THE FRENCH POLICY OF ENCIRCLEMENT. ,
WE have all looked to Czecho-Slovakia as one of the hopes of Europe. She has handled her own affairs brilliantly—more brilliantly probably than any of the States which were created by the Peace Treaties— she has stabilized her currency and launched herself upon what promises to be a prosperous commercial career. She has a President who is a man of letters and a cultivator of the arts ; she has a Prime Minister who has mounted very high indeed in esteem and power, though he is still a young man, and whose interventions between greater Powers in. the interests of peace have been welcomed and honoured. If any State directly related to the affairs of Central and South-eastern Europe could be written down as a safe friend for the ideas embodied in the Covenant of the League of Nations, that State was Czecho-Slovakia.
And now an event has occurred which brings us some misgiving. Our fears may be ill-founded, and we sin- cerely hope that they may prove to be so, but nobody who is jealous for the peaceful future of Europe should fail to point out dangers when he perceives them. That is what we propose to do. Czecho-Slovakia has negotiated a treaty with France which will probably be signed within a few days when the Czecho-Slovakian Prime Minister, Dr. Benes, visits Paris. We do not like the look of a treaty between Czecho-Slovakia and Paris, because it is likely to give moral support to the French policy of encircling Germany with a ring of enemies. It may well be that this new treaty is quite unlike the treaty between Poland and France and Belgium and France, which are military conventions—indeed, we give the Czecho- Slovakian declarations upon this subject their full and literal value—but we dislike the countenancing of French policy only a little less than a promise of material help. In an article in the Daily News of Monday, Mr. H. Wilson Harris, who is usually well informed, said that the treaty provides "first of all for defence of the dispositions in Europe established by the Paris Treaties, and in particular declares anew against any return of the Hohenzollems or Hapsburgs. It provides for obligatory arbitration without reservations between the two countries. It gives definite recognition to the League Covenant, and contains a passage designed to set any Italian apprehensions at rest."
Verbally that looks innocent enough, and Dr. Benes has pointed out that the treaty amounts to nothing more than one of those "regional understandings" which are provided for by Article 21 of the Covenant. All the same, we do not like the look of it. Why should Czecho- Slovakia desire any sort of alliance with France ? It was natural enough for her to ally herself with Jugo- Slavia and Rumania in the Little Entente, because all three wanted to provide against a possible return of the Hapsburgs, under whom all of them had suffered. But what are the Hohenzollerns doing in this galley ? There is sufficient evidence that France invited Czecho-Slovakia to make an alliance which would have been the equivalent of the Polish Alliance. If France had got her way, she might have been willing to grant even more credits for munitions. To Poland, Jugo-Slavia and Rumania she has already granted about 800 million francs in credits for this purpose, and Czecho-Slovakia might have become another beneficiary. To the credit of President Masaryk and Dr. Benes it must be said that they resisted a military alliance when they were in Paris last October. They said that they were ready to enter into an understanding which made no definite military promises, but that they would go no further. About the same time it was announced—quite sincerely we have no doubt—that Czecho-Slovakia intended soon to reduce her military establishment. On leaving Paris Dr. Benes promised to return and rediscuss the matter. The result of the subsequent discussion is the present proposed treaty.
However respectable the intentions of Czecho-Slovakia may be she is paying a moral tribute to the commanding military position of France in Europe. In a word, she has been drawn further into the French orbit. The policy of France is not in accordance with the spirit of the Covenant, but is derived from the pre-War days in which nations were grouped and power was balanced. We see no hope for Europe along these lines, and we sincerely regret that Ciecho-Slovakia should even seem to sanction it. Of course, in dealing with Czecho-Slovakia, France could argue from a strong brief. She could—and no doubt did—point out that Czecho-Slovakia owes her very existence to the Peace Treaties, and no doubt she also declared that her one and only object was the main- tenance of the situation brought about by those Treaties. Versailles, St. Germain, Trianon, Neuilly are all names of magic to a Czech ear.
It may be, too, that Dr. Benes has aims and ambi- tions which far transcend the merely negative or restric- tive policy of keeping Germany quiet by hemming her in. He is credited with a desire to lead Russia by the hand back into the comity of nations, and he may believe himself strong enough to influence France. Let us hope that he is, for this is indeed our main cause for hope. We recall that in the old days of the Triple Alliance we used to counsel Italy to remain in the Alliance for the very reason that she introduced into it an element of caution, and that she could be counted upon to cling round the legs of Germany when that demented country began to prance. As we all know, that is exactly the function which Italy in the end did perform to great purpose. If Czecho-Slovakia can play a corresponding part now, all may be well. In the meantime, every friend of Czecho-Slovakia here will watch events with some anxiety which will not be disposed of by the mere fact that the new treaty comes within the four corners of the Covenant and can be registered at Geneva.
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