National Government
THAT the National Government has no present intention of splitting into its component parts at the next General Election has been made perfectly clear by the programme of the Co-ordinating Committee. The case for its continuance is to be stated at a series of meetings throughout the country by the Prime Minister, Mr. Baldwin, Sir John Simon, Mr. Thomas and Mr. Chamberlain, in each case representatives of all the three parties appearing together on the platform. In taking their decision Ministers were presumably guided by one or more of three considerations : that the crisis which produced the coalition still confronts us and continues to demand unity ; that differences of opinion which may exist between Ministers or their supporters are not such as to preclude common action or justify return to the normal practices of party government ; that the Government as now constituted does stand for a fairly solid bloc of opinion, organized on new lines, future opposition to which may be expected to develop not from within their ranks, but outside. This last proposition is far removed from the first and the second. Its adoption would imply the belief, not necessarily that party govern- ment is dead, but that the old alignments are obsolete.
Perhaps one of the best arguments for the continuance of what is called the National Government is the absence of any powerful opposition to it, inside or outside Par- liament. We say " what is called the National Govern- ment," for it is clear that it is not fully national in the sense of representing all parties. The whole official Labour organization has been from the start avowedly hostile, and now the Samuelite Liberals, who control the Liberal Party machinery, are also in formal opposition. Yet the Government does possess a certain " National " character which is revealed by other facts than the inclusion of important Labour and Liberal Ministers. The Opposition elements are very half-hearted in attack. At no other time since the War has a Government been so tenderly treated by its critics. This may be partly due to the fact that the Samuelite leaders are still in a measure tied by their attitude at the election, and Labour by its weakness in the House of Commons ; but mainly it is due to a consciousness that the greater part of the country is not in the mood to tolerate party politics, and is still demanding the whole concentration of the national energy on certain essential national tasks.
If we ask what are those tasks, the official answer will be that they are substantially the same as in 1931. If we look below the circumstances which constituted that crisis—the stagnation of trade, the unbalanced Budget, unbalanced imports and exports, precarious currencies, and economic complications with other countries—we see that the demand for a strong National Government rested upon two desires : the desire to have a Government so far free from the temptation to curry favour by party promises that it could impose sacrifices upon the people in a spirit of disinterested prudence : and, secondly, the desire to have a Government that could effectually speak to foreign countries with the single voice of the people of Britain. An administration competent to deal with a unique situation at home and a unique situation abroad was believed to be indispensable to national recovery.
At home the position has changed considerably since 1931. The blessed word "economy" has lost much of its virtue, and there is no lack of critics to point out that it has left a blighting legacy in the timid housing policy and the unimaginative education policy so far pursued by the Government. The reduction in the numbers of the unemployed may be held to justify its economic programme, but in view of the increased employment in America, Germany, Austria, Japan and other countries— as shown in the recent report of the International Labour Office—it may be argued that the improvement here is as much due to world conditions as to the National Government.
But the political situation—strange as it may seem in a country the majority of whose politicians have been habitually and traditionally ill-informed about and indifferent to foreign affairs—has, during the last two and a half years, turned upon international matters. The nation has not forgotten that the crisis of 1931 was precipitated by the run of foreign depositors on the Bank of England ; that international debts played a great part in it ; that foreign tariffs had cut down our export trade ; that the antagonisms of foreign Powers have created the oppressive burden of armaments and fear of a new war ; and that the whole economic situation is conditioned, as Lord Lothian pointed out in a recent pamphlet, by international anarchy, manifesting itself politically in Communism or Fascism, economically in trade wars. It was to deal with this problem—a world problem—that the country desired and still desires a Government capable of speaking and acting for it with power and emphasis. The public interest which in earlier times was concentrated on the pitched battles between political parties in the House of Commons has been turned to another arena, and the nation watches a vaster conflict in which Britain and the principles for which Britain stands are pitted against other principles represented by other Governments. Domestic party differences seem a small thing in comparison with the world conflict between democracy and dictatorship, in which Britain is ranged on the side of democracy. Even the long-standing party quarrel about Free Trade assumes smaller dimen- sions in view of the fact that our Government, in spite of the tariffs it has imposed, stands, in relation to other countries, for the principle of freer trade. An over- whelming majority of the nation is profoundly pacifist in disposition, and longs for a government which can give tangible expression to its desire for measures of dis- armament ; and none of the spasmodic sensational Press attacks upon the League of Nations have diverted the mass of the British people from desiring the strong support of the principles for which the League stands.
Here are reasons for refraining for the moment from violent party politics and supporting a National Govern- ment. But those reasons would vanish into thin air if the Government failed to pursue a national policy. It must strengthen its Foreign Office and assert British policy abroad with far greater vigour than at present if it is to continue to deserve its title. If it accomplishes that, the storms and stresses of this period are good reasons why it should go to the country at the next General Election and ask for a prolongation of its life. But it cannot perpetuate it. In less abnormal times problems of social reform will present themselves with renewed insistence, and even if the present Ministers do not part company, other leaders must arise to express a rival mode of thought, and to satisfy the nation's instinctive and sound desire for occasional changes of rulers. The failure of the country to produce opposition leaders with alter- native plans is a convincing reason for the continuance for a time of the present Government, if it can contrive to strengthen its weak points. But at the next election there will be no walk-over as at the last, and Ministers would cherish a vain hope if they imagined that party politics will become extinct.
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