POLLOCK'S SPINOZA.*
[SECOND NOTICE.]
ANOTHER feature of Spinoza's philosophy which commands the resolute adherence of Mr. Pollock, is his thorough-going Spinosa r his Dye and Philosophy. By Frederick Pollook, Barristonat-Law, late Yellow of Trinity College, Cambridge, &c. London: 0. Kogan Paul and Co. determinism. Those who read Spinoza must learn a new definition of freedom. They will discover that the opposite of freedom is not necessity, but slavery, and the opposite of deter- minism is arbitrariness. " The determinist," says Mr. Pollock, " holds, in accordance with common experience, that the deli- berate action of men is among the conditions that shape the course of events, and is oftener the most important condition.. If particular men or societies are foolish enough to think that their own acts or omissions count for nothing, that is a condi- tion too, and its results will be greatly to their disadvantage. Determinsm, in short, if only one applies it thoroughly, leaves all the common uses of life exactly where they were.. For my own part, I hold that the choice I exercise in writing these lines is determined, and is nowise arbitrary." It is strange that in those few sentences Mr. Pollock has again and again assumed the possibility of the thing he is attempting to deny and disprove. Grant, as he does, to men the pos- sibility of deliberate action, and he has granted all that the most strenuous advocate of philosophical freedom ever sought. Determinism, strenuously applied, excludes the possibility of real deliberate action, and leaves only a, semblance of it. "Determinism, if only we apply it thoroughly,"—we suppose Mr. Pollock means, if we carry it consistently through as a system in thought. But if it is possible not to carry it through, then that possibility is sufficient to disprove its truth. In other words, if Mr. Pollock's argument is good,. the opposite of necessity ought to be inconceivable. As regards the interesting fact that personally Mr. Pollock has found that his belief in Determinism has not robbed life of its interest for him, we have no reason to doubt the fact, every reason to believe that life is full of interest for him. Our ex- planation is, that he has not applied Determinism thoroughly. In this case also we point out that the advocates of Determin- ism, charmed with the simplicity and power of the principle o`l necessity in that sphere of things where it undoubtedly holds good, are led to extend it to spheres in which it does not hold the same undoubted sway. As Spinoza sought to explain the universe by the two assumptions of thought and extension, and deceived himself by a false simplicity, so the Determinist argu- ment generally deceives itself by assuming a simplicity which does not hold. If science cannot account for light with- out the hypothesis of a luminiferous ether, it boldly pos- tulates the ether, and justifies its postulate by proving that it can account for all the facts ; if philosophy cannot explain the facts of human life, without postulating human freedom, then it has a right to postulate human freedom. But it is not according to legitimate procedure in science or in philosophy to assume p hypothesis as universally true and sufficient to account for the facts, the first procedure under which is to explain all the facts away. The admission of free- dom, no doubt, complicates the problem, and makes it more difficult of solution. But the answer to that is, widen your cal- culus, state your problem truly, and perhaps you may in time solve it. But you will never solve it, never make any progress
towards its solution, if you persistently and consistently miss state your problem. It is a necessary consequence of the mis- statement of the problem, and of the assumption of Deterininism• as true, that Spinoza proceeds to declare that understanding and will are ono. It is, no doubt, involved in his system from the beginning. Whatever the Divine Being knows he wills, and all things which are possible are thus actual. " He is substance, consisting of infinite attributes, whereof every one expresses eternal and infinite being." Thought and will are one, what the Deity thinks he wills, and all possible things are real. It is a speculation in free space, apart from all conditions, and as such we may leave it full scope. But in this respect Spinoza is logical, and the determinist is bound to follow him, and to declare that understanding and will are only names.
In his purely ethical work, Spinoza has been more successful than in his metaphysic. Here he has really contributed some- thing to human knowledge and to the progress of human thought. But the valuable part of his contribution can easily be detached from his system, as in truth it is joined to it empirically. In this part we see him face to face with the facts of human nature, and we gladly concede that his glance is keen, and his results are often of abiding value. But even here the defects of his
method pursued him, and the longing for a simplicity which is not to be found, made him crush the facts into a bed of Pro- crustes. Take, for example, the first principle of his ethics, self-preservation. The attempt is made to deduce from this tho
whole of his ethical principles. This conatus, or effort after self-preservation, is universal. In living things, it is identified with life. " In the less complex relations of the material world, it would appear in the fundamental properties of matter,—inaction, mass, and impenetrability. But the fact now assumed as ultimate for ordinary scientific purposes, that every atom of every element succeeds in pre- serving itself, would, in Spinoza's view, be no more than an abiding illustration. The conatus is equally present in the most unstable as in the most stable of combinations. A molecule of water endeavours, in the peculiar sense here explained, not to be decomposed; and not less so, while it holds together, does the molecule of some of those transitory compounds which explode at a touch or vibration." A general law of physics is at once extended and applied to living beings,—to self-conscious beings, and every category of difference is ignored. It only serves to delude with a false appearance of knowledge, for between Newton's first law of motion and the endeavour at self-pre- servation there is no more resemblance than between the watch- dog and the dog-star. The statement of this principle remains only a statement, and, as iu the metaphysic so in the ethic, differences are brought in as Spinoza needs them. Mr. Pollock is able to supplement Spinoza's thought by reference to the teaching of Mr. Darwin and Mr. Herbert Spencer. With all respect to these great men and profound thinkers, the reference does not help us out of the difficulty. Let it be granted that "older by countless ages than conscious desire, older than any-
