BOOKS.
WHEWELL'S LECTURES ON THE HISTORY OF MORAL PHILOSOPHY IN ENGLAND.* THE history, of Moral Philosophy is the narrative of the account men have given to themselves of the meaning of the word ought, of the consciousness which it expresses, and the faculty which it indicates. As in fact there originally exists among men, or grows up by education and circumstances, a great variety of character, and as in fact human conduct is traceable to a great variety of motives, and is indeed never dependent upon any single one, it is no wonder that thinkers have been led to make one and another of these motives the supreme rule of life, accordinL to their own temperament and their observation of mankind. But through these countless differences of opinion one broad line of de- marcation runs, and divides the disputants into two great parties. On the one side are ranged those who hold that the word ought should be expunged from our vocabulary, as being only an obscure and unmeaning way of expressing the supreme law of self-interest; who deny that mankind has any consciousnesi answering to the word except the universal desire of happiness, and couple with this the denial of the existence of any faculty in the mind by which qualities of actions are discerned, but substitute for such a faculty the power of judging of the consequences of actions. The opponents of this school urge, that if the word self-interest be used with any pretence of scientific precision, it is only one among many motives of human action; that among contending motives the will determines, and cannot do this without rousing into activity a pe- culiar sensibility,. of which the word ought is the exponent ; and that the faculty in which this sensibility resides judges of actions that they are right or wrong, that they ought or ought not to be done,—not that they tend to the happiness or misery of the person who does them, however by the constitution of things these two I may be inseparably connected. It is this fundamental antithesis in moral speculation that Dr. Whewell has illustrated in these• Lectures. Commencing with Taylor and Sanderson, and ending with Bentham, he briefly indicates the views taken by all the leading English moralists of the intermediate period ; sparingly , mingling with his narrative, exposition, criticism, and biography. I Unfortunately, Dr. Whewell is a man who has too many pur- suits and occupations to attain perfection in them all. The design of these lectures is admirable, aiming at an exhibition in detail of the development of the two sides of moral speculation among us, and at showing how the state of society and the progress of other branches of science acted upon this development. Enough of this I design has been executed to prove how interesting the writer might have made his theme had he bestowed upon it more time and more thought; but in their present shape the lectures are scarcely more than a rough draught put into order for delivery— notes taken and remarks made during the perusal of the writers who form the subject of the inquiry. The connexion between the writers, the relation their systems bore to each other in the way of correction, modification, advance, or retrogression, is very in- adequately made out, though every page bears evidence that such an organic growth was present to the author's mind, and only needed patience and thought to realize it for the reader. Thus the book is more the annals than the history of philosophy in England; and in this respect is inferior to the treatise contributed by Mr. Maurice to the Eneyelopcedia Metropolitana, which, sketchy as it is, yet seizes the method and the central truth of each writer, and exhibits the series as a necessary progress, of which no stage was superfluous or without modifying effects upon all those which suc- ceeded. Dr. Whewell, on tie contrary, collects the opinions of writers, instead of exhibiting their methods; dwells on their phraseology, instead of penetrating to the truth they attempted to express by their phraseology,—exceedingly useful as a first process, but not satisfactory as a final result, and leaving upon the mind an impression that the author deals with these subjects as scholastic exercises, not as the records of the life struggles of humanity to solve "the painful riddle of the world] There is a traperficiality of insight quite reconcileable with great knowledge, or at least great learning, as there is depth of insight often found in union with ignorance ; and, undeniably extensive as Dr. Whewell's learning is we could be well content to spare some of it for an occasional flash of that 'penetrating spirit which belongs to men whose studies in moralphilosophy have been in the con- flicts of their own souls as well as in the books of the schools.
Viewed, however, as running commentary on the authors who pass under review, these lectures will be serviceable to the student, containing much acute criticism, and hinting relations of phrase and system which he may work out for himself. Nor are they wanting in passages of weighty sense and graceful illustration. The subjoined passage contains an admirable statement of the posi- tion of the moral controversy, after the general reception of the Lockian metaphysic, and in its concluding paragraph gives proof that Dr. Whewell has not failed in writing a History of Moral Philosophy because he is ignorant of the true conception of such a history. "If all our conceptions and notions belong either to sense or to reason, virtue must be ranged either in one division or the other. If, on the other hand, virtue be neither a part of sense nor of reason, this cannot be a com- plete division of the human faculties. And this appears plainly to be the case, from the course of the controversy which I have described. In any • Lectures on the History of Moral Philosophy in England. By William Whewell, D.D., Master of Trinity Collmo, and Professor of Moral Philosophy, in the Univer- sity of Cambridge. Published by John W. Parker and Son. rigorous sense of the terms, it was found impossible to maintain either tl at virtue was merely a result of reason, or a result of a sense. And the two terms had in modern times had a rigorous meaning given to them. This had been the effect of the general 'progress of philosophy. Reason had been limited, sense had been definitely studied. Nor was it fitting to undo what had thus been done, in order to get rid of the difficulty' about the moral sense. If metaphysics have really become more precise, we must not attempt again to throw the subject into confusion, for the purpose of providing a temporary refuge for morality. If sense and reason have taken up fixed positions, anil virtue cannot find a place with either of them, we must seek one which is appropriate to her. If philosophers have analyzed man's intellectual being, and ascertained that moral good does not derive its origin from thence, wo must analyze the remainder of his being, and try if we can discover what the true source of moral relations is.
