Vietnam: The Choice Before the President

By P. .1. HONEY

ITN the course of a private conversation with of my personal friends a few weeks ago, a senior Viet Cong (Vietnamese Communist) cadre described the prospects in South Vietnam in the following terms: The Viet Cong insurgents regard a purely military victory as impossible. Their numbers are inferior to those of the government troops, they have no air support, and they rely upon North Vietnam for much of their supply of arms and munitions, which burdens them with serious problems of logistics. They have achieved a large measure of success in their programme of political subversion and hope to achieve more in the future, but they do not expect political action alone to bring them final victory. Their greatest hope of success rests upon a massive and well-orchestrated propaganda campaign, conducted on a world- wide scale, and aimed at the creation of a climate of international opinion which will make it increasingly difficult for the United States to continue the provision of military aid to beleaguered South Vietnam. The Viet Cong will, of course, go on waging the war on all these three fronts, since each is complementary to the other two.

When asked whether Communist North Viet- nam was not afraid of provoking an American attack against its own territory, the cadre replied: 'The United States has shown herself afraid to take any determined action against Cuba, a Com- munist state on her own doorstep, so there is no danger of her intervening in North Vietnam.'

This week's reprisal bombings of North Viet- nam have showp how unrealistic his assessment was. Like all such appraisals, it was based Upon the experience of the Viet Minh in their earlier war against the French. Fear of foreign and domestic criticism then led weak French governments to forbid field commanders to undertake major military operations and to order them to avoid incurring casualties at all costs. That proved a major factor in making Victory possible for the Viet Minh. However, the parallel which the Vietnamese Communists draw between the two wars is a bad one. Firstly, France was fighting to reimpose her rule on Indochina, an aim which incurred the hostility of all the Indochinese peoples. Secondly, and more importantly, the Vietnamese Communists Were dealing with the ephemeral governments of the Fourth Republic, while they now have to reckon with a United States government enjoying the mandate of its massive election victory.

The United States undertook to provide South Vietnam with sufficient military, economic and technical aid to enable her to resist armed Com- munist aggression and political subversion. Politi- cal instability, which is a direct result of Viet Cong activities, has weakened the military effort

and reduced its effectiveness in defeating the Communists. To restore South Vietnam to a situation which can be considered satisfactory, It will be necessary to eliminate the armed insur- gents, to re-establish local government in the countryside where the Viet Cong have killed Most of the officials, to safeguard the security of the people, and to ensure that armed aggres-

sion from the north is not renewed. This is a formidable list of requirements, and opinions differ greatly about whether they can be achieved and, if so, how.

General de Gaulle, for reasons of his own, has long canvassed the neutralist solution. Maintain- ing that the war cannot be won, he advocates the

convening of an international conference at which agreement would be reached to establish a neutralist South Vietnam guaranteed by the participating states. The attractions of this sug- gestion are that it would seem to offer an immediate end to the fighting and would avoid any danger of escalation into a major war. But would it, in fact, do this? Similar international agreements were reached at Geneva in 1954 and 1962: both have been broken by North Vietnam. There is no basis for believing that a further agreement would be any more effective.

Since the North Vietnamese leaders believe they will win the war by following present tactics, they have little incentive either to change these or to accept a neutralist South Vietnam beyond their control. They are unlikely, therefore, to agree to any neutralisation unless it takes such form as to make an ultimate Communist take- over certain. Current advocates of neutralisation fall into two classes: those who have not paused to think about its feasibility and those who wish to see America forced to abandon South Vietnam.

A second solution envisages a continuation of present strategy with increased supplies of American military aid and possibly the direct participation of American soldiers in the fighting. Given a modicum of political stability in Saigon and more imaginative use of the available ire- sources, such a policy could succeed. The clearing of the many islands in the Mekong delta, for example, and their sealing against further ,infil- tration would constitute an excellent beginning to the elimination of the Viet Cong. There are many such purely tactical matters which merit more careful study and where great improve- ments could be effected. But this solution has its drawbacks. It would be several years before it could be successful. The South Vietnamese people are already showing signs of war- weariness and could well grow impatient at the prospect of further years of fighting. Again, while the Viet Cong are present in the south they will certainly cohtinue political subversion,, so that government stability is by no means certain. Nevertheless, this solution does not necessitate extending the war outside South Vietnam or assuming any fresh commitments, which renders it attractive to some Washington officials.

Other Americans, many of them holding very senior posts in the administration, argue that North Vietnam is waging this war and will con- tinue to do so as long as she conceives it to be to her advantage. Only when she has been per- suaded that it is in her own best interests to

end it, will there be any hope of a lasting peace. A realistic American policy should, therefore,

be directed to making the war so damaging to North Vietnam that she will herself wish to put an end to it. But how is this to be achieved?

North Vietnam, they maintain, can be demon- strated to be a belligerent in the South Viet- namese war. Abundant proof of this is readily available and should be made public. If that were done, then South Vietnam could not be denied the right of retaliation. The north is overerowded, perennially short of food, and industrially back- ward, they argue. It depends for external supplies upon an exposed rail link with China and upon the port of Haiphong. If the railway were de- stroyed by bombing, together with the few oil storage depots and the sluices of irrigation systems, Haiphong could be closed by minefields, thus halting the whole of North Vietnamese in- dustry, transport and much of the agricultural production without introducing a single soldier.

Some in Washington reason that it would not be necessary to carry out the whole bombing programme, but merely to begin on a small scale and escalate gradually. Once the North Viet- namese Communists had become convinced that the programme would be completed unless the war were ended in the south, they would conclude that the cost of its continuation was too h:gh. Should at any time Viet Cong operations be re- started, so might the bombing, and the status quo ante be restored.

The government of South Vietnam relies on American aid for the country's defence, so the policy it adopts must depend upon the kind of aid the United States is prepared to supply. In the last resort, therefore, it is President Johnson who has to decide what form the war in Vietnam will take. If he is willing to accept the risks attendant upon the systematic bombing of North Vietnam, there is no doubt that this is the strategy which South Vietnamese leaders would prefer.

The recent American and South Vietnamese air strikes against Viet Cong camps and staging posts in North Vietnam were purely retaliatory raids. They do not necessarily imply that Presi- dent Johnson has already adopted the third solution, though they would make its adoption easier than before. North Vietnam, Russia and China can have been left in no doubt of American determination to do whatever is necessary to defend South 'Vietnam, and they must plan their future actions in the light of that knowledge. Mr. Kosygin now appreciates the foolhardiness of his ill-timed trip to Hanoi in pursuit of Com- munist bloc objectives. The final choice of solu- tions to the Vietnamese problem has still to be made, but the events of the past week have re- moved some of the uncertainties.