Europe Before the War ' The Eve of 1914. By Theodor
Wolff. Translated by E. W: Dickos. (Gollancz. 21s.) TEN years ago Theodor Wolff published a book entitled The Prelude, containing his memories of the opening years of the century, which won the honour of a French translation. The sequel displays the • same shining merits and surpasses it in dramatic interest. The Editor of the Berliner Tageblatt was the most distinguished journalist of his time, less scintillating indeed than Maximilian Harden, but a far steadier guide. He saw a great deal of history in the making, and at certain moments he helped to make it. Yet he stands above the battle, so far as that is possible to a contemporary. The chief historical value of the book lies in the sketches of leading actors in the drama, in his personal experiences on the eve of war, and in his mature reflections on the causes of the catastrophe. For such a thoughtful Liberal there is, of course, no place in Nazi Germany. • The best portraits are naturally those which personal know- ledge enables him to paint with the greatest care. The Kaiser emerges as a rather pathetic figure, tragically unfitted to rule, his mood shifting as quickly as a squirrel in its cage—a stage hero, not a war-lord. He never grew up and never learned to bridle his tongue. His one unchanging resolve was to earn immortality as the creator of a mighty fleet, which, though in no way' a crime, was .a blunder of the first magnitude. For at the bottom of his heart he had no desire to use it. His beloved battleships were to embody the glory of his Empire, to stiffen the aim of his diplomacy, to exalt his personal prestige. Whether Tirpitz planned to wrest Neptune's trident from our hands we cannot be sure. That his master had formed such a resolve there is no reason to believe. " He was no Attila." If he was wrong in his Plotted- politik, he was right in disliking the Moroccan adventures. He was right again, in our author's opinion, when he declared that Serbia's answer to the Austrian ultimatum removed all need for war, and, had he been a stronger man, he would have put his foot down at that point and prevented the War.
The Kaiser's flightiness enhanced the responsibility of his Chancellors, whom Wolff knew fairly well. Like everyone else he delighted in Billow's conversation, and the brilliant chartneur never resented the outspoken criticisms of the Tageblatt. If Billow's figure dominated the previous volume, it is Bethmann of whom we hear most in the sequel—a born schoolmaster, intensely conscientious, a little wooden and apt to bore his mercurial master. Exasperated as he is by Bethmanngs costly errors, Wolff never fails to respect his lofty character. In his high seriousness and " predilection for ethics " he compares him to Grey. There is nothing more moving in these six hundred pages than the intimate talk between the journalist and the harassed Chancellor in Feb- ruary, 1915. " When one comes to the question of the responsibility for this' War,". remarked the latter, " we must candidly admit that we .have our share of it. To say that I am oppressed by this thought would be to say too little—the thought never leaves me, I live in it.", Grey, he added, was sincerely anxious to prevent war, but slipped into it, being more concerned for the Triple Entente than for peace. But Germany was also to blame, with the overbearing spirit which had developed in the people. " If there is anything that could keep me alive after. this War, it would be for the purpose of changing' the political spirit of the country." These confessions arc the more remarkable because Bethmann's official apologia, pUblished after the War, refused to acknowledge any ,errors Of his own or his countrymen.
Of minor figures in the Wilhelmstrasse, such as Jagow, Zimmermann and Stumm, we get interesting snapshots. At the crisis of its fate the nation was ruled:by men not one of whom was equal to a major emergency. Billow assured Wolff that if he had been at the helm he would have averted the War, and supplied him with a list of the errors which he would have avoided. No one can say whethei the old pilot, whose superior skill was admitted by his successor, could have kept the ship off the rocks. In 1908 he had supported Achrenthal's Bosnian policy, much as he disliked it, fearing to thwart his only reliable partner 'in a prole& on which{ he had set his heart. The same logic might have compelled him to a similar compliance in 1914.
The most important contribution in these pages to our knowledge of events is the story of the author's part in the revelation of the Anglo-Russian naval negotiations of 1914. The desire of Russia for such an agreement was conveyed to Grey through French intermediaries during the King's visit to Paris, was favourably received by him, and was approved by the Cabinet on his return. Negotiations between the Admiralties commenced, and, had not War broken out, a pact would probably have been signed in the summer. While the British people knew nothing of what was afoot, the German Government was aware of every move in the game, for Siebert, a member of the staff of the Russian Embassy in London, communicated copies of the most important telegrams and despatches. To remonstrate with the Governments con- cerned at negotiations which suggested a tightening of the ring would have involved a revelation of the source of infor- mation. Yet to take no action was to facilitate the alarming design. In this dilemma the Wilhelmstrasse invited the Editor of the Tageblatt to announce that Anglo-Russian naval discussions were in progress. Convinced that an agreement would encourage chauvinists in the Triple Entente and inflame the German naval fanatics to new demands, Wolff revealed the secret in the form of " a letter from Paris." The informa- tion might be challenged, ended the imaginary message, but the proposal was a reality, and, though it might still be far from realisation, it did not appear • to have been definitely rejected. Iswolsky was held responsible for the whole enter- prise. The article created a first-class sensation. Grey gave a designedly ambiguous ..answer in the House of Commons. Jagow expressed his relief to our Ambassador at Grey's declaration, adding.ithat if the rumour had been true the consequences would have been very serious. Anglo-German. relations would have lost their cordiality, and the armament fever in Germany would have burst out afresh. It was a polite warning, for the Tageblatt revelations had come from the Wilhelmstrasse itself ; but it produced no effect beyond embarrassment.
On the threadbare problem of responsibility for the World War Wolff writes with understanding of the various actors in the drama, with one exception. He admits that Russia could not hold aloof when her rival in the Balkans was about to trample Serbia underfoot ; that France had to stand by her ally and Great Britain by her friends. German policy, he adds, was 'marked by short-sighted incapacity, and the carte blanche presented to Austria by the Kaiser and Bethmann at Potsdam was a tragic mistake. There was no war party at work : Tirpitz was not ready, and Moltkc did not intervene till the eleventh hour. Three civilians—the Kaiser, Bethmann and Jagow—made German policy during the fatal weeks, and stumbled into a war which they all desired to avoid. Of Austria,- on the other hand, he writes with anger and scorn. The two greatest errors of the Central Powers, in his eyes, were Germany's rejection of British approaches at the turn of the century and Austria's veto on Serbia's access to the sea during the Balkan wars. He speaks of the " wretched dilettantes " of Vienna, and dismisses Berchtold as an elegant trifler.
There is plenty to be said against Austria's handling of the Jugoslays within and beyond her frontiers, and the indictment has been framed not only by Professor Seton-Watson but by Austrians like Baernreither. But to understand the diplomacy of the Austrian statesmen we must remember that behind Serbia they saw the Russian coloisus, no longer satisfied, as in the days of Bismarck, with its sphere of influence in the eastern half of the Balkan peninsula but openly encouraging Panserb ambitions in the west. .Berchtold's apologia is to be found in 5,090 pages of the Austrian documents, published in 1930, and nobody , can fully visualise his gnawing anxieties without digesting this enormous meal. That in 1914 Austria was the rider and , pertnany the horse is now generally recognised by historians, But Russia's share in producing the catastrophe was larger than readers of these pages might suppose. The deepest cause of all was not the errors of this or that statesman but the shameful anarchy in which the peoples of pre-War Europe. were con- tent to dwell.
G. P. Geom.
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