TOPICS OF THE DAY.
THE PROBLEM OF THE LORDS. THE Daily Mail of Wednesday publishes a forecast of political events which we cannot help thinking is likely to prove correct. According to this forecast, the Budget of 1909-10 will be introduced into the House of Commons immediately after the Address and " carried by Resolution." This, we presume, means that the Standing Orders will be suspended and all the stages got through in one or two days. Next, we are told that a Resolution will be proposed " asserting the inalienable right of the House of Commons over finance, and rejecting the pre- tensions of the Lords to interfere with that privilege." That passed, the Chancellor of the Exchequer will make his Budget statement for the year 1910-11. The House of Commons will then adjourn for one month over the Easter holidays. " In this interval the Government will frame a Bill for the reform of the House of Lords. The nature of this Bill will be a subject for long and careful con- sideration ; but it may be taken for granted that it will be drastic and fundamental in its provisions, and will make some attempt to secure for future Parliaments some approach to a balance of political parties in both Houses. This Bill will be sent to the House of Lords for con- sideration. It is recognised that the House of Lords have the right not only to discuss but to reject a measure which deals with their constitution. The rejection of the Bill by the House of Lords is, of course, anticipated. An appeal to the country would naturally follow." If this view is correct, it will be seen that the Government have adopted the principle which we felt sure they would find it necessary to adopt—that of dividing their policy into two parts : that which has to do merely with finance, and that which deals with the reform of the House of Lords, for their ultimate proposal will not be to abolish the veto, but only to reform the Upper House. Before we go any further, let us express our belief that if this is the Government scheme it will, as far as procedure is concerned, meet with general approval. We agree with those who hold that it is the business of the responsible Government to bring forward plans for the reform of the House of Lords, and that the suggestion that the Lords should initiate such legislation is only to be regarded as sound if the Ministry refuse to do anything but strike at the legislative powers of the Second Chamber. In that case, no doubt, the Lords ought to take the initiative in suggesting a scheme of reform. The Lords will, of course, claim their full share in discussing and shaping the details of any measure the Government may propose, but the initiation of Constitutional reform should, in the first place, come from the Executive.
The chief point which we desire to emphasise in dealing with the problem of the Lords is the serious disability under which the nation rests owing to its having no properly organised machinery for handling amendments to the Constitution. In almost every other democraticState a suitable form of procedure is provided for deliberation worthy of the occasion when fundamental alterations in the framework of government are proposed. We unfor- tunately are obliged to use the same procedure which is employed for passing an amendment to a local Waterworks Act. It is of course no use merely to bewail this fact, since it is a fact; but is it not worth while to consider whether it may not be possible to establish some machinery ad hoc for discussing in detail the proposed, and as we admit necessary, amendment to the Constitution ? What all sensible men are agreed upon is that we do not want a mere partisan settlement,—a settlement arrived at with a view of doing, not what is best for the nation, but what will best suit one or other of the contending parties. The Americans in their State systems get over the difficulty of framing a satisfactory Constitutional amendment under a party system by means of a Constitutional Convention. This body devotes its whole time and energy to the Constitutional point, and is not required to be constantly interrupting its deliberations to deal with all sorts of executive legislative matters, great and small. Might it not be possible to provide something in the nature of a Constitutional Convention by reviving an institution which has fallen into abeyance for the last couple of hundred years, but which is still in existence and ready to hand,—we mean a Conference between the two Houses ? We believe that archaeologists tell us that these Conferences ceased because of some foolish pretensions on the part of the representa- tives of the Lords in the seventeenth century. They insisted on sitting covered while the Commons sat un- covered, or some such triviality. All that of course would be brushed aside at the present day, and the representa.- tires would meet on terms of complete ceremonial equality. Could not fifty men chosen from the Peers meet fifty men chosen from the Commons and discuss the matter in detail? In the case of both delegations representatives should be chosen from all parties. The fifty Peers would include among them a proportionate number of Liberal Peers, while the Commons delegation would of course contain not only Liberals but Labour Members, Irish Members of both sections, and Unionist Members. The hundred Members thus chosen would not be the body to decide finally on the measure. Neither would they, like the old Conferences, take up the discussion at the very end and as a forlorn hope. On the contrary, they would get to work on the first draft. They would in all probability be able to agree upon a good many points, if not on all, and at any rate they would clear the ground. If this proposal is for any reason impracticable, then could not the Govern- ment suggest some other form of national Convention which would avoid the difficulty of the presentation of a mere party scheme to the House of Lords, a procedure which, we fear, is only too likely to prejudice the discussion at the very outset ? Before we leave this aspect of the problem of the Lords we desire to draw attention to one general principle which, it seems to us, ought to have weight given to it at the present moment. Granted that a scheme of reform can be agreed upon by the two Houses, the Act will, in our opinion, be a matter of such vital importance that it ought to be given some greater sanction than that which belongs to an Act of Parliament, which can be repealed, or partly repealed, by ordinary legislative enactment. In any Bill for the reform of the House of Lords we would. insert a Referendum clause,—a clause providing that the assent of the people must be obtained for the measure before it can come into operation. As we have so often pointed out in these columns, the machinery for such a Referendum is perfectly easy to set up. It should further be enacted that any alteration at any future time sought to be made in this Act should not be valid unless it also had been referred to and received the assent of the nation at a poll of the people. By this means we should have obtained what so many of the best minds at the time of the Common- wealth desired,—a "fundamental" through an "agreement of the people." Another advantage of inserting a Referendum clause would be that it would in all proba- bility smooth the way for a settlement, and would avoid another General Election. The Lords might very likely feel justified in passing an Act with a Referendum clause, though if such Referendum clause did not exist they would be forced to reject the measure. While party passion runs high Liberals are apt to assert that the desire of the Lords to take the opinion of the people is a mere piece of party tactics. That is not true in fact. For good or evil, the Lords honestly and sincerely believe that their chief function and duty in the Constitution is to make sure of the consent of the people. If this view is recognised in the Bill which the Government intend to produce, we feel sure that through the medium of a Referendum clause the risk of friction may be very much reduced.
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