Generalities
DREW MIDDLETON writes from Paris: Post-mortems on General de Gaulle's press conferences go on and on and on. The oracle will not speak again until midsummer. The elysee- ologists, who now take over the stage, are busy dissecting each sentence, pondering every nuance.
At this point it is possible to draw two con- clusions. One is that the General is as strongly anti-Anglo-Saxon now as ever and that this in- cludes the British, despite his condescending reference, when reminded, to Mr. Wilson. The second is that he doesn't think anything is going to happen about German reunification, Europe's central problem, and that we all might as well join him in his esoteric visions of the day when the Slav has lain down with the Teuton, and Europe—his exclusive Europe—works out her own destinies.
The General's choicest item was that France, Communist China, Russia, the United States and Britain should meet to re-examine and probably revise the Charter of the United Nations. Does anyone, including the General, believe this is a runner? After the press conference, of course not. But in that atmosphere, face to face with this great man, it seems almost real. It is only later that the audience realises that this is just another of those big, Gaullist ideas that sound wonderful on presentation but seldom stand up to the cold light of reason.
The beauty of these tactics from the General's standpoint is that the world being what it is, his number may come up one of these days. There may be a tri-power directorate of NATO. We may see the Geneva conference reconvened. If either happens, you can be certain of the identity of the man in the centre of the stage taking the bows.
The suggestion that the Communist Chinese participate in a revision of the United Nations Charter was one rap over the knuckles for the United States. The second was the suggestion that the world alter its monetary system and go back to the gold standard.
The financial soothsayers have given a great deal of anxious thought to the General's moti- vation here. I hope I am not being discourteous in saying they are wasting their time in looking for arcane reasons. The essential cause is the familiar one of French grandeur. De Gaulle doesn't like a world system in which the dollar and the pound are money of account and the franc is not. It seems to put the franc, and France, in a subsidiary position. And that, if he can help it, he will not have. His reputation as a financial genius is not high. But no one doubts his devotion to the cause of France. With respect, I submit that it is as simple as that. A great world figure who becomes irritated because French troops appear somewhat slovenly in a parade in comparison with the Americans and British is not likely to take the inferiority of the franc lying down.
The General can be petty, as the friends of Maxime Weygand will tell you. But he can also be big. There was the greatness of a dedicated leader in the vision he drew of Europe and its role in the reunification of Germany. This is a European problem to be settled by Europeans, meaning a Europe stretching from the Atlantic to the Urals.
The President's exclusion of the Americans, British and Russians from the negotiation of the German settlement and his inclusion of the East European governments points, I believe, to his conviction that nothing substantive is likely to emerge from the proposed talks between the western big three and the USSR on unity. Little can happen in his view until the Germans have given up their transatlantic ties and settled down as good Europeans and the East Europeans have made ,further progress toward independence, both political and economic, of the Soviets. All this constitutes a bright vision for those Euro- peans, and for those American pundits, who believe Europe should settle her own problems with the minimum of interference from Washing- ton. The picture is attractive. Is it realistic?
A West German deputy put his finger on the point. The reunification of Germany is impos-
sible, he said, unless it is supported by the power of the United States. That power, of course, doesn't rest on the Seventh Army in Germany or the Sixth Fleet in the Mediterranean. When we talk of power vis-a-vis the Soviets we mean nuclear power. Painful though this may be, it is true. What worried the German politician is what worries a lot of people all over Europe. How far does General de Gaulle intend to go? Is Europe to negotiate Germany's reunification without the backing of the United States?
The blunt answer is that at the moment it can't. Moreover, there is nothing in the present political mood that leads any prudent man to believe that Europe will generate a nuclear power comparable with that of the Soviet Union or the United States. There is no doubt that Europe, including Britain, could do it in a rather short period. But there is no evidence that it will. The General can talk until his eyes pop about
a European nuclear deterrent. But the cost. of
such a deterrent, in a period when an advanced weapons system costs as much as the entire budget of a reasonably large European country, is out of the question. Europe might want such a weapons system. But who would pay for it?
This is the area where the General's substance gives way to shadows. The objective is clear and admirable. But the means of reaching it are vague.
Yet I yield to no one in my admiration for the old patriot in the Elysde Palace. There he sits and talks, dreaming great dreams with France emblazoned on his heart. The annual turnover of General Motors is much greater than the French defence budget. The force de frappe may be less impressive than the salvo from a single Polaris submarine. But so long as he 'can spin his yarns of a European future and raise sniggers about the Americans. Europe will • be under his spell to a certain extent. This is not the world as it is. But it is the world many Europeans would like to inhabit.
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