A letter, addressed within these few days, by a shrewd
observer of men and politics, to a friend at a distance, contains some remarks on the pre- sent state of parties in England, which we are permitted to publish.
"The public news about the date of my last will have led you to think it possible that the crisis would end in some Whig-Peelite coalition. But that was really impossible at the time. The Papal Aggression measure would have stood in the way, even if Lord John had been willing to make room for an energetic Premier : too many Liberals were committed to some legislation against the Pope ; and all the leading Peelites had taken their line against any penal legislation. But, moreover, Lord John (I think we may now say confidently) never intended to retire altogether, but only made a party move in resigning, with the view of whipping the Advanced Liberals' into sub- ordination, and perhaps of bothering Stanley by forcing him to exhibit the utter official weakness of his party. If it was a manceuvre, its object has been partially attained : for when Stanley could not induce one Peelite to join the Country Party, there was an end of his attempt to form a present- able Ministry ; and of course the old set stepped again into their places, the Duke of Wellington being made use of at the Palace to advise that only pos- sible course.
"However, the 'as you were' is far from being perfect. It is the old order of things considerably deteriorated as respects the objects and means of government. The Whig majority is weaker than before the shock ; more than ever a Government without a sufficient party and without a policy, but still preserved by the more complete want of a policy in both the Stanley and Peelite sections. As before, we have neither a Government nor an Op-
• sition in the proper constitutional sense of the words ; but there is this
erence—that we are more completely and more conspicuously than ever without either Government or Opposition. It was bad enough before, but it is now worse in precisely the same direction. I see no alteration, except that the peculiar evils of our state of politics since 1846 have been aggra- vated.
"You will recollect that I have thought for years that no remedy would be found for this strange and deplorable state of things until the Pro- tectionists should have had their turn in office. Common opinion seems to think that we shall soon have a pure Stanley Ministry. The notion is, that the extreme weakness of the Russell Ministry places them at Stanley's mercy ; that he may turn them out by some very hostile vote whenever he pleases ; and that he is only waiting to take this step until they shall have disposed of all the matters the disposal of which might puzzle him in the present House of Commons. The common ex- pectation, therefore, is, that as soon as the business of the session shall be pretty well done, the Stanleyites will assault the Min' istry in earnest, com- pel them to retire once more, and come into power with a view to an imme- diate general election on the cry of Protection and Protestantism.' You will see by the enclosed that * * • ** * • deems this the probable course of events, and thinks it possible that Stanley may obtain a House of Com- mons majority. I doubt. I cannot bring myself to believe that Stanley will ever take the office of Prime Minister. To be sure, all public in- dications are against my view, which is mainly founded on an opinion that Stanley hates work and fears responsibility so much as to be inca- pable of undertaking a task of excessive labour and responsibility : for let us mark further, that he would not have a single colleague fit to share with him the troubles of governing. It is difficult to conceive a Premiership more onerous than his would be. I cannot suppose him in it for a month without violent illness in the form of gout ; and my im- pression is, that his natural timidity and habitual incapacity for real work, being well known to himself, will lead him to disappoint his party, by al- ways finding some excuse for declining to form a Ministry. He will make a great show of intending to bring his party into power, and may be for a long while on the verge of the plunge : but the plunge he will not take, in my humble opinion, if he can by any means avoid it. His actual position of proximate Premier exactly suds his character : it has all the show and flash, and just that amount of excitement, in which he delights ; but real Premier- ship would kill him, or at any rate overwhelm him with trouble and anxiety. He is very clever, very adroit, very plausible, let us say very skilful, at playing a jockeying game ; and I cannot help thinking it probable that he will successfully play the game of only pretending to the office of Prime Minister.
"This belief is in complete opposition to my wishes. I long to see the Stanley party in power, as a means or step towards the formation of a new Liberal Conservative party which might furnish a real and good Government. You will soon have your wish,' says one, 'Stanley will be in at the close of the session' : to which I answer, 'Why did he not keep in when he had got in ? ' The reply is, 'He could not have kept in without a dissolution' : and my rejoinder says, Why did he not take a dissolution when it was of- fered to him ? His party has been stunning us for two years about what they would do with a general election. Perhaps they cannot get one now ; why did not Stanley take it when he could ? He was afraid ; and he will be afraid to the end of the chapter.' Another says, 'His cry was not ready : wait till the autumn, and then you will see Protection and Protestantism win a majority.' I answer, 'Nonsense : the Merchant Tailors' dinner was got up as a grand occasion for letting Stanley raise his cry; and was it not a miserable squeak, a most unsubstantial sigh ? He had his opportunity, has missed it, and will never have another. Nor, if he had another, would he make use of it : he has neither cry, nor policy, nor cause, nor purpose, save only the purpose of continuing as long as may be to enjoy the brilliant posi- tion and capital fun of heading a great sham which involves neither trouble nor anxiety.' "So, according to this theory, all the shams of the last four veers are re- vived,—the Whig sham of doing battle for Free Trade, which 'is not in the slightest danger; the Stanley sham of fighting for Protection, which is dead and gone ; the Radical sham of supporting the Whigs against impossible reaction, and pursuing a Liberal policy which has no definite existence; and the Peelite sham of abstinence from damaging the Government by a rival policy, when in truth there is no such policy, nor any policy, in the mind of any one of the adherents of the dead statesman, who, with all their official and debating ability, appear to be as destitute of grasp and self-reliance as Russell or Stanley. How long it may all last, who /shall venture to guess ? In what manner it may break up, would be still more difficult to conjecture. But I think one should be safe in saying that it is degrading all authority and undermining many institutions, and in predicting that the result will be a storm of the destructive kind. Without attempting to look so far forward,
I only stick to my doctrine of Stanley's insuperable love of ease and fear of responsibility, together with his admirable skill in pretending to his party that he means to bring them into power."
Previous page
