BOOKS.
MARIOTTI'S ITALY IN 1848.* SIGNOR 11.1.niorri is well known to the public as an Italian patriot of considerable acquirements, enlarged and philosophic views, and a familiar acquaintance with the English language rarely attained by foreigners. When the expulsion of the Austrians from Milan and the extemporized war of Charles Albert made many Italians think that the " barbarians" would be only too easily " driven be- yond the Alps," Merlotti, like other exiles, made his way to Lom- bardy, and joined the forces under the nominal command of his Sardinian Majesty. What were his own experience and deeds Signor Mariotti does not tell, nor indeed give any narrative of affairs from direct personal observation. But he has written a critical and philosophical account of the war in Lombardy, from the first outbreak in Milan until the capitulation of the city to Radetzky, after the series of disasters and defeats which drove Charles Albert back into his own dominions : in this account the result of personal observation is everywhere visible, as well as a close study of the past history and present condition of Italy. Although Merlotti waives all claim to a professional knowledge of military matters, yet his narrative of the war gives a more satisfying account to a general reader than histories which have emanated from military men. The mind is not encumbered with confusing details; the general results alone being presented. A more prominent place is given to economical and moral influences than mere soldiers can always appreciate. The political causes operating upon Charles Albert's position and actions—as foreign diplomacy and European opinion, the bigotry and weakness of the Pope, and the equal bigotry of Young Italy in another way—are fully taken into consideration. Finally, the whole subject is ex- amined with reference to the Italian character, feeling, and conduct ; the probabilities of success are estimated from the outset as regards the nature of the circumstances as they ac- tually were, or turned out without power of remedy, at least on the part of Charles Albert and the men who were engaged with him. The critic, judging after the event, seems to think that suc- cess, under the given circumstances, was hopeless from the be- ginning. In a strictly military point of view, this conclusion is scarcely supported by the facts. The errors of Charles Albert were innumerable,—errors of strategy, errors of tactics, indecision, vacillation, delays when the enemy was repulsed, and might pos- sibly have been cut off from his base by a bold pursuit, as he would certainly have been weakened. Yet, after all, the rent of the Piedmontese and the thorough triumph of the Austrians was ow- ing to non-military causes. The victory was hardly won, the pur- suit cautious and often checked ; but the Piedmontese were physically beaten, worn down by exposure to summer heats, malaria, and bad living ; brought into action after insufficient food, and starved in the retreat to Milan. These, no doubt, were military causes in a certain sense. Half a century ago, General Wellesley, in a criticism upon Monson's retreat, arrived at the conclusion, that the first thing we should consider in any military operation is how to feed the army. But deficient food was a cause that the patriotism of the people and of men of business should have contrived to re- move : they could not fulfil the actual duties of the commissariat, but they could have furnished the commissariat with supplies. Even had the army been well fed and gained a battle, the ex- pulsion of the " barbarians " would not have been so easy, with Mantua, Verona, and the Alps to fall back upon : the repulse of Rad.etzky at Somme Campagna would have prolonged the war, not have decided it. It seems clear from Mariotti's narrative, that there was neither unity, self-denial, sustained will, business habits, nor patriotism, to support this war—not in Italy, for Rome and Naples were out of the question, but in the states most immediately concerned, Lombardy and the Venetian provinces. And in this point of view, he is quite right in his conclusion, that success from the outset was impossible. The disunion and vanity of the Italians rendered combined and earnest action impossible; their inflated ideas of the successful outbreak at Milan disposed them to despise their enemy ; Italian pride and a more respectable feeling of nationality would have called forth an universal burst of indignation at any attempt to negotiate on a frontier short of the whole of Italy, and have rendered future government by Charles Albert impossible. Of Mariotti's patriotism no doubt can be entertained ; but a sterner censure on the Italians, a more hopeless view of their early future, has not appeared. There is no temper, no disposition to attack ; all, on the contrary, is calm, stern, and truthful-looking; but every statement, every argument, even when the most seem- ingly remote from the subject, points to this conclusion, that the day for Italian nationality is far distant. Externally there is no prospect. England will not interfere ; France cannot be trusted if she would, which is doubtful—except under Red Republicans, whose presence would be worse than that of the Austrians ; Germany, nay Hungary, and the Sclavonic provinces, have shown themselves ready to back Austria. in subduing Italy ; and Germany, at all events, would do so again. Internally there is no hope. Naples is subdued—subdued through the rashness of her own so-called patriots ; Rome is kept down by foreign bayonets ; Lombardy and "Venice are again under the yoke. Combined Eu- rope would not allow an attempt to change this state of things at the risk of a war that might become general. From Mariotti's de- scription of the ardent Republicans of the Mazzini school, or the " moderate " patriots of the upper and respectable classes—or the • Italy in 1848. By L. Mariotti. Published by Chapman and IlalL doings of the various kinds of volunteers who embarked or professed to embark in the war, and the stolid or treacherous conduct of the peasantry—there are no means of attempting an Italian insurrec- tion, even if Europe would permit it. There may be in Mariotti's views somewhat of the " rational " as opposed to the " exalted " patriot; and his arguments against Mazzmi, courteous and re- spectful as they are, show that their political views are irrecon- &cable ; but there is a soundness an apparent truth in Mariotti's critical narrative, which gives confidence not so much in his con- clusions as in those which the reader is compelled to draw. It is this depth and largeness of view, this presentation of the whole philosophy of the subject, as well as of its facts, that forms the distinguishing characteristic of Italy in 1848. Other writers may have produced a fuller and completer narrative of parts of the action ; it might not be difficult perhaps to give a better historical account of the revolutions and wars in Italy during that eventful year ; but it requires the grasp and subtilty of the Italian intel- lect to exhibit so thoroughly both the facts and the philosophy.