thing to which we now grant the name of life, the primseval and common impulse—' the will to live, the competence to be '—is at
length, in the sight of all men, as it was for Spinoza's keen vision, the root of all action, and of all that makes the world alive," yet the great problem of ethics remains what it was, or rather the difficulty is increased. Science and philosophy, as represented by Spinoza and his expositors, and by others, unite in showing us for count- less ages a state of universal strife and efforts at self-preservation. Everything is doing all it can to persist. Every man is seeking to preserve himself, and to remove out of his way everything which hinders this. On all sides there are cultivation and growth of the self-preserving emotions and desires. Suddenly we are landed in a state where all is changed. The self-regarding instincts are transformed into those which regard the good 'of others. Selfishness has become altruism. This met us before in the metaphysic ; it reappears in the ethic, with added force and power. How do we, in the principles of this philosophy, get at otherness ? Carlyle's problem, " Given a world of rogues, to deduce an honesty from their united action," is simplicity itself, when compared with this,—" Given a world of self-seeking, in which all outward forces and inner impulses for countless time have been tending to increase the effects which tend to the good of self, how to produce in this world unselfishness, desire for the good of others, and regard to social well-being." This is the problem as it is put by Mr. Pollock, Mr. Herbert Spencer, and others. The problem as stated is insoluble, and cannot be solved on the terms given by this philosophy. But here, again, as an the former case, our philosophers, like the late Professor Clifford, will, no doubt, take refuge iu an instinct, and say, " Men have gone on that supposition."
One other problem we touch on, ere we close. It is the pro- blem of Final Causes. To this problem, also, a solution of a kind is given, and the solution consists in a general denial of the facts, with some lofty counsel " to those who discuss natural theology." But Mr. Pollock, in the energy of his zeal, has not considered whether, in destroying the argument from final causes, he has not cut down the branch on which he is himself sitting. A. good deal has been said by him in his exposition of Spinoza's system regarding perfection, and an idea of perfection. It plays a great part in Spinoza's system. We can, it seems, have an idea of perfection, when we are thinking of such small matters as substance, attribute, mode. We can speak of the perfection and reality of substance, and say, because of the perfection of substance, it must have infi- nite attributes. That is a matter.quite within the competence of the human mind. It is otherwise, however, when we speak of the sensible world and its order, and of design and perfection with regard to it. In the sensible world, it appears, " all our ideas of design and perfection are derived from the efforts of man, a finite being, working for definite objects, and with such instru- ments as he can procure ; and the attempt to find something answering to them in the constitution of the universe leads to nothing but insoluble perplexities." Mr. Pollock is careful here to insist on the imperfections of the human intellect. But this: human intellect, which is unequal to the task of recognising-
design and perfection in the world, and which is involved in endless perplexities when it speaks of purpose and design in nature, is yet able to explain the origin, being, and nature of the universe. Truly, on the representation of Mr. Pollock the human intellect is an amazing thing, both in its strength and in its weakness ! Is it not obvious that what is needed hero is a just criticism, and a proof of the cause why certain principles of human thought sho uld have universal validity, and why other principles lead only to insoluble perplexities, when we seek to find something answeriug to them in the constitution of the universe ?- Certainly, Mr. Pollock's procedure is both uncritical and un- philosophical. Is it contrary to reason to think that life, and thought, and history have a goal P Are there movement, and progress, and thought in the constitution of the universe ? Or is it a mere barren identity, an aimless and purposeless play of attributes, and nothing more ? It is a question involving vaster issues than Mr. Pollock has yet seen. And one great merit of the philosophy of Hegel, which has attained to such power in our country at present, lies here,—that it recognises an end, a pur- pose, and a goal ; that it provides for movement and progress; whereas Spinozism can give no rational account of history, of movement, or of progress.
It remains for us to say that the leading thoughts which Mr. Pollock has emphasised—as those which make the philosophy of Spinoza—are by uo means peculiar to him. Nor are these the thoughts which have attracted to Spinoza the attention of poets and literary men. It is the mystic-poetic element which won their admiration. The universal presence of the divine, the abiding, immanent presence of God in all his works, it is which have won for the name of Spinoza the power it wields to-day. But this is an element which all wise theists recognise, even while they refuse to think that God is a theological expression for the order of the universe. It would be well, we may remark in passing, if Mr. Pollock would make himself acquainted with theology, before he presumes to pass judgment on it, as he does so frequently. Let him read, for instance, Dorner's system of theology, and he will understand how theologians can appre- ciate Spinoza, and give him his position in the history of human thought. As for the scientific ideas on which Mrs Pollock lays so much stress, the ideas of uniformity, of the identity of body and mind, of naturallaw,—with the exception of the second, they are held by every philosopher and theologian with which the present writer is acquainted. All hold the unity and uniformity of Nature, all hold the connection of body and mind, and all, also, hold the abiding rule of law. No doubt, they do not hold them as Spinoza held them, nor as Mr. Pollock holds them. They are not drawn from the same principles, nor driven to the same issues. But all the ascer- tained results of science may be held in consistency with other truths which Mr. Pollock ignores or denies.
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