BOOKS
Thirty years on
Philip de Zulueta
ANTHONY EDEN by Robert Rhodes James
Weidenfeld & Nicolson, f16.95
No one could ever accuse Anthony Eden of being a desiccated calculating machine: personal relations — with family, staff, colleagues and foreigners — were crucial to him. At the beginning of his book Mr Rhodes James explains his dis- trust of diaries and fallibly human memor- ies: he refers only anonymously to former colleagues, officials and friends who helped him (and has an irritating habit of including equally anonymous quotations in his text). It was therefore a pleasant surprise to find his book sympathetic, understanding and fairly perceptive about Eden's character, as well, of course, as being an accurate if not particularly origin- al account of his long career. The criticisms levied at Eden's character were numerous: he was said to be ill-tempered, self- centred, vain and indecisive. Rhodes James point out that the alleged vanity did not extend to his undoubted gallantry in World War One, his wide knowledge of painting, or his first class degree in oriental languages. Nor was he vain about his political speeches: indeed he could be highly critical of his own performances. The most that can be said is that he was intensely conscious of, some would say touchy about, his public reputation. In this he was clearly wise because indeed his reputation was his strength and was the key to the respect, affection and even adulation in which, as Rhodes James emphasises, he was held by so many, not only in this country but world wide. Eden's bouts of ill temper, petulance perhaps, could indeed be trying and at times absurd and were undoubtedly aggravated by ill health but their basic cause was his perfectionism. He set himself the highest standards and expected others to attain the same level. As Prime Minister he did irritate his colleagues by what seemed to some exces- sive interference in relatively minor mat- ters. This is however not a particularly unusual characteristic of Prime Ministers. As against this he was remarkably loyal to his colleagues and staff, both before and during his premiership. Rhodes James seems to regard Eden as unduly forbearing whether with Chamberlain, Churchill or the ministers in his own Cabinet: certainly it must be doubtful if he would have been a good butcher in a longer premiership. Never at home in the smoking-room of the House of Commons nor interested in political intrigue, rather innocent about it in fact, he could be a brilliant leader but not an adroit manager of men. Above all, Eden's interest and enthusiasm was in making policy rather than in the mere conduct of affairs. Rhodes James quotes Sir Alec Cadogan as complaining that Anthony was always 'wanting to do some- thing'. This active approach to public, particularly foreign, affairs was by no means always popular with colleagues, let alone officials, who found (and still find) a more passive attitude more comfortable. But if Eden had not sought passionately to change the world for the better he would have been a diplomat and not a politician. It was probably inevitable that Rhodes James should devote nearly a quarter of his book to the Suez episode. He deals with this period well and fairly but the emphasis unbalances the book and tilts it towards being a history rather than a biography. In particular 1954, indeed Eden's annus mira- bili s, receives somewhat cursory attention. This is a pity since the achievements were extraodinary and demonstrated the bril- liance of a man at the height of his powers as well as the effect of his great personal charm. Some Americans were apparently put off by or misunderstood his manner and mannerisms: they disliked being called `my dear'. But nearly everyone else, even the Russians, succumbed and responded to his genuine warmth and understanding. During 1954 the Geneva Conference about Indo-China and Korea, of which Eden was chairman, was a particularly good exam- ple of his methods — and did something unfortunately to spoil relations with Dul- les, who was jealous of Eden's success and annoyed at failing to carry his own Con- gress in favour of US intervention at that stage. Eden's attitude was not due to credulity about communist aims or policy but rather to an instinctive understanding of what was possible. I remember his explaining to me that, in political terms, Indo-China was, as he put it, a sponge and if dried out it would disintegrate — as indeed it later did. This Geneva Confer- ence deserves more space as does the stand which Eden took about Buraimi.
While Suez came to be regarded as the most controversial time in Eden's career his attitude to European affairs was argu- ably both more important in the longer run and also less defensible. Eden was deeply patriotic, immensely proud of Britain's past and a strong believer in the Common- wealth — then still almost credible as an alliance and not just another club. All his life he had been involved in Europe's internecine wars and had suffered from the fragility of continental governments and even of democracy itself. He did not therefore particularly want a strong Europe which might force Britain to chose between it and the Commonwealth nor did he see that a re-grouping was necessary to protect British interests. Most important of all, he did not believe that European integration would succeed: French rejec- tion of the European Defence Community in August 1954 confirmed his view. All this was understandable if uncharacteristically short-sighted. But all the same it was Eden who, following the collapse of the EDC, conceived and brought about the Western European Union involving German admis- sion to NATO and the unparalleled com- mitment of British troops to the mainland of Europe more or less in perpetuity. Without WEU the EEC could never have flourished but unfortunately neither Eden nor his colleagues (let alone the very insular civil servants) seem to have per- ceived then the need and opportunity for Britain in Europe.
