LETTERS TO THE EDITOR.

THE RUSSO-AFGHAN CORRESPONDENCE. ere THE EDITOR 01' THE " SPEOTATOR.1

Srn,—It is a pity that this correspondence was not published when it was discovered. The events which occasioned it were then fresh in the public mind, and would have given it a com- plexion very different from that which it is likely to wear now to the eyes of those—the vast majority—who cannot supply from memory the necessary context. When we first heard of the correspondence in this country I published a letter in your columns on the subject, in which I ventured to make two asser- tions :—(1) That down to the period of our warlike prepara- tions against Russia the correspondence would be found to be quite innocent, and carried on with the knowledge and approval of our Government ; (2) that after that date the correspondence was irrelevant, because provoked by our hostile attitude towards Russia. I will now, with your permission, endeavour to sub- stantiate those two assertions :- 1. My first assertion is absolutely correct, for the earliest letter in the discovered correspondence is dated June, 1878.

2. The only question, therefore, is whether the conduct of the English Government and of English officials justified. the Russian Government and Russian officials in the steps which they took against us at Cabul P Let us begin with the conduct of our own Government.

In the Times of October 5th, 1878, there appeared a letter from Colonel Brackenbury, stating that General Skobeleff had told him, in the autumn of 1877, that the Russian Government had information that 10,000 men had been organised by the Indian Government " to raise Central Asia against" the Russians. The plan of this campaign was revealed in the semi-official Pioneer of Calcutta of August 28th, 1878. Its inspired Simla correspondent wrote as follows :—" I believe it is no longer a secret that, had war broken out, we should not have remained on the defensive in India. A force of 30,000 men, having purchased its way through Afghanistan, thrown rapidly into Samarcand and Bokhara, would have had little difficulty in beating the scattered Russian troops back to the Caspian ; for, coming thus as deliverers, the whole population would have risen in our favour. In the feasibility of such a programme the Russians fully believed." And " fully be- lieving " it, they took measures to counteract it, as we shall presently see. Meanwhile, let us follow the development of Lord Lytton's aggressive programme. Failing to persuade

Shore Ali, either by blandishments or by the threat of " wiping Afghanistan out of the map," to fall in with his plans, he determined to fasten a quarrel on him, He withdrew

the British Envoy from Cabul ; and the moment he heard that " a fresh Envoy was already on the way from Cabul to Pesha- war," with " authority to accept eventually all the conditions of the British Government" (it is Lord Lytton himself whom I am quoting), the Viceroy telegraphed to Sir Lewis Pelly to " close the conference." The Ameer, says Lord Lytton, " was much surprised and embarrassed by this step." He found himself, in fact, as the Duke of Argyll expressed it, effectually " boycotted " by the Indian Government.

Having broken off diplomatic relations with Shore Ali, Lord • Lytton sent two British officers—Captains Napier and Butler —to " incite," according to the formal complaint of the Russian Government, "the Turkoman tribes to hostilities against Russia." The Russian Government bad, indeed, obtained a copy of a letter from Captain Butler " to certain Turkoman chiefs." In the end of the year 1879 Captain Butler returned. to India, with the rank of major, from his sojourn of intrigue among the Turkomans. The result of his enterprise is thus described in the Bombay Gazette (see Times of January 3rd, 1879) :—

" It is reported that Major Butler, the Central-Asian explorer, who has just returned from Turkestan, has been so successful in his interviews with the Turkoman chiefs, that they are willing to co-operate with the British either against the Afghans or the Russians."

Further light is thrown upon this subject by a frank letter from Major Butler himself, written on the lst of this month, and published in the Globe of February 3rd. That letter gives an interesting account of the military plans of the Turkomans, and of their chances against the strategy of General Skobeleff. But the sentence to which I wish to direct special attention is the following:—" In this neighbourhood [i. c., Aslikabad and Anno], if the chiefs have followed out my plan of defence, will be made their second stand."

Here, then, we have a British officer, sojourning among the Turkomans long after the Treaty of Berlin, drawing up plans of campaign for them against Russia, and negotiating with them so successfully " that they are willing to co-operate with the British either against the Afghans or the Russians." Nor is this all. In the Nineteenth Century of August, 1879 —that is, more than a year after the Treaty of Berlin—there is an article from the pen of Sir Henry Rawlinson, in which that distinguished official says :—" Persia must be detached from Russia, wide quo co lt° She [Russia] must be made to understand, while there is yet time for her to modify her aggressive preparations, that she will not be permitted. un- opposed to establish herself in strength upon the Afghan frontier, either at Merv, or at Serakhs, or even at Abiverd." And if Russia should disregard our remonstrance, then Sir Henry Rawlinson would be "prepared, in self-defence, to sup- port the Turkomans—with whom she has no legitimate quarrel (1)—with arms and money, or even to turn the tables on her by encouraging the efforts of the Uzbegs to recover their liberty." The writer of this article, be it remembered, is a General officer in the British Army, and was when he wrote it, and is still, a member of the Council of the Secretary of State for India.