"We must do this, that is, if we can, and as soon aswe can. It is easy to say, We must discover,' but this declaration of necessity does not necessarily lead to discovery. It is easy to say, 'We must analyze,' but it is hard to analyze aright. If it be true that in recent times the senses and the intel- lect have been more thoroughly studied, mere completely dissected, their structure and processes better determined than had before been done ; hew much labour, -how much time, how much ability, how long a succession of persevering inquirers, each profiting by the labours of his re ecessor* this progress required! o e can one man, one generation, perfor m irssuch a task ? If, after all the attempts to discover the true nature and grounds of moral rectitude, we have the labour to recommence, we can hardly hope that we shall be permitted to see it completed. "But this is not so. It is far from being true, in the progress of know- ledge, that after every failure we must recommence from the beginning. Every failure is a step to success. Every detection of what is false directs us towards what is true : every trial exhausts some tempting form of error. Not only so • but scarcely any attempt is entirely a failure ; scarcely any theory, the result of steady thought, is altogether false ; no tempting form of error is without some latent charm derived from truth."
Another noble passage' though perhaps somewhat too rhetorical in illustration, furnishes also the precise test by which, if this work be judged, it must be considered a failure. The "point of union" hinted at towards the close has been found at least approximately, but no one would guess the fact from reading this book from be-
ginning to end. • -
"Cudworth and Locke are perhaps the two greatest English names on the two contrary sides of the question respecting the nature of knowledge. But these two speculators made their philosophical voyage with very different fortune. They started from the opposite shores of the great ocean of specula- tion: Cudworth in a vessel of heavy and antique fashion, deeply laden with ancient treasures ; Locke in a lighter bark, fitted to skim nearer the surface, and exhibiting in its rigging the improvements of modern times. But this was not all the difference. The breezes of popular favour, which had long veered between the opposite quarters of ideas and sense at last set steadily
in favour of the latter ; the Lochan theory rushed on before the prosperous wind, with expanded sails and flying colours ; while the system of Cudworth, ill suited for such a rivalry, endeavoured in vain to make head against the adverse influences. And thus at this period all seems to be in favour of the ultimate success of the new doctrine.
"Yet let us not be too hasty in deciding thus. Let us not despair of the fortunes of the course which leads from ideas to truth. The voyage is yet far from finished ; it is hardly begun. Who knows what changes the suc- cessive time may still have in store. Perhaps the newer system, while it thus bounds on with bending mast and swelling canvass, may be suffering a strain which its texture is too frail to resist. Perhaps its parting sides may admit the surrounding flood, ever ready to whelm such adventures in its un- fathomable depths. Perhaps the rising storm may soon bring to light the superior security of the stronger forms of ancient building ; 'perhaps the direction of the wind may change ; perhaps from that other shore, lighter galleys, fitted for modern times, may advance to relieve their comrade. Or, once more, perhaps it may be found that both paths, rightly pursued, lead to the same end: and persevering and skilful navigators, who have taken their departure from the remotest positions of the intellectual globe, may still meet in some common point, to which their course is tending; may find and recognize each other as fellow-labourers on some shore as yet undiscovered ; may rejoice together in the bright sunshine of the unknown Islands of the Blest, which they :sought. so long in mist and twilight, ever mistaking each other, and missing of their aim.
"Such a point of union we may consistently hope there will be found. We know from the history of all the most clear and undoubted portions of our knowledge, that except we are rightly guided by ideas, truth is not to be found. From the physical sciences themselves, the great boast of the philo- sophy of experience, we know that experience cannot lead to solid know- ledge, except so far as it is combined with a careful investigation of the ideas which knowledge must involve. We know that the attempts to reject these fundamental elements of truth involve us in endless change, obscurity, and doubt. We know, in short, that we must look for no science of morals, as -we find no science of any other kind, except we can discern the region where the truths taught by Cudworth and by Locke are united ; where the eternal and the immutable beams through the outward veil of the actual and visible ; where experience gives reality to ideas, and ideas give universality to the truths which we gather from experience."
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