar Junction, and then proceed to march on Bloemfontein, the Free State Boers, if not, indeed, the bulk of the Transvaal Beers also, must at once rush back from Ladysmith to meet and repel the invader: They cannot afford to see their base and the best part of their country in the hands of the enemy, especially as an unehecked advance in force into the Free State would certainly raise the siege of Kimberley and probably of Mafeking, and thus quite conceivably allow the forces relieved to raid into the Transvaal and even threaten Pretoria.
As to the question which of these plans for relieving Ladysmith, the direct or the indirect, would be the quicker and better, it is very difficult for any one here, and without official information, to form a positive opinion. Probably one would be about as quick as the other. No doubt we could get an effective force somewhat quicker to Estcourt than we could to the Orange River frontier, but then the Boers would have to retire from Ladysmith earlier in the event of a threat of invasion across the Orauge River. If Ladysmith is relieved viti Estcourt and Coleuses the Boers would wait till the attack was actually delivered. It would, in fact, take them as long to get from Ladysmith to the frontier at Bethulie or Aliwal North, as it would take us to get our troops from the transports at East London and Port Eliza- beth to the Orange River. This being so, most strategists, official and amateur, will, no doubt, prina facie, incline to an indirect relief as the more certain of the two, and as likely to give the Boers more trouble and difficulty in the way of marching and transport, and also as the plan better calculated to have a good political effect in the Colony. We agree that if our soldiers are to obey the obvious and text-book strategy they will adopt the plan of indirect relief. It, is, in fact, the obvious thing to do,—the thing Which will occur at once to anybody who has ever turned his attention to the art of war. In spite of that, however, we cannot help thinking that under present circumstances the better plan for us will be not to obey "the ordinary rules of strategy," but instead to relieve Ladysmith by a direct march and attack from Estcourt. Our reasons can be stated shortly. The object of this war, alike from a military and a political point of view, is to destroy the fighting power of the Boers. We want, as it were, to dismount their military machine, and put it permanently out of gear. If we can sucbeed in doing this we shall have won the game, and shall be relieved of all dread of having to run up and down the Free State and the Transvaal encountering independent Boer com- mandos, and engaging in a guerilla war on a large scale. But it is obvious that if we relieve Ladysmith indirectly, and if the Boers, or rether the bulk of them, withdraw from the investment of Ladysmith, leaving only a force sufficient to check and harass our, troops in an advance thrOugh. • the passes that lead to the high veldt, the guerilla war will have begun. The war will be cOntinued. guerilla fashion in Natal, and a great new guerilla war will .be' organised and begun in face of our advance "acrosi; the Orange River. If, on the other hand, We advance from Estcourt, the Boers will hardly be able to resist the tempta- tion to fight a general action,—the very thing we desire: To put the matter in another way. The Boers are at present swarming at Ladysmith. Our game is to do nothing to disperse the swarm without fighting, but to destroy the swarm by a big battle. No doubt the Boers ought to, • and could, disperse before an advance from Estcourt; but we venture to think that this would be more than even General Joubert, one of the canniest of men, could' endure to do until he had been defeated. He could not, . that is, unless his flank were threatened and he were iti serious danger of being cut off from his beat line of retreat, abandon his position and his great guns at Ladysmith'. Therefore, it seems to us that the advance by Estcourt is the wiser because it offers us the better chance of meeting the . Boer army in force and in the mass, and not as a number ' of dispersed forces. But though we find these very cogent reasons for thinking that between two otherwise fairly equal plans of relief the balance inclines to the direct plan, we are quite aware that there may yet beau insuperable objection. It is quite possible that soldiers who know the ground may declare that the country - is too difficult for an operation of the kind We propose, and that when the united army had relieved Lady- smith and smashed the Boers it would be unable safely - or easily to get through the passes of the Drakensberg. Of course, if there are really physical objections of this kind, they dominate the situation ; but we do not feel at all prepared to admit them offhand, for it seems'. to us that what man has done man can do, and that if the Boers could come in by Van Reenen's Pass and by Laings Nek, we can go out that way.
All these matters, however, lie on the lap of Sir Red.vers Buller, and we may feel confident that he will decide • them wisely and well. If we thought that it were possible that public opinion here could in any way disturb or - interfere with his judgment we should not have written as we have written, for we do not hold with twitching • the driver's elbow, even if the twitcher has in fact hit • upon a good theory. Fortunately, Sir Redvers Buller . is not only out of reach of public opinion, but also the last man who would pay any attention to it when it was contrary to his own views. If he has elected for the indirect relief of Ledvsmith ten thousand newspaper- leaders would not make him alter his decision. That being so, there is no reason why the matter should not be discussed. If, after all, the indirect plan is adopted, our readers will be able to judge of some of the reasons which may have induced a departure from what at first sight seem the obvious rules of strategy.
Previous page
