TOPICS OF THE DAY.
OUR WAR AIMS.
MR. LLOYD GEORGE'S speech has been accepted every- where except in Germany as a most just, reasonable, and moderate statement of the War Aims of the Allies. It was indeed a masterly effort— a State Paper of the first order. It was timely, it was temperate, it was as conciliatory as the facts allowed, and yet in all essentials it was as firm as it was fair. In almost every respect the speech was worthy of a great occasion. Such criticisms as we have to offer are not intended to derogate in any way from our general sense of the greatness of the speech as a statement of our minimum war aims. We have criticized Mr. Lloyd George of late sharply and plainly, and shall continue to do so whenever he is, in our opinion, showing recklessness, levity, or weakness ; but we shall not, for fear of foolish charges of fickleness, refrain from praising him when he is worthy of praise, as he most certainly is in the present case. Neither our censure nor our laudation is to be let on lease. The speech showed how grossly unjust have been the accusations of militarism, Imperialism, ambition, cynicism, and oppression brought by the Pacificists against those who are determined not to abandon the struggle till the cause of Liberty and of a lasting Peace has been won. But though Mr. Lloyd George's statement of our general aspirations, and in the main of our specific proposals for carrying out these aspirations, was beyond praise, there were certain points where his words were, we venture to say, somewhat vague, and unnecessarily vague. We will, however, deal first with those parts of the speech in regard to which there will, we believe, be entire agreement. In the first place, the Prime Minister was thoroughly sound on what we may call the Three " R's "—Restoration, Repar- ation, and Redemption. By Restoration we mean, of course, the restoring to freedom and independence of the States of Belgium, Serbia, and Montenegro, and the restoration to the States to which they belong of the occupied parts of France, Italy, and Rumania. By Reparation we mean the obliteration as far as is possible of the hideous evils, physical and moral, perpetrated wherever German occupation has taken place. Though Mr. Lloyd George did not say so specifically, this Reparation must clearly be made by those who committed the crimes, and not by the victims themselves, or by the peoples who were not only innocent of the misdeeds but were doing their best to prevent them—i.e., the Allies. When a man's house has been burnt, you do not make the friends and neighbours who worked at the risk of their lives to put out the fire pay the greater part of the penalty which is exacted from the evildoer. As for Redemption, that means the redeeming of lands which have been suffering from oppression, such as Poland, the Italian provinces of Austria, the Rumanian province of Hungary, and, most important of all, Alsace-Lorraine, portions of France included against their will in the German Empire forty-seven years ago. They must be redeemed in the interests not only of Liberty and Justice but of a permanent Peace—the consideration which must be paramount throughout the resettlement of Europe. If the principle of Redemption is not honestly and thoroughly carried out, we shall leave the seeds of future wars. Mr. Lloyd George made it clear that Redemption was to apply to Alsace-Lorraine, to Italia Irredenta, and also to those unfortunate provinces of Turkey now freed, or in process of being freed, from the awful weight of Ottoman oppression—Arabia, Armenia, Syria, and Pales- tine. Finally comes the case of the German Colonies, places where, when the veil is ultimately lifted, it will be found that the horrors of German rule show as ghastly a face as even in Belgium itself. Mr. Lloyd George fully realizes that to hand back the natives to the tender mercies of their former German governors would be an outrage on civilization. But here we must interpose a caveat. We are perfectly willing that the future of the German Colonies shall be considered in a Confer- ence with our Allies. If, however, the Conference at which Mr. Lloyd. George tells us that the future of the Colonies will be decided is to be a Peace Conference at which Germany will be represented, the venue is radically bad. The notion of inviting the wolf to join in a friendly discussion as to whether the mangled lamb is to be handed over to him to be finished, or whether it is to be taken up, cared for, and restored to life, is more than we can stomach, and more, we believe, than the nation as a whole will stomach. We do not for a moment accuse Mr. Lloyd George of wishing to let the criminals be parties to settling the sentence on their crimes, but we do think it is high time that our rulers, when they talk about a Peace Conference, should tell us exactly what they mean by the term " Conference." They must inform us who are to be the members of that Conference. They now use the words " Peace Conference " and " Conference " as if they were interchangeable, or indeed of identical meaning. A similar consideration applies to Reparation in the matter of German action at sea. Mr. Lloyd George most rightly insists that there must be reparation for injuries done in violation of international law. As he puts it, " the Peace Conference must not forget our seamen, and the services they have rendered, and the outrages they have suffered for the common cause of Freedom." The whole British nation, and all fair-minded people throughout the civilized world, will endorse this declaration. But here again we find ourselves checked by the consideration of how the " Peace Conference " (the words actually used by Mr. Lloyd George in this context) is to be constituted. The notion that German representatives are to discuss whether it is or is not a crime to take away their cork jackets from seamen, place the said seamen on the deck of a submarine, and then submerge it, and if it is a crime, in what way reparation should be made, is surely utterly inadmissible—an intolerable concession to shame- lessness and crime. And here we must enter another caveat. Though Mr. Lloyd George alluded generally to the need for Reparation in the matter of breaches of international law, he dealt specifically only with the case of the sea- men. We sincerely trust that this does not mean that the equally horrible violations of international law which have taken place in Belgium and France are to be passed over in silence. Are we to forget the shootings of the hostages, the forcing of prisoners of war and of civilians to take part in semi-combative work, and the criminal recourse had by the Germans to fire, famine, and slaughter ?