At the same time, this philosophy may be pushed to an imprac- ticable extent, even when it is sound in theory. Mariotti's idea is, that to succeed in an Italian war of nationality, everything must be put to issue ; that the common laws of war, and even the common feelings of humanity, must sometimes be suspended ; in short, in the words of the Terrorist, "Revolutions are not made with rose-water." These are his remarks on Durando's capitula- tion at Vicenza, the first of those series of triumphs that dis- tinguished Radetzky's arms.
"We have equally examined the reasons urged in exculpation of his im- prudence in suffering himself to be shut up in Vicenza. If we acquit him of that error, we must still rate him severely for his unwillingness to com- mit the town to a resistance a l'outrance. All military- authorities agree that a renewal of the fight on the 11th would have been an act of the most wanton cruelty. A few hours' bombardment would have reduced the city— the city of Palladio—into a heap of ashes. Upon the burning ruins the gar- rison and the people would mercilessly have been put to the sword. Mate- rially the very few hours that it would have cost Radetzky to take Vicenza by storm would not have affected the sequel of the campaign ; but the moral effect of that terrible execution would have passed all calculation. It was the demolition of Milan under Barbarossa, in 1162, and nothing else, that brought forth the victory of Leg,nano fourteen years later and several cen- turies of vigorous independent existence for Italy. That country, we are firmly convinced, can be redeemed at no other price than blood—blood, shed wisely and sparingly if circumstances admit of it, but in torrents also and with utter recklessness if necessity require it. Udine Belluno, and Feltre, had already given too glaring a scandal by their dastardly submission ; but Vicenza was large enough and had combatants in sufficient number to make amends for it. It was good for Italy that Vicenza should cease to be. If its buildings and helpless population pleaded irresistibly to the hearts of the defenders, then a thousand ways for an honourable death awaited these latter outside the walls. Many were willing to bear witness to their coun- try's cause with their blood; and we cannot thank Durando for hindering them. Wo to him who teaches a revolutionized nation that there are two issues to an engagement! A national war is no game of chess : strategic combinations may aid its success, but are not to interfere with its reverses. Where the soldier is allowed to suike Ms colours, th.c 1.4-„taiot is bidden to die.
"Are we told that these exaggerated notions of a citizen's duty are no
longer suitable to our refined and humanized age ? We might refer to Saragossa and Moscow for a different conclusion; but we limit ourselves to this assertion merely, that out of the strictest rules of oldfashioned heroism there is no possible resurrection for Italy. The capitulation of Vicenza established a fatal precedent, of which Milan was too eager to avail itself a few months later ; and if the Italians better learned how to stand on their city bastions at Brescia, Bologna, Messina, or Rome' it was only when the great national game was irreparably lost, and when their sacrifice could only remain as a glorious warning to future generations."
