IRELAND
My solution for Ulster
JOHN VAIZEY
Northern Ireland has ceased to work. Twelve thousand soldiers, internment, thuggery, looting and burning and no conceivable end to it. Everybody, overtly or covertly, agrees that a 'political ' solution is necessary. It is the purpose of this article to spell out the ingredients of a solution. It embodies the essential ingredients. I am not such a fool as to imagine that the process by which they will be combined can be foretold. Chance will play its usual crucial part.
The first point is that all responsible Irishmen are now of the opinion that Irish reunification on the basis of a simple incorporation of the North into the South is neither desirable nor possible. This is a radical shift of opinion. The 1922 civil war, the 1937 Constitution, neutrality in 1939, and refusal to join NATO are all directly attributable to allegiance to the doctrine of incorporation. The IRA, both wings, and some other small groups still remain loyal to the notion of a unified Ireland, in the sense of a Gaelic-speaking Replublic. The other parties now no longer believe this is possible or desirable, though it is necessary to remember that they still feel longings in that direction. It has to be recalled that the IRA owes its present origin to an attempt to overthrow the Dublin government, that Mr De Valera was active in that attempt and that the IRA's main objective, still, especially since he ratted on them, is the overthrow of the Dublin regime.
The next point is that the notion of a self-governing Northern Ireland, as a part of the United Kingdom, as it existed between 1922 and 1968, is dead. The present White Paper issued by Stormont, listing the reforms since then, is an indication of just what things were like before 1968; and the reforms since 1969 have been largely dictated by Whitehall, changing the original notion of local selfrule. Further, peace and order is being kept, insofar as it is being kept at all, by the United Kingdom army which is only partly answerable to orders from the Northern Irish government. My own view is that the army deserves tremendous praise for the way that it has handled itself over the past two years. I also happen to share the view that the present exceptional powers, including internment, intolerable elsewhere in the United Kingdom, are essential if the situation is not to deteriorate further. But it would also seem reasonable to take the view that it will not be possible to keep order in Northern Ireland for much longer than the life of the present Parliament by present methods. In the first place, it seriously reduces the effectiveness of the army elsewhere, and will eventually affect its morale: taking sides in a civil war is not a desirable form of long-term training.. In the second place, if the next Parliament were to have a Labour majority, the situation would be immediately untenable. Therefore, in the run-up to the election, some serious political step will have to be taken, even if only because people will expect that Labour might win and officials are bound to take cognisance of that fact. ' Direct rule ' is sooner or later most probable. But it is merely a stage to a final solution because, again, it is inconceivable that Westminster could run 'Northern Ireland directly for any extended period without a full constitutional settlement. My argument is directed towards seeking the elements of such a settlement. It begins from a premise about the constitution, for it is this that is the central issue.
The United Kingdom constitution is a mixture of practices, statutes and treaties, and Northern Ireland's part in it has shifted in many ways over the past sixty years. In particular, Northern Ireland is virtually totally dependent for internal security on UK troops, and for internal prosperity on UK subsidies. There is a pledge, in the 1949 Act, not to change Northern Ireland's constitutional position in the United Kingdom without the agreement of the Stormont parliament. It will be readily understood that, in the context of a continually evolving and changing UK constitution, this pledge is not wholly unambiguous. Nevertheless, to make the changes proposed below will require the consent, reluctant or enthusiastic, of the Unionist majority. Three weapons exist to gain this consent, as well as the usual arts of reasonable persuasion. Above all, peace must be the overwhelming desire of many. The three weapons are the fact that the UK army not only defends the border against external attack, but acts as a Northern Irish police force. There is the fact that the UK pays a large subsidy to Northern Ireland. And, lastly, there is the fact that the Ireland Act, 1949, like all Acts, •is amendable and revokable, because no Parliament can bind its successors. The pledge in the 1949 Act was explicit; but implicit also was the reasonable expectation of reasonable conditions in Northern Ireland. But, in fact, the revocation of the 1949 pledge is not necessary to achieve the aims proposed here.
What, then, are the elements of the package? The first, I think, is to realise that Stormont does not have the status of a true Parliament but that of an assembly : Stormont is not a sovereign body, like an American State. It is a legal construct, by the UK Parliament, like a county council. It has always been anomalous that the powers of Stormont over civil liberties should be so much greater than those of the GLC.
Above all, powers of detention and policing must be removed from Stormont. If Stormont were seen to be what it is, 'merely' a regional body, rather than a Parliament, it could conduct its affairs through committees on which all elected opinion would sit and the Ministers, now tempted to strut about like real Ministers of a sovereign state, would be revealed as what they are, local authority chairmen. This is an honourable estate, but not one that usually leads to delusions of grandeur. It would be necessary, too, to adopt the policy common to many local authorities,. of a majority party member as chairman and a minority party member as vicechairman of committees.
Next, powers of policing, and 'other powers such as internment, should be vested in the Governor, who should be directly responsible to the Home Secretary. The precedent for this is that the Metropolitan Police, paid for by a rate' levied in London, are responsible not to County Hall but to the Home Secretary. A' police authority representing both communities already exists. It need merely report direct to the Governor. The Governor would need to be a man or woman of judgement and responsibility Such are to be found; even in Ireland.
There are several less major initiatives that might contribute to the easing of tension. One is the introduction of proportional representation in local elections. Another is the amendment of the Irish constitution so that it was less overtly Roman Catholic, though whether the Orangemen really lust for unrestricted divorce, abortion and pornography is open to doubt. Northern Ireland is also underrepresented, on a basis of population, in the United Kingdom Parliament. This may have to be tackled.
But there is one key factor to the proposed package and this is the most important part of the idea. An advance needs to be made in the field of citizenship. Two-thirds, at least, of the people of Northern Ireland regard themselves as United Kingdom citizens and are determined to remain such, so long, at least, as that status does not involve, say, compulsory submission to Rome (not the Treaty — the Pope). One-third of tne population are United Kingdom citizens but wish they were not, except, perhaps. on pension day. Repeatedly, since the early nineteenth century, they have voted for Home Rule, Sinn Fein, or Nationalism. Now, Anglo-Irish relations are very complex purely because for seven centuries both countries have been mutually involved, not only by conquest, but by migration, and by cultural, political and economic ties. This mutual complexity has been recognised by the present peculiar legal situation that to all intents and purposes an Irishman arriving in England is a British subject, and has the right to vote, and that there are no immigration formalities at either end of the journey. Many Irishmen carry two passports though, strictly speaking, that is illegal. My proposal is that anybody in Northern Ireland should be entitled to both United Kingdom and Irish citizenship.
This may seem a proposal shot through with anomalies. (It might be, Mr instance, that some MPs would wish to sit in the Dail in Dublin, while the majority would sit at Westminster. Is it entirely beyond the wit of man to devise some system that would enable this to happen?) Would it not be possible for the Dublin government to have an official representative in the North, to represent its citizens, perhaps as Deputy Governor? In the context of the Rome Treaty, and other major constitutional developments, surely some complex but satisfactory solution can be achieved to the Irish problem?
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