THE CASUALTIES.
LAST week we wrote of the serenity with which soldiers at -1-4 the front accept the prospect of death, having put behind them all speculation as to their chances and all weighing of probabilities, and having thus reached a com- posure which is the most edifying aspect of courage on a grand scale the country has ever seen. We wrote, too, of the equal yet different courage of people at home, who, though weighted by their sense of comparative helplessness—for they do not enjoy the new and strange standard of emotions which is the gift and merciful privilege of the soldier in battle—are only anxious when death has claimed a member of their families to go on with their work quietly, and to lose more relations if so be the country's cause may be served. All this is splendid conduct. One cannot use words that would over. praise it. But lately a tendency in conversation and news- paper writing has become apparent which might shake the resolution of some at home; and the pity would be great if that happened, because calmness would be sacrificed through a pure misunderstanding. Others at home, no doubt, are in an unshakable position. No personal sorrow—sorrow, is not, of course, the less real because the sufferer would have scorned to throat away the conditions of it—could ever persuade them to falter in their conviction that the loss of husbands, eons, brothers, and friends is worth while for honour. We did not, indeed, put it strongly enough in saying that they would have scorned to thrust away the conditions of sorrow. The thought that self-respect could admit any choice would never even have entered into their minds. The tendency which we are thinking of is that of over-emphasizing the casualties.
We read, for example, such headlines as "Another Long List of Casualties," " More Heavy Losses," and so on. And these phrases have their echo in general conversation, so that the country is in danger of regarding the casualties as some. how out of proportion to the number of our troops employed and to the military ends achieved. No one could possibly deny that the recent losses literally justify any epithets of pity and deep concern that may be applied to them. But we do deny that such headlines and such a tone in conversation are, in effect, faithful to the facts. It is quite an easy feat, and quite a familiar one, to distort facts while confining oneself to the use of words which may be literally justified. The worst part of the practice we are describing is the tendency to use the casualty lists as a method of argument for some particular policy. We all know that we have not had enough high-explosive shells at the front, and we all know that an advance depends solely on our ability to make that defect good. But we venture to say that when allowance has been made for all the lives which might have been saved if high-explosive shells had been more plentiful, we could not have reduced our casualty lists by more than a very few thousands. To say that our advance has been delayed is a different thing from saying that most of the casualties so far incurred might have been avoided. The vast majority of them could not have been avoided. Of course, if when the war began we bad had an enormous reserve of the sort of ammunition which this war has proved to be necessary, the casualty lists might have been very different. Mr. Lloyd George may well be right in saying that if we had had enough high-explosive shells the Germans would now be neither in France nor in Belgium. But all that goes back too far to justify the use of the casualty lista as a political argument in the present circumstances. The effect of setting forth the casualty lists in such a way as to suggest wanton prodigality in lives is merely to create distrust in the leadership of the country—the worst spirit for a nation which wants to wage war successfully. It is difficult to describe in exact terms the use of casualty lists which is fair and the use which is unfair. There is no prescription. And yet every one must recognize in practice the use which conveys an insinuation or encourages an unnecessary despondency. We want candour, frankness, and the entire truth ; we do not want any trace of pessimism, which is both unwarranted and useless. The fact which many people seem to forget, for all its simplicity, is that our casualties are bound to increase as the number of our troops abroad increases. The only condition on which the casualties would not increase would exist if the growing Armies at the various fronts were not used for the purposes of war—a condition which ought not to satisfy any sane person. It is manifestly absurd to compare the casualties at the beginning of the war with the casualties now. Then we had on the western front our magnificently trained but small original Expeditionary Force. Now we have—well, we must not hint at numbers, but two months ago Mr. Lloyd George spoke of our seven hundred thousand men in the various theatres of war, and since then the numbers have been greatly increased. The casualties are not relatively greater now than they were at the beginning. The swelling casualty lists are not an argument for this or that, and certainly not a reason for military despondency, but a mere statistical fact which could have been foreseen, and by students of war like Lord Kitchener actually was foreseen. Suppose that the experience of this war shows that there is an average wastage of ten per cent. or fifteen per cent. a month, it is very easy to see what sort of casualties must be expected in our new Armies, and very easy also to reach the conclusion that our casualties so far have not been beyond the estimates that should have been formed. The casualty lists are a new thing to us because we have never before had such a great Army. But we must remember that the French, the Russians, and the Germans have borne the burden of such huge lists, with all the misery they convey, since the beginning of the war. Where their resolution has not wavered, shall ours ? English men and women will have only to ask themselves that question to answer it in one way.
There are other facts which should not be forgotten in contemplating the casualty lists. The vast majority of wounded men who are brought to the hospitals recover. Never did the skill of surgeons stand so high ; never were doctors so quick to prevent each new menace from some disease peculiar to the conditions of the moment. Epidemics such as used to carry off in former wars more soldiers than were killed in battle are absent now. Inoculation against enteric fever has saved many thousands of lives in this war, if we may judge from the unfortunate experience of the South African War. The Army in Flanders passed through one of the most trying winters on record with an unparalleled absence of disease. The organization of the commissariat, again, has been beyond praise. Starvation used onoe to be a depicter of armies. Not a single British soldier, who has not becomo detached from his battalion, has suffered from even temporary want in this war. When we think of the Crimean War—of a noble Army freezing and dying from disease and suffering cruel privations on a plateau within easy reach of the coast and the transports—we may appreciate the clockwork per- fection of the Army Service Corps system to-day. In sum, the casualty lists in this war prove nothing, and should be employed to prove nothing—except that in a war against the strongest military Power in the world victory can be won in the last analysis only by laying down life. If the lists cannot make us optimists, they certainly should not make us pessimists. All that we suffer the Germans are also suffering. Owing to the fashion of their fighting, we may be mire that whatever our casualties may be theirs will always be heavier —at least in the proportion of three to two.
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