As regards the problem of Austria-Hungary, the Prime Minister's words showed the vagueness which we have already mentioned. If we are determined, as Mr. Lloyd George most rightly says we must be determined, not to leave the seeds of future wars in our settlement, how are we to avoid what he calls " the breaking up of Austria-Hungary " ? For ourselves, we have always desired in the abstract to come to some arrangement with Austria-Hungary. But what is to be done if the oppressed nationalities of Austria-Hungary tell us that they cannot and will not continue under the yoke of the Hapsburgs ? Mr. Lloyd George admits that in any case Poland must be freed ; but if Poland, why not the Czechs of Bohemia and the Croats, Slovaks, Slovenes, and other South Slays ? This problem, however, is so difficult that we do not wonder that Mr. Lloyd George did not attempt to be specific, but looked to future consideration. Here again, however, it must be the consideration of the Allies, and not discussions in which the Austrians, Turks, and Bulgarians are to have a proportionate voice.
We need not say that we are heartily glad that Mr. Lloyd George discriminates between the German people and their rulers, and insists that we have no desire to deprive the German people of their right to choose whatever Government they will. Again, he rightly insists that we have " never aimed at the breaking up of the German peoples or the dis- integration of their State or country." That has been the position of the Spectator ever since August, 1914. We want to see Germany reformed, not destroyed. But we have always felt that those who insist that Germany shall not be deprived of the right of self-government, and that there shall be no sowing of the seeds of future wars by wresting from her any unwilling provinces—i.e., no creating of new Alsace-Lorraines—ought to be very careful in the matter of foundations. They ought to follow the example of Bismarck, and insist that Peace should be made with the freely elected representatives of the German people, and not with a Govern- ment which draws its sanction, not from the will of the governed, but from the alleged divine right of a particular Royal family. No doubt there are difficulties here, though they are difficulties which Bismarck insisted on surmounting ; but at any rate, if our proposal is rejected, the Allies should make it clear to the German nation that it will be possible to agree to far more liberal terms if they are endorsed by the German people as a whole, than if they are only accepted by the Kaiser and the representatives of the military oligarchy. In a Junker Peace there must always be the danger of the seeds of future wars. What would be our answer if twenty years hence an emancipated German Democracy, finding some- thing that it disliked in the final Treaty of Peace, were to declare that it was never a party to it, and that therefore Free Germany had a right to repudiate its terms ? To put it at the lowest, then, we ought to warn the German people that terms made with the Hohenzollerns will have to be a-good deal sterner than terms made with the representatives of a Reichstag elected for the purpose of making Peace. Unfortu- nately, however, Mr. Lloyd George seems deliberately to have rejected the proposal to remind our enemies of the fact that the longer they postpone Peace the worse must be the terms, and that the precedent of the Sibylline Books holds good. Even in the case of Turkey this very important point seems to have been forgotten. Certainly the Turks should have been told that if they want to retain Constantinople they can only make sure of it by an immediate cessation of hostilities. An unlimited promise of Constantinople was quite unnecessary. As far as aspiration goes, nothing could be better than the three conditions which, in the peroration of his speech, Mr. Lloyd George laid down as essential :— " Firstly, the sanctity of treaties must be re-established ; secondly, a territorial settlement must be secured based on the right of self. determination or the consent of the governed ; and, lastly, we must seek by the creation of some international organization to limit the burden of armaments and diminish the probability of war."