Let us now glance at the Russian side of the matter. Russia knew that the Indian Government was organising a most for- midable expedition against her in Turkestan, where Russia was at that time very weak. She knew that British officers were intriguing against her among the Turkomans, planning cam- paigns for them, and tempting them into an alliance against her. She had seen the British Parliament hurriedly preparing for war against her ; she had seen a British Fleet forcing the Dardanelles, in violation of an international treaty ; the Army Reserves called out, and Indian troops despatched to Malta. Is it surprising, under these circumstances, that the Russian Governor-General of Turkestan should take decisive steps to counteract our contemplated aggression ? It was a matter of life or death to Russian rule in Central Asia that Afghanistan should be closed against our troops. The Russian Mission was therefore sent to Cabal, to " define, one way or the other, either in an amicable or hostile sense," the relations between Shore Ali and the Government of the Czar. If Shore All refused the

Russian alliance, Abdul Ralunan was to be let loose upon him, .backed by a Russian army. If he accepted the Russian there was the imminent risk of a war with England. The wretched " pipkiu" was, iu fact, between the " two iron pots " with which Lord Lytton had threatened to crush him, and in his perplexity he tried to temporise. Ho kept the Russian Mis- sion for three weeks on the banks of the Oxus, and the official who allowed it at last to pass died suddenly,—poisoned, it is said, by order of the Amcor. When the Mission arrived at Cabal, informatiou reached Lord Lytton that the "Ameer would

like an English officer of excellence to come to Cabal for a few days

in the capacity of Envoy from the British Government, with whom he may personally discuss the proceedings which had passed be- tween him and the English Government within the last few years, when he would acknowledge, without any grudging, any blame which might be justly thrown on him," provided his overtures were met in a similar spirit. " His Highness says that a small territory, of which he is the ruler, lies between the dominions of two great Powers, and that, as a matter of policy, he will in- cline himself towards the party whose alliance would be most 'beneficial to him. It is said that the Ameer is now in groat anxiety, on account of the arrival of the European Russian Envoy at his capital." It is plain that a little judicious handling of him by the Viceroy at this time would have de- tached Shere Ali from the Russian alliance. Lord Lytton's treatment, on the contrary, drove the " earthern pipkiu" towards the " iron pot," which appeared the less dangerous of the two.

Where, in all this, is the slightest particle of evidence that

there is any danger to India from Afghanistan, if only the Government of India will leave Afghanistan alone P What the Russo-Afghan correspondence proves is, that every single step taken against England by Shore Ali or General Kaufmann was in response to some hostile step of the Viceroy's Government against Afghanistan or Russia.

But the Russian Mission started for Cabal after Kaufmann

knew that the Berlin Congress had met P That is not certain ; and, in any. case, the meeting of the Congress did not neces- sarily ensure peace ; and, moreover, Captain Butler was still among the Turkomans, the bridge of boats was still across the Indus, British troops were still massed on the Afghan frontier, and there was no proof that the contemplated invasion of 'Turkestan had been abandoned. And as to Stoletoff's letter to Shere Ali from Livadia suggesting intrigues among the Mussul- mans of India, those at least have no right to condemn it who applaud Sir Henry Rawliuson's suggestion, a year after the 'Treaty of Berlin, to raise the Turkomans and Uzbegs against Russian rule in Central Asia.

In short, Shore Ali may have had good cause of complaint

against Russia for leaving him in the lurch in his hour of need, though it must be added that Russia's promise of help was a rather vague engagement. But the British Government has not even a colourable ground of offence against Russia. We were the aggressors throughout, and Russia was through- out acting in self-defence. I appeal to Lord Beaconsfield, who deviared in the House of Lords, on December 10th, 1878, that the conduct of Russia was, under the circnmstances, "perfectly allowable," and her explanation "frank and satisfactory." It may be difficult to reconcile this admission with the invasion of Afghanistan. But that is a question on which I do not enter. —I am, Sir, &c., Mazola' MacCoLL. 1 New Burlington Street, TV., February 9th.