In such an irregular appeal to opinion by a military foreigner, he ought to be quite sure of the opinion he is appealing to. °It is by no means clear that the " moral effect of that terrible execution might not have " passed " Mariotti's " calculation " ; that Europe probably, that Italy certainly, would have exlaimed more against Durando than Radetzky. Such sacrifices, to tell, must be spon- taneous. That the generality of the Italians would not originate or even appreciate such devotion may be guessed from the charac- ter of many of those who thronged to the war, which they thought was to be a triumph. "Assuredly, no proper organization of the Italian volunteers was over at- tempted, unless it be perhaps in later times in Venice and Rome. The very virtues of the most earnest and generous were turned to account by base ad- venturers and intriguers. The titles and offices that deserving modesty dreaded to accept fell to the lot of unblushing pretension. The appointment of officers on the principle of popular election submitted the honest patriot to the command of the unprincipled demagogue. Nothing more blind than the faveuritism of the multitude. The Italian legions were under the con- trol of men that could inspire no confidence ; hence their endless insubordi- nation, jealousy, and suspiciousness. "We are not willing to give credit to the most sinister rumours that cir- culated at the time to the disparagement of the worst class of these patriot soldiers, though we can vouch for the belief which was then pretty generally added to them, that the band of Ton-es was dissolved because 'his comrades accused him of having made a peculation on their ray ' ; that some of the Neapolitan volunteers, and nominally of those who had come with the Prin- cess Belgiojoso, were guilty of personal violence upon some Tyrolese women : we repeat, the worst of these reports might be entirely unfounded, or at any rate grossly exaggerated ; but coupled with the undeniable indiscipline of the free corps, and their unnecessary exposure to want and danger, they contributed to deter the best men from the volunteer service ; and instead of undergoing a thorough sifting and winnowing, the free corps fell every day into a more deplorable state of disorder and corruption, and lost more and more of their efficiency. "We repeat it distinctly, no country, not excepting even the North Ame- ricans of George Washington, ever supplied finer elements for a national army than Italy did by the volunteers that crowded, or would have crowded, under her standards on the first appeal of 1848. But the good elements were suffered to go to waste, and the bad ones, as a necessary consequence, in- creased even to luxuriancy. Needy adventurers from every quarter flocked to Lombardy, and even more to Venice, attracted by the extravagantly libe- ral pay that the country awarded to its chivalrous defenders. The volunteer received thrice the soldier's wages; no limit to his exactions, if the peasantry were not already too eager to anticipate his m ishes and supply his demands. Petty officers, who should have been shot for quitting the camp without leave, insisted upon travelling post at the expense of the communes, as if they had been princes or ambassadors, often under pretence of being bearers of de- spatches. Nothing more ruinous, nothing more insane, in short, than this volunteer warfare—such, at least, as it was practised in Italy : it only pro- duced a lot of soldiers who expected to reap all the benefit and the honour of the campaign with hardly any of its hardships or dangers. Most of these men evidently defined a volunteer to be a man who was allowed to follow no rule but his own will; whereas the efficiency of such a service depends en- tirely on his renunciation of it."
The soldiers trained by the Austrians were not better, even in a military sense, when they had left their masters.
"Deprived of the German officers, who alone could command them, freed from the terror of the lash—the hazel-stick—which is the real staff of Aus- trian discipline, it was found impossible to bring these otherwise excellent soldiers to any rule. The Italian peasantry, from which, agreeably to a cor- rupt law of conscription, these troops were almost exclusively recruited, arc by nature abhorrent from military service, and can only be made soldiers either by education or compulsion. Under the sway of good officers, the Ceccopien and Zanini infantry, and the Kress cheraux-kters, fought with signal- bravery, both at Vienna and in Hungary—they little cared whether for or against Austria. Jellachich used to take off his hat when he passed the latter-named troopers—all recruits from the Venetian provinces—greeting them as the main instruments in saving the monarchy. General Klapka is no less prodigal of his praises to the Lombard grenadiers that served under his orders. Na)', more—in Italy itself, at the very time that the deserters of Cremona and Venice were disbanded, as worse than useless to the cause of Italy, Radetzky was still using the Italian soldiers of the Taxis regiment with good effect at Castehmvo (April 12), and received them victorious at Verona, loud in their acclamations to the officers who had led them to the slaughter of their own countrymen, and vowing to follow them wherever they might lead. Nay, more—sixty- of these recreants, who had deserted and joined the insurgents at Lasize, by a double treason turned against these latter at Castelnovo, fired their muskets at them, and once more passed over to the Austrians.
"But under Italian commanders, and for the sake of their country, it was found extremely difficult to bring a single battalion of these men on the battle- field, and when actually' brought there, impossible to obtain from them a nianly and steady behaviour."
Such and similar were the internal causes of ill success. Among the external, was the popular determination in Germany, as well as throughout the Austrian dominions.