With the second of these conditions we have already dealt at length. With the first—i.e., the re-establishment of the sanctity of treaties—we are in the strongest possible agree- ment. We have always, indeed, regarded this as a much better method of building up a system of international amity and peace than that of a League of Nations, or than a system of arbitration imposed from above. The great difficulty about arbitration is that there is always a risk of the Power against which the arbitration goes refusing to accept it. You then have the great difficulty of invoking force to carry out the arbitration. But when once recourse is had to force, you will find that there are nations, like men, who are in favour of the law but against its enforcement. Practically every one assents in theory to the law that if a man makes a formal lease of his house to John Smith on condition that John Smith is to give up possession if he fails to pay his rent, John Smith must go. There are, however, a very great many people who will in practice always strongly dissent from carrying out by force an order made by the Court upon John Smith requiring him to fulfil the covenants in the lease and leave the house. In view of the difficulties connected with arbitra- tion, we desire that the sanctity of treaties should be pro- tected by an international agreement, not for arbitration, but to enforce the sanctity of treaties by a universal boycott of any nation which refuses to carry out the obligations of a contract set forth in a treaty between two Sovereign States. No doubt it will be necessary to have some sort of Tribunal to decide whether there has or has not been refusal to carry out a treaty contract, but this is a much easier business than arbitration on the merits of an intricate and bitter quarrel between two nations, involving complicated and difficult allegations connected with internal policy. No doubt, again, under the system we advocate nations would have to be protected against the dead hand of ancient treaties by an agreement that any treaty may be revoked by a year's notice from either of the contracting parties. An international rule of law of this kind would mean that in the case of a quarrel no shot could be fired for at least one year. But except in the case of a nation determined on a policy of conquest, it is inconceivable that during that year the quarrel could not be made up. In the case of a nation determined upon con- quest, the world would have time to arm itself. Of course no plan of this kind is perfect, but we think there is more hope in a universal determination to support the sanctity of treaties as long as they exist, than in an agreement of nations to place all their dearest aspirations at the mercy of an Arbitration Court. We think, that is, that there is a far greater hope of reaching our aim by basing action on a system of contract between individual States, than upon a League of Nations, which is almost certain to become oppressive, because, as happened in the case of the Holy Alliance, its cast-iron system leaves no hope to the oppressed. A League of Nations could not always be reviewing the internal policy of the constituent nations. But if it were not part of its plan to review them, it might in effect be guaranteeing immunity to every sort of misgovernment. Of a truth, Internationalism is not as easy as blind-man's-buff, as the Duke of Wellington and Castlereagh found when they began their attempt to argue the matter out with the Emperors of Russia and Austria and the King of Prussia in 1815. Mr. Lloyd George's final aspiration, " the limitation and reduction of armaments, in order to diminish the possibility of war," is almost more difficult than the aspiration with which we have just been dealing. Of course, disarmament is what we all long for and pray for. The difficulty is, how is it to be secured without sowing the seeds of future wars ? Take as an example the question of aerial warfare. Suppose in the future a State which has assented to the limitation of arma- ments is found to be building, by means of subsidies, com- mercial aeroplanes of great strength and speed, and then suppose that some other Power directs the attention of the International Council to this fact, and alleges that the said aeroplanes are intended to be used for military purposes, and are, in fact, a form of secret preparation for war. The reply of the accused Power will be of course that the accusing Power is simply acting out of commercial jealousy, and trying to throttle a rival by a false allegation of a breach of the International Agreement. Every one must admit that there is plenty of possibility of a wrong decision here—one based upon panic, or false information, or intrigue. But if a wrong decision is reached, how are we going to prevent a proud and powerful nation from repudiating it ? Do what we will, the "sacred right of insurrection " will always remain, for no one is powerful enough to eradicate that sentiment from the human breast, and indeed no true lover of freedom could ever wish to eradicate it. In truth, we come back to the sad saying : " It is possible to buy universal peace, but, alas ! the price that must be paid for it is too high." How will it profit the nations if they gain peace for the whole world and lose their own souls ?
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