OLD AND NEW FRENCH REPUBLICANS.
FRANCE has lost in M. Respell a good man, but a politician belonging to a class which even in France we are glad to believe is slowly disappearing. From 1815 down to a very recent period the cause of Republicanism has been maintained chiefly by men who bore to politicians the relation which Ultramontane priests are supposed to bear to ordinary Catholics. Necessarily determined men, for they had to contend with all the powers of the world, and usually filled with that passion of pity for mankind which, like high Calvinistic theology, so often pro- duces tempers of iron, they became under incessant persecution true fanatics, incapable of doubt, of compromise, and almost of comprehending ordinary men. Better men than some of them never lived—Respell in particular was a true philan- thropist—nor men more unreasonable. They came to see their ends, often very noble, though sometimes very foolish ends, so closely that they forgot the influence of time alto- gether, and were inclined to regard obstacles, hostile human beings sometimes included, very much as nuisances obstruct- ing the prospect, to be swept as summarily as might be out of the way. They did not, indeed, advocate bloodshed, for they had tried that in the Terror, and had seen how extra- ordinarily little it was able to accomplish—for example, death, though "poured out like water," as Carlyle says, did not extinguish the use of titles—but there was no institution which they would not abolish, no " Service " they would not summarily dismiss, no prejudice they would not disregard, no conviction they would not trample down, in order to make the world happier in their own way. They became incapable of conceiving of liberty under a Monarchy, or equality without taxation proportioned to superfluity, or religious freedom with an organised Church of any sort or kind. Any defence of such compromises irritated them just as any denial of a proved proposition in physics irritates a man of science, and they were as incapable of tolerating a plea for slow advances, even in their own direction, as a moralist is of tolerating a plea for a gradual advance from crime to innocence. Mazzinr, Respell, Delescluze, and a hundred less known men, were in this respect all alike,—they all refused to remain content even tem- porarily with institutions which, though they granted room for a victory of their principles, were not avowedly based upon them. Mazzini wanted the unity of Italy, but even that could not reconcile him to a Royal Standard as the symbol of that unity. Respell wanted a Republic, but even that could not induce him to tolerate the payment of priests or the delay in making education compulsory. Delescluze wanted true equality of rights, and revolted against a Republic rather than wait till the majority which he wanted to rule, and which under a Republic must rule, were able to secure it. As a rule, the fanatics were personally so good, so self-sacrificing, and so infinitely beyond most competitors in genuine care for the people as a whole, and especially for the poor as a whole, that they always had a great following, and for years it appeared as if the establishment of Republics must inevitably be followed by throwing all power into their hands, a result which men even well inclined to them dreaded, as religious men dread the concession of absolute power to priests. They know, almost without reasoning, that they will not be able to bear the use the priests, however good, will ultimately make of the power. Liberals, and strong Liberals, too, dreaded the fanatics, till they half doubted whether Republics would not be too dangerous, merely because Republics would give them fair-play. So strong indeed was this feeling, that we firmly believe if the truth were known, men like Mazzini, Respell, Delesciuse, Blanqui, and even, though be does not belong to a type nearly so extreme, Louis Blanc, have delayed the triumph of Repub- licanism nearly as much as the Kings. The mass of men have said to themselves,—' If we have Republics, these Ultra- montanes of Liberalism will rule, and we do not want that ;' have said so even when recognising, as we do most fully, that such men are the natural products of persecution, and that without them, in some eras, the torch might not have been kept alive. How different is a Republican leader of the later type, we see in the remarkable speech of M. Leon Renault on the right policy for the Left Centre of the Chamber of Deputies,—a speech delivered by him as the newly-chosen President of that most important section of the Republican party. He declares that the true need and urgency of Republican institutions is to prevent, not to promote, the periodic recurrence of popular excitement. The moderate Monarchists in France, he tells us, had become convinced by the repeated recurrence of catastrophes that there was no safety to be found by placing reliance on any -dynastic principle in France, whereas "Republican institutions, despite their apparent mobility, and by virtue even of that mobility, might prove the most effective guarantee of liberty, the most powerful obstacle to those revolutionary and violent crises which suspend industry and annihilate thrift, as well as the best safeguard against that spirit of adventure which entices to the pursuit of victory and leads to the hideous realities of defeat and invasion." In other words, the flexibility of the Re- public to popular ideas will remove the motive for