TOPICS OF THE DAY.
THE MILITARY UNITY OF THE ALLIES.
WE should be faithless to all the teaching of history if we hesitated to believe the assurance of General Joffre that victory is certain for the Allies. Since the early days of the war the Central Powers have been besieged, and the command of the seas has belonged to the besiegers. There is no example in history of victory being withheld from an army of besiegers who enjoyed the command of the sea. Of course there was always the possibility that Germany would so enlarge her borders during the temporary weakness of the Allies that she would have an enormous new area to draw upon for food and supplies of every kind, and that in this way she would possess the means to support herself almost indefinitely. If this had happened, she would not indeed have ceased to be besieged, but her perimeter would have been so vast—a world in itself—that she might have seen exhaustion visit the Allies before she was exhausted heiseif. Whatever danger there was in that direction has long since passed •away. The besiegers are not only enveloping a perimeter of manageable length in spite of its great size, but are everywhere battering, weakening, and reducing it. Nothing but an inconceivable split in the Entente, or some unimaginable military blundering on our part, can save Germany from defeat. As General Joffre said to some American correspondents a few days ago, this certainty of victory is the result of the unity of the Allies. No movement is made by any one of them without its having been carefully planned to fit in with the movements of other Armies else- where. The unity of the Allies is to be seen in inaction, where inaction serves a purpose, as well as in action. Take the inaction of the Russians, for example, when Austrian troops were being recklessly withdrawn on the Eastern Front in order to teach the Italians a lesson " in the Trentino. No one can doubt that the Russians saw the weakening of the Austrian line opposite them. Excited pessimists would have asked, had they known the facts, what on earth the Russians were doing not to attack a visibly weakening enemy. But the Russians knew very well what they were about, and so did the " Unity of Control " which directs all the Allies' strategy. The Russians waited. The Italians were quite strong enough to take care of themselves, though they at first gave ground which it had never been part of their original intention to defend. Now we see the fruits of this deliberate and far-seeing restraint. The Austrians were allowed to become the victims of their own folly, since they would have it so. The way was open for the series of smashing Russian successes at the most profitable moment, and the Italians, after watching the Austrians spend their effort, have dealt them by far the heaviest blow that has been given or taken on either side on the Austro-Italian frontier. It was the same story over again that we had seen in the galling but most fruitful inaction of the British during the first weeks of the storm at Verdun. If British troops had rushed to the rescue of Verdun, the whole scheme of the Allies' strategy would have been upset. What is so impressive in incidents of this kind is the coolness and the long sight of the directing heads who preside over our fortunes. Indeed, there is not much sign or danger of military blundering now. Strategists who habitually bide their time, and sustain intermediate shocks of great violence with patience and confidence, in order to save their thrusts for the most favourable moment, are indeed worthy of the highest confidence. There is no more searching test by which they can be judged.
In our opinion, the Government should be freely given their share of the credit for this military unity among the Allies, of which we are now just beginning to reap the full-eared harvest. The Government have worked for it. They have never dis- played any kind of obstructive jealousy. Both at home and abroad their policy has been one. It is true that there were no signs of unity in the highly detached movements of the Allies in the earlier part of the war. It may be that unity had to be a thing of gradual growth which was conditioned by an ascending mutual trust. Or again it may be that a more dogmatic and assertive British Prime Minister could have taken the leadership among a party of friends and procured strategical unity very much sooner. However that may be, wo are on safe ground in saying that Mr. Asquith has had throughout the sovereign merit of trusting those at home whom he had appointed as worthy of trust, and of never with- holding his confidence from the leaders of the Allies abroad. He trusted Lord Kitchener ; he trusts Sir William Robertson; - he implicitly trusts General Joffre, as he has proved several times. The creation of the New Armies received nothing but unquestioning support from him, though we do not doubt that if he listened to current military opinion he must have been warned many times that Lord Kitchener was about to lose the Empire while pursuing an impossible ideal. One would think, to hear some people talk, and to read what other people write, that the failure at the Dardanelles (the author of which has disappeared from the Government) and the tragedy of Mesopotamia had prohibited all sensible men from ever listening to the Government again. These persons forget that war