THE CHANCES OF WAR OVER CUBA. T HE publication of the
stolen letter addressed by the Spanish Minister in Washington to the editor of a Madrid newspaper has already led to what is in fact the expulsion of Senor Dupuy de Lome from the United States, and is almost certain to produce fresh diffi- culties between Spain and America. We say this from a general view of the case, and not from any failure to per- ceive that the incident ought to have made no difference whatever to the situation. If President McKinley and the leaders of public opinion had been wise they would have set their teeth like iron, and have declared that, come what would, they would pay no attention whatever to purloined private letters, however genuine, and that as far as they were concerned the incident was non-existent. President McKinley should at once have publicly called on the Spanish Minister, or if etiquette forbids that, should have asked him to dinner, and informed him that he needed no assurances that the letter was a forgery, the bad taste and vulgarity of the language being ample proof of the fact. He might have added, of course, that the incident would not affect the policy of the United States towards Spain either favour- ably or unfavourably, but that the matter would be as completely ignored as if it had never happened. If Presi- dent McKinley had had the nerve and the wisdom to do that he would have immensely raised his prestige as a ruler of men and a statesman, not only abroad, but among his own countrymen, who are business men, and who know that business, private or public, could not be properly conducted if private letters, when stolen and published, were to be treated as if they were official acts. To put the matter from a worldly point of view, if President McKinley had employed secret- service agents to watch the Spanish Legation, and had found out that the Spanish Minister abused him at his dinner-table, he would have taken no notice of the fact. There was no more reason to do so when he knew the fact, not from a confidential report, but from a letter of very doubtful antecedents published in the Press.
But though we hold so strongly the view that in international relations a Government can only deal with the official acts of foreign representatives, and ought to shut its eyes absolutely to all their essentially private acts, however injudici:70, we cannot pretend to be sur- prised that the United States Government failed in the present case to treat the letter attributed to Senor Dupuy de Lome with the contempt it merited. When we say this, let us be careful not to give the slightest handle for any of those misrepresentations which are constantly made in America in regard to the comments of the English Press. We do not suggest for a moment that the American Executive failed to ignore the incident because they are ignorant of diplomatic usage, or because they have not sufficiently good manners to be self-restrained under provocation. That is, of course, all nonsense. Americans have as good manners as other people, and their politicians and officials know perfectly well how Lord. Salisbury or M. Hanotaux would have disposed of a letter like that just communicated to the American Press. Nor, again, is Washington without plenty of traditions of the better kind. Mr. Lincoln had not been trained in Courts or Chancelleries, but we can guess pretty accurately how he would have treated the publication of a private letter never meant to meet his eye, but indulging in violent language against him as chief of the Executive. No, it is not want of manners or of traditions that has made the United States Government take the incident too seriously. It is rather that want of firmness and of savoir faire which has been shown by the present Administration throughout their term of office. The President never seems to have made up his mind what his real policy is in regard to Cuba. He has hinted a fault and hesitated a dislike of the methods of the Spanish Govern- ment in Cuba, but he has never come to close quarters with the question. Now it is, we hold, only too probable that the tremendous, even if momentary, wave of opinion which will be stirred up by the publication of the Spanish Minister's letter will lead the President to make a grave international incident out of the scandal. He may think it easier to quarrel with Spain about the letter than about Cuba.
The incident, as we have said, ought to make no dif- ference in the situation. As we have said also, it is almost certain to make a great deal of difference and to bring the United States and Spain much nearer to a rupture in regard to Cuba. But though we think the decencies of public life are involved in the ignoring of any publi- cation of private letters, we cannot profess to be sorry to think that the moment may actually be approaching when the United States will intervene to stop the long agony of Cuba. We have no antipathy to Spain, but rather wish her well. But she cannot regain her health as a State as long as she is wasting her blood and treasure on Cuba. Unless the amputation of the Cuban limb takes place, and takes place speedily, the whole body of Spain will be poisoned. But though we wish to see Cuba separated from Spain for the sake of Spain, this is not our strongest reason for desiring American intervention to put an end to the insurrection, and to give Cuba her freedom. The condition of the island. is at this moment so terrible, and has been so appallingly miserable for the last three or four years, that as one reads even moderate and well-balanced accounts such as that in this month's Blackwood, one wonders whether even in the Thirty Years' War itself " the negation of God " was ever more effectually carried out by human beings. The wretched island is tormented beyond belief. Had it not, indeed, been an island, but a country with land borders, what has been happening could not have taken place. The people then could not have been prevented flying from it in thou- sands, and the land's misery would have been visible to the whole world. If there was a physical boundary where a man could stand and say, On one side I am safe, and can lead a human life ; on the other I am either shot as a rebel, starved to death as a " pacifico," or plundered and neglected as soldier of Spain or a supporter of the Government, the agony of Cuba could not have gone on so long. As it Is, the island is distant and small, and therefore invisible. Men do not realise what is going on behind the ocean screen. Curiously enough, the cup of misery has by no means to be drunk solely or chiefly by the Cubans. In all probability, if a census of suffering could be taken, it would be found that the men who have endured most have been the Spanish soldiers—boy recruits without physique or knowledge, and without leaders or helpers or friends of any kind—who are " dumped " on to the island by the foolish and perverse tenacity of Spain, to die of fever and starvation, No one knows, no one ever will know, exactly how many of the poor boys sent from Andalusia and Castile to Cuba have died since the war began. In all likelihood, however, nearly a hundred thousand have perished or become disabled, and there are probably at this moment another hun- dred and fifty thousand perishing, not in fighting, but by fever and famine. Spain has made truly heroic efforts to get the recruits out, but as soon as they are landed they are subjected to the most shameful neglect. Meantime the island has been ravaged as provinces used to be ravaged in the Middle Ages,—first by the rebels, and then by the soldiers. No doubt things are a little better under Marshal Blanco than they were under General Weyler, but even he is powerless to stop the Cuban horror. The only hope is in the United States sternly declaring that the Spanish troops must leave the island, and that then the Cubans must be allowed to settle their own fate, and to decide whether they will have autonomy or independence. That the United States would be morally justified in saying that the war must now end, and Cuba be given peace, we do not doubt for a moment.
Previous page