"The panic of Austria was of no long duration. It was only for one day that the fortunes of the house of Habsburg were despaired of. The despatches of Lord Ponsonby, during the whole of that eventful April, give us a distinct idea of the state of the Austrian capital, no less than of its provinces. The indig- nation of the Viennese at the presumption of their despised Lombard vassals far exceeded their fears. There may have been titubation in the council, but there was none amongst the people. Volunteers in great numbers hast- ened to swell the ranks of Nugent : Styria mustered up under the old stand- ard of 'good' Archduke John. Tyrol, German Tyrol, appealed to the names of Andreas Hofer, and salted loudly to Germany for 'powder and load.' The Italian portion of that province, we have seen, was either awed into silence by superior forces, or wearied with the exigencies; and in some instances insolence, rapacity, and violence, of their Swiss and Lombard deliverers. Hungary and Croatia, then not yet at war between them, rivalled each other in their display of loyal devotion. They would suffer no constitutional innovation to interfere with the interests of the dynasty and the integrity of the monarchy. Austria could also count on her own Crusa- ders. The very ferment of men's minds throughout the empire redoubled her energies, and brought forth unexpected resources. "Behind Austria, Germany also ranged itself. The German press was loud in its denunciation of Italian high treason and Sardinian treachery : it was preparing the mind of the nation for that Frankfort Assembly, so eager in the vindication of its claims of nationality against the weak, so overbearing in its pretensions against Holland and Denmark, and yet so haughty and scornful in its rejection of the humble petition of the members for South Tyrol, pleading their ties of tongue and race, and insisting upon their rights of withdrawing from the Teutonic confederacy ; the Frankfort Assembly, whose first act was the election of an Austrian Prince to the rank of repre- sentative of the German enipire—whose first resolutions were an identifi- cation of German with Austrian interests—whose first definition of its terri- torial limits was a gross encroachment on Italian lands, even to the Adige and Mincio!"
France had rather an indirect than a direct influence on the af- fairs of Italy ; less by what she did than by what both parties feared she might do. Her national policy and character are both subjected to severe examination. Here is an example.
"In a normal state, no people lends itself more easily, more passively, more unconditionally, to its leaders, than the French : it is the flock' par excellence. Its old system of centralization, its compact bureaucracy, its long habit to the yoke, as first laid on its neck by all the Louises, from the Eleventh to the Fourteenth, improved by Napoleon, perfected by Louis Philippe, had long since rendered the nation, as a mass, incapable of legal and system- atic opposition. It is of: little use to try every year new experiments of one or two Chambers, of larger and smaller Assemblies. The executive will al- ways be despotic in France : no medium there between passive servitude and violent resistance. The man in power is always omnipotent, till suddenly struck with utter impotence. There is no decline, no oscillation' but only sudden downfall of authority. A French King or President rules by a pres- tige analogous to the sway exercised by a sorcerer over the dmmon to whom he has bartered his soul. Bo i long as the bond holds good, the whole of na- ture made to bend to his sovereign will. But the hour strikes: the chains of fate are broken asunder. It is the familiar's turn now, and most unmer- cifully will he use his advantage. "Revolution in France is always short, unless fomented by foreign threat or intrigue. The French are always eager for a master—a hero, if it is to be found ; if not, the most obscure or contemptible man will always equally do. Power will transform and rehabilitate him. The King can do no harm. The National storms ; the Chanirari sneers ; but the people bow down and revere. The throne is the Pythoness's tripod : hence all happy inspirations. Its occupier is always the 'Napoleon either of war or peace' ; if not the Achilles, then the Ulysses of the Since Louis XIV, France has in- variably had a grand monarque at its 'head: this from no feeling of loyalty, but from base grovelling servility. The throne is no less sure to give way suddenly, unexpectedly, almost always undeservedly, at the wrongest pos- sible moment; and then, sec how mercilessly it is dragged in the mud, how wantonly assailed with the grossest contumely. "In May and June 1848, France 'had found a master: Cavaignac was brave and determined : he drove far worse men' from the place that was awarded to him. He deserved the homage of the nation. Hence had he in
his turn to make way for something less than a man, for a mere thing—the 'shade of a great name ' ; that nephew of his. uncle' that had so often called down upon him the inextinguishable laughter of the gods, by his Strasburg exploits, by the tame eagle of Boulogne. Cavaig,nac's thinness and capacity were hardly needed. Nothing easier in France than to put down a revolution and disavow it, when the French are tired of it."
The views we have deduced from Mariotti's book he might probably demur to ; and, no doubt, passages could be quoted that would seem to lead to an opposite opinion. We have hinted atsome of this seeming inconsistency, in the account of his views touching the necessary failure of the insurrection and Charles Albert's war, and intimated the doubtful character of his logic in his remarks on Vicenza. In like manner, passages could be quoted strongly in favour of the volunteers ; and so on upon almost every subject that he handles. This apparent contradiction, however, is not incon- sistency, but the sternly impartial presentation of both sides of a subject without the care to make one side decidedly predominate in the reader's mind. Indifference to Italy no one can suppose that Mariotti entertains ; his hope for her regeneration is a faith : but such feelings do not blind him to the difficulties of her task, to the impracticability of some of her sons, and to the unworthiness of others. At the same time, a critical impartiality, and the ne- cessity of describing one thing at a time, may seem to give un- certainty to his conclusions.
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