Eden's short time as Prime Minister came to be dominated by the Suez crisis but Rhodes James seems to me to under- rate Eden's knowledge of or interest in domestic affairs. Although foreign affairs were always his prime concern and field of expert knowledge he had after all been a senior Cabinet Minister and Deputy Lead- er for some 20 years and he had also enjoyed, while out of office, quite exten- sive involvement in commercial affairs. His `property owning democracy' was not just a phrase; it was a true ideal which he contrasted starkly with state controlled poverty. He was vehemently against what he saw as the insensitive and selfish atti- tude of some of the older Tories. His concentration on foreign affairs during his premiership was due much more to the pressure of outside events than to prefer- ence. For example, his remarkable feeling for popular opinion, at least as much in domestic as in foreign affairs, showed itself to great advantage during the 1955 election campaign. I shall never myself forget the famous open meeting in the Birmingham Rag Market with some 10,000 people pressing in and Eden captivating his audi- ence not so much by a rather uninspired speech as by his sensitive and effective impromptu replies to questions from a very diverse crowd.
Unhappily, however, foreign affairs in general and the Middle East in particular forced themselves to the front of the stage and indeed all over it so that Clarissa Eden observed — with wisdom as well as feeling — that the Suez Canal seemed to be flowing through her drawing-room. Rhodes James gives a very detailed account of the Suez period based mostly on the public documents and memoirs now available. There seems little of a factual nature to add. What is novel, and I feel most justified, is Rhodes James' attack on the faulty military preparations, particular- ly on Monckton as Minister of Defence and the Chiefs of Staff, especially Mountbat- ten. As in all military operations, success was all (as it was in our recent Falklands war) and sadly the strategic thought was, unsound and unto-ordinated: indeed only excellent tactical control and fighting abil- ity averted disaster. The Chiefs of Staff gave the impression that they still wanted to go back to El Alamein or Caen as a model: at any rate their council was not- ably confused and often plain wrong. As an example I recall advice from the Chiefs on 6 November that another week was needed to secure the Canal: on the return of our troops it was clear that 48 hours at most would have sufficed. Eden should have sacked the lot and especially the Minister of Defence. But Rhodes James is right: it was the stab in the back from Washington and not the protests of others, let alone the empty threats of the Russians, which de- cided the outcome. Looking back now at the situation the attitude of the US admi- nistration, and particularly President Eisenhower, seems extraordinary and in- explicable — so contrary was it to their true interests and even beliefs. While one may legitimately criticise the methods adopted and the military bungling it now seems beyond question that Eden's strategic thought was right. What great misery would have been avoided if indeed an effective cordon sanitaire had been built up between Egypt and Israel and free passage along the Canal guaranteed to all, including Israeli vessels. But those were the heady post-Korea, pre-Vietnam days when US power seemed limitless and Eisenhower saw himself as supreme com- mander of the western world. He was living in the past but still had the power to wound his allies. It is interesting incidental- ly to note that the balance of economic strength has altered so profoundly in 30 years that economic pressure from the USA on Britain at the time of the Falk- lands war would not have been effective even if exercised. It is also encouraging to see in the Falklands war a transformed and modernised British military capacity: at least some of the lessons of Suez have been taken to heart.
So far as the detail in the book goes, Rhodes James has inevitably made some errors but mostly of a minor character; he seems to me much too kind to William Clark who had quite lost the confidence of the Prime Minister months before Suez following disloyal and indiscreet remarks at a dinner party which Peter Fleming reported in his Spectator column. Rhodes James is however totally correct in stressing how literally vital to Anthony was Clarissa's love and devotion. Inexperienced in, and not greatly enjoying, political life her touch was not always sensitive during the premier- ship but without her Eden would not have survived then nor lived to enjoy his long retirement.
When Eden resigned and he and Clarissa went to Chequers it was my sad duty to go with them. At dinner that night Anthony several times asked me if I felt that he had been unfair to Butler in not recommending him as his successor to the Queen. It was typical of his generous spirit to be con- cerned about this at such a moment in his life. No wonder that Rhodes James writes that at Eden's resignation tears were shed by many especially among those who had worked for him. Mine were certainly not among the dry eyes.
Sir Philip de Zulueta was private secretary to Anthony Eden 1955-56.
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