THE EASTERN PROBLEM.
The Far East : its History and its Question. By Alexis Krauaae. (Grant Richards. 18s.)—In his latest work Mr. Krausse has given us a valuable epitome of the political history of the Far East, and a summary of the chief problems which await solution. Our policy in the past, so runs his argument, has lacked any consistent principle. We have been careless about Chinese prejudices, and we have been too easy with Chinese arrogance ; we have preached peace when there was no peace, and non- interference when everybody was scrambling for territory ; and though our trade with China is nearly double that of all the other countries added together, we have taken no measures to protect it. Russia, aiming at the sovereignty of Eastern Asia, has been pushing southwards unchecked, while France is usurping trade and territory from the south. Our policy has been throughout. a paradox ; for "while we refrained from championing China against Russian aggression, we yet adhered to our nominal policy of demanding the respecting of the integrity of China." The interests of Japan and the United States are the same as our own ; but Mr. Krause, while he considers the alliance the beet thing in a. had business, seems to regard the two Powers ea somewhat intractable allies. So far the author writes in a pessimistic strain. But he is less hag-ridden by the Russian bogey than most writers on this subject, and he points out Russia's strategic weaknesses, the defects of her Trans-Siberian Railway, and her inability permanently to conciliate conquered tribes with much shrewdness. One other point he might have noticed, which applies both to Russia and France. Had China been a lifeless mass, the policy of land-grabbing might have paid ; but on the view which now obtains, that she still lives and must be kept living, the territory which the two Poweri have gained will only increase the difficulties and responsibilities of its owners. Mr. Krausse also points out what we believe to be a fact, that "the main principle in the policy of Germany must always be a mocha vivendi with Russia," and that it is useless to look to Germany to check Russian aggression. With the author's
conclusion on the general question, which is that "some other Power must seize, in the form of a protectorate or in actual occu pation, those portions of the Far East which abut on the Muscovite frontier," we do not agree, nor with the detailed scheme of division which he proposes. Such a solution would give rise to new problems harder to solve than the first, apart from the fact that it would he impracticable without a show of armed strength sufficient to check any hostile alliances. But we are entirely at one with Mr. Krausse when he sees small chance of success in the way of mutual understanding. It is a case in which no result can satisfy all, and it is for the stronger Power to insist upon its demands. Let us realise what are our real interests in the East, and, having our mind finally made up, let us make it clear that this share—the Yangtse Valley or whatever it is—is our irreducible minimum. There need be no war, but there must be a clear knowledge of our interests ; other- wise we will negotiate vaguely till we find too late that we have been elbowed out of what we really wanted.
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