revolutionary violence, while the predominance of popular interests will render the conspiracies of individual ambition as hopeless as they are criminal. And M. Leon Renault does not conceal in the least the use which he desires to see the Republic make of its new security against popular violence, on the one side, and personal ambition on the other. He wishes it to use this security in the interests of tranquillity, industry, and peace,— in the interests, that is, of the French people, who are weary of these terrible crises, and who have adopted the Republic solely because, like M. Thiers, they see in it the only chance of ridding themselves of such crises. He wishes to see the majority united in defence of an unsensational, but firm policy, —to see no shrinking from the due exercise of authority,—no -tampering with the imperatively needful organisation of the French power of self -del ence,—no favour shown to rash and hasty schemes,—and the firmest possible discouragement of any- thing like Socialism, together with a careful attention to the proper development of the material resources of France,—the making of canals and roads, and the utilising of the already made railroads,—all for the purpose of securing that steady progress in prosperity which a -single revolution or coup d'etat so fear- fully interrupts. Even as to the policy of the future, M. Leon Renault favours nothing more radical than the repeal of the University measure of the recent French Government, and a return to the principle of a purely national University ; cer- tainly not a violent, but, as far as we understand the matter, neither an urgent nor, on the whole, a desirable proposal. But even this slight measure of precaution—as M. Leon Renault probably deems it—against the educational policy of the Ultra- montanes, the prudent orator does not advise pressing, until the next set of Senatorial elections have given the Republicans a working majority in the Senate such as they already have in the Chamber. He would-hazard nothing which wouldeettheUhainber and the Senate in conflict with each other, so long as the result of such a conflict might possibly be a new attempt to upset the Republic. For the present at all events, he advises, as M. Gambetta, also advises, a policy of extreme caution. I3oth states- men would have the Republicans entrench themselves in the position they have won, and fortify it with new earthworke; rather than hazard any forward movement which might weaken their position. A temperate reform of the Press law,—a law regulating the proclamation of a state of siege so as to secure the Republic against surprise,—and a general amnesty, which should put an end to the recent prosecutions,—such are the chief immediate measures of precaution advocated by the Left Centre, together with any general measures by which the in- dustrial resources of France might be developed and the tranquillity of the country thereby secured.
Such is the programme of M. Leon Renault and the peat majority of the new, as distinguished from the old Republicans, and we think our readers will admit that a popular policy less alarming and incendiary could hardly be sketched out. Not a word is uttered against the Church. The Army is to be heartily supported, and its discipline enforced. Authority is to be vindicated, with only so mach the more confidence that at the same time liberty is to be secured. The chief energy of the Administration is to be expended on the measures by which the labour and capital of the French peasantry will profit. Not a word is hinted of a policy of revenge against the Monarchical parties, and all the drift of the new Republicans is profoundly opposed to such a policy. A guarantee of safety against fresh shooks,—military or political—is the one great wish of the new Electorate. They ask for a Republic not as the grand fulfil- ment of poetic aspirations, but as the only -satisfactory pledge against dangerous and mischievous crusades. The new Republi- cans speak as the mouthpieces of a class who are frugal, labori- ous, shrewd, but above all, sober-minded,—the class of peasant proprietors, whose savings, invested either in their land or in Rentes, make them desire peace with Europe as much as they desire a career of undisturbed industry and frugality at home. And the leaders of course take their cue from the followers. M. Leon Renault, looking before and after, sees nothing in the Empire to praise except its sagacity in promoting the commer- cial interests of France. And with all his praise of the Republic, this it is which chiefly excites his admiration,—that by its flexi- bility,—its power of moulding itself to the need of the moment without any change of constitutional form,—it averts crises in which labour starves and capital loses its best investments. There is room in a Republic for the expansion of liberty without scaring authority, for the demand for firm government and the demand for liberty come alike from the people. There is room even for its contraction without intoxicating authority, for liberty can only be contracted through the fear felt by the people of the prejudicial results of their own spasmodic impulses. Thus it is the sobriety of the Republic,—its sobering influence alike on the Administration and the masses, —which recommends it to the new and ablest class of French statesmen, as much as it would have alienated from it eager dreamers like M. Respell or M. Delescluze.
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