is a history of mistakes. Not, of course, that mistakes should be carelessly and light-heartedly condoned; but we are entitled, in judging our own Government,' t000mpare their mistakes with those of Germany. The Lerman mistakes have been not only numerous but fatal. Here is .a short list, to which additions could easily be made :—(I) Germany miscalculated altogether the difficulties of rushing upon Paris and forcing France to a separate peace before Russia •and Britain could get ready. (2) She blundered strategically when she advanced precipitately to the Marne, leaving General Castelnau and the unbeaten fortress troops of the French eastern frontier in her rear. (3) She miscalculated the amount of ammunition she would need and ran short in the autumn of 1914. (4) She _failed to see that if she did not break through at Ypres in 1914 or early in 1915 her chance would be gone for ever, and she did not make an effort as violent as she has since made at Verdun. (5) She neglected to enter Warsaw in the autumn of 1914 when it was practically undefended. (6) She miscalculated the advantage of overrunning Russian Poland and the Baltic provinces, and utterly failed to force Russia to a separate peace. (7) She placed extravagant reliance upon the assistance of Turkey, and on the consequent policy of the road to Baghdad. (8) All over the world, in Egypt, in India, in Africa, she relied upon diplomatic intrigues which were abortive. (9) She blundered in her submarine policy, neglected the opinion of the United States, and was compelled to accept the humiliation of nominally abandoning her methods. (10) She has deceived her own people, and now is forced to continue such expensive and unproductive enterprises as the attack upon Verdun in order to impress public opinion at home. . . . Would a Government guilty of similar mistakes be allowed to continue in power here ? All these mistakes have been committed although military unity has marked the action of the Central Powers from the first moment of the war. There could never be any doubt about unity in their case, since Germany simply issued the command and Austria subserviently obeyed.
It is an interesting speculation how the effects of the military unity of the Allies will first appear in a pronounced form. Where will the break come ? Something must happen, for Germany can no longer rush troops with impunity to various points in turn as they are threatened. The feature of our strategical unity is that the pressure of the besiegers is applied all round the circle simultaneously. Russia, Italy, France, and Britain are all engaged in an offensive. And that is not all. We are delighted to learn from messages from the Balkans that the Serbians are once again in the field, re- equipped, and in great spirits. We know what old scores those untiring and skilful soldiers have to work off, and we may be sure that they intend that the reckoning shall be paid. The " Middle-Europe " scheme which German philosophers support with much grandiose talk about the " " destiny of their country seems likely to shrivel back into the brains from which it emerged. On the-whole, we are inclined to think that the break will come in the collapse or declension of Austria, or of Turkey, or of Bulgaria. Austria has lost nearly three hundred and forty thousand prisoners within the past two months. It is impossible to suppose that she is not already weakened to an extent which brings a collapse within calculable distance. If one of Germany's allies were to fall away from sheer inability to continue the struggle, if not of her own volition, others would probably soon follow. The desire to desert a ship in grave peril is very infectious. :But while the rottenness of Austria and of Turkey spreads, we must admit that there is no visible sign of failing in the Germans. Their defence is as stubborn and as courageous as ever. There is no prospect of collapse -in the German Army in any rational sense of the word. It is a common expectation that before long the Germans will have to shorten their line. We do not think the shortening would help them very much, for a line from Antwerp along the Meuse is still a very long line. On the other hand, it is a very defensible line. We must prepare ourselves for many further tremendous struggles against the Germans, and for winning ground hi painful inches. Theywill fight at the last with the desperation proverbial ix those who defend their homes. Their rulers will not dare to yield. Morally, politically, militarily, they have burnt their boats. Whether in that desperate crisis the heart of the people will be found still beating in sympathy with, that of the Hohenzollern dynasty is one of the most intensely interesting secrets which the course of the future has ever kept from an expectant world. There may be a psychological reaction, not military in form or origin, but gradually communicable to the Army. Docility among the people, too long practised, may flare out in a surprising revulsion. Whatever happens, the end is certain. If British and French_ soldiers could take the labyrinthine system of fortified villages on; the Somme, they can eventually take anything. Our strength grows and German strength dwindles. Only unity was needed in the combined effort of the Allies, and that is being daily displayed to admiration.
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