THE SIGNIFICANCE OF SINGAPORE

Commonwealth and Foreign

By WILLIAM HENRY CHAMBERLIN [The important manoeuvres which took place off Singapore last week proved definitely in the opinion of the umpires that the base might be considered impregnable against joint naval and air attack—the judgement expressed here by a well-known American writer being thus officially confirmed.]

ONE's first view of the Singapore naval base falls somewhat short of imaginative expectations. It lacks two things which are calculated to impress the lay observer : an impressive

display of warships riding at anchor and a natural location of spectacular visible strength.

The only large vessel which is now permanently stationed at Singapore is an old monitor, the ' Terror,' which is used as a stores and repair ship. The base is located on the northern side of Singapore Island, some twelve miles away from the city, facing the Strait of Johore. It requires an effort of the mind, as well as of the eye, and a knowledge of the co-ordina- tion of land and air with naval power at Singapore, to realise that the naval base is an important weight cast into the uncertain balance of power in the Far East, and probably represents full defensive value for the £7,700,000 which has been appropriated for its construction.

Naval warfare today is very largely a matter of bases. A fleet with no secure port where it can refuel, overhaul its ships after a long voyage, nurse the wounds that may have been received in battle, is obviously at a vast disadvantage in operating against an enemy which is closer to its home harbours. Before Singapore was constructed Great Britain's larger warships would have been in the position of waifs in Far Eastern waters. Now, so long as Singapore can be held, they have admirable facilities for drydocking and repairs in a place of unique and obvious strategic significance.

There are several geographical and economic facts about Singapore that mark it out as a natural bulwark of Imperial defence in the Far East. It is the outlet of a rich hinterland that produces about 45 per cent. of the world's rubber and about 3o per cent. of the world's tin. It commands the main navigable channel through the maze of islands and treacherous reefs in the Malay Archipelago. It is the cross-roads of south-eastern Asia, the place where the main trade route from Suez and India diverges northward to China and Japan and southward to Australia and New Zealand. Last, but by no means least, it is the Eastern gateway to India.

The most striking feature of the base, as one goes over it today, is the vast graving-dock, one thousand feet long and 130 feet wide, completely surrounded by concrete walls and deep enough to handle any ship afloat today. Only less im- pressive than the graving-dock is the floating drydock, the third largest of its kind in the world, which was towed out in several parts and is capable of lifting a 5o,000-ton battleship out of the water.

The main labour and expense in the construction of the naval base have been devoted to reclaiming hundreds of acres of mangrove swamp and in laying down vast quantities of granite and concrete, necessary to insure the stability of the sea-walls, quays and docks in the soft soil. On what was formerly a jungle swamp, office buildings, storehouses of various kinds, oil storage tanks have sprung up like mushrooms.

The value of Singapore obviously depends in large measure on its capacity for self-defence until Great Britain's main naval forces arrive from European waters. The retired Japanese naval officer, Lieut.-Commander Tota Ishimaru, in his blue print of an imaginary war between Japan and Great Britain (Japan Must Fight Britain) emphasises the importance, from the Japanese standpoint, of blockading Singapore as soon as possible after the outbreak of hostilities : " Singapore, like Hong Kong, even more than Hong Kong, is a base essential to British operations. Were it invested, the danger of attempting to enter it would be so great that the British Fleet would have to find a base elsewhere, and there is none that is secure nearer than Australia. Therefore it would be to our advantage to attack it, whatever the risk."

The defensive plans for Singapore conceive co-ordinated operations of the land, sea and air forces ; and British officers with whom I talked were confident that the base was in no danger from a sudden or surprise attack. Two battalions of British troops, along with some units of the Royal Artillery and Royal Engineers, altogether totalling between two and three thousand men, are now stationed at Singapore, and another battalion is expected to be sent here in the near future.

The air base at Seletar, some two miles from the naval base and fourteen miles from the city, is one of the most up-to-date in the Empire, and performs both civil and military functions. Singapore is an important port of call both for the Imperial Airways and for the Dutch K.L.M. line. Two squadrons of bombers and one of flying boats are based on Seletar ; the airport is well provided with steel hangars, huge barracks and anti-aircraft defences. About 600 officers and men of the R.A.F. are stationed there. Two new aerodromes are being built on the island, and the air force will probably be substantially augmented in the near future.

It is believed that the existing defences, which are steadily being enlarged, afford adequate security against any small surprise raid. Inasmuch as Tokyo is about as far from Singa- pore as London is from New York, no large expeditionary force could very well be sent against the new base without being observed from a considerable distance.

So much for the strategic aspects of Singapore. Its political significance is perhaps even greater. The construction and equipment of this impressive combined naval and air base serves definite notice that Great Britain does not propose to retire from the Far East. Work on the base began in 1923, after the Washington Naval Treaty and the termination of the Anglo-Japanese Alliance which had previously been a kind of insurance for Great Biitain's Far Eastern position. At the time of the first Labour Government, when hopes of disarma- ment and collective security were higher than they are today the work was suspended ; but it was resumed after the return to power of a Conservative Cabinet in 1924. From the standpoint of British Far Eastern Imperial diplo- matic and commercial interests the case for the Singapore base is stronger today than it was during the last decade. The British Empire has reached its maximum territorial expansion ; British interest today lies in the maintenance of the status quo and of some kind of balance of power in the Far East. Since 1931 Japan has thrown its sword into the scales of the balance of power and tipped it rather strongly. The frequently voiced Japanese claim to be " the stabilising force in East Asia" is the kind of elastic formula which, if unchallenged, might cover some far-reaching changes in the map of the Far East.

Another consideration to which Great Britain can scarcely remain indifferent is the prospective withdrawal of America from the Philippines. These Islands are now under a tran- sitional r‘gime, with full freedom of self-government and their own President, Mr. Manuel Quezon, as chief executive. The United States, however, reserves certain rights of intervention, in the event of grave disorder or breakdown of financial stability, and .retains a small garrison and naval force in and around Manila. In 1946, unless present arrangements are modified, all political, military and economic ties between America and the Philippines will be severed, although the question whether America may retain a naval base there has been left open for future negOtiation.

If the withdrawal of American influence should, as some observers think not improbable, be followed by an increase in Japanese influence, Japan might establish itself in an archipelago which flanks the route between Hong Kong and Singapore. Given present world conditions, and assuming the desirability of protecting against violent change the complicated system of British associations, possessions and vested interests in Eastern and South-eastern Asia, the significance of Singapore is both great and obvious. It is not the least of the trump cards o,n which .a British diplomat can cotmt in the game of Far Eastern politics.