Irtitr in tOt Eititur.
SHAM REPRESENTATION OF MAJORITIES: ELECTORAL LMPOST1JRE8.
fint—The return made at the recent election for Marylebone has been spoken of as an indication of the state of feeling of the public on the Re- Mm question ; on which I beg leave to observe, that it is a return made by a minority, little more than one-third of the 20,000 electors, a minority no- toriously composed of the lowest and loosest of those who are under the in- fluence of the vestries. On the previous contested election, when the ultra- Itadieal professors of political purity at elections, put forward as their fa- vourite candidate, a gentleman convicted of bribery at St. Albans, some of the majority of electors thought fit to step out, and Lord Ebring- ton was returned, despite of the vestrymen. On the present occasion, few of the majority may have seen sufficient evidence of the legis- lative qualifications of Colonel Remaly to impress them with the be- lief that it was their duty to incur the sacrifice of time and trouble, and probable annoyance in attending to give their votes for him in pre- ference to his opponent. These elections, however, really furnish only examples of the influence of money power, under the existing barbarous electoral arragements. Mr. Bell, according to the published accounts, spent somewhat less than three thous•ind pounds, and lost—Lord Ebrington spent more than live thousand pounds, and won. In the recent election, Colonel Ito- rainy spent little more than two thousand pounds, and lost. Mr. James spent more than double,—it is reported snore than six thousand pounds, and won. On the part of professional men, these outlays are viewed as in- vestments, for position and professional advancement. Mr. James, by his investment, gams the position and sonic of the chances of his friend Sir Alexander Cockburn. In a contested election the money power is exercised in the hire of numerous public-houses as committee-rooms, which is the hire of the publican's interest with his customers ; in the hire of election agents for districts, and the hire of canvassers. The hired canvassers, are hired laudatorssger tiers, iihd detractors, in short hired liars, to act upon 6 omit, to whom they can obtain access. The simple elector ay by them be inflamed with hatred against Andrew Marvel, as a politi- cal villain, and animated with enthusiasm for Repay, the hirer who has as- cumulated wealth from bill discounting and from the hire of vile tenements, &c., who finds it worth while to pay for social position. For such purposes those are hired as canvassers, who are related to electors, or who are connected with them, and who can get up votes "to oblige me"—the canvasser : pay- ment to the body of agents is payment or bribery for influence with the electors. It is notoriously the most respectable of the electors constituting the majority who are not to be influenced by the low class of agents and can- vassers hired for electoral purposes. Though the more respectable trades- men and professional men, and persons of better education constituting the majority of the electors, are averse to enter the crowds at public housniueet- ings, or to encounter the assaults, or the impetuosities of agents, or the tu- mults of boiling booths, or to sacrifice their time and attention from their business for the purpose of voting,—it is proved that when they are re- lieved from the necessity of such sacrifices and inconveniences, they do ex- ercise their franchise in greater numbers on less important occasions, name- ly, in the election of guardians by the collection of votes by means of voting papers from house to house. Under that method, and without hired can- vassers or multiplied open houses as committee rooms, at an expense not greater than two extra polling places, or less than one twentieth the ex- pense now imposed on the candidates, 17 or 18,000 voters or more, or the positive majority would have been enabled to vote. The representation of the metropolis, as a representation of the majority of the electors, is a huge im- posture. In almost every instance, as the statistical returns show, it is a re- presentation of minorities got by money power, as at Marylebone, as is shown in the majority of instances by the return of the electoral expenses. This these impostor minorities and their representatives well know, and therefore they will be found to be bitter opponents of the MCUTIS of reducing expense and of giving convenience to the exercise of the franchise by the majority. They are mendacious in their assertion of the peculiar liability to abuse of the mode of election which does this. The statistical returns show that the com- plaints on account of false returns, though they may be made at the trouble
only of writing to the Poor-law Board, are scarcely a tithe of the petitions against false returns of Parliamentary elections, though these are made under tremendous penalties of the expense to thepetitioners of Parliamentary committees. Lord Ebringtou, who had experience of both methods of election in the very borough of Marylebone, and also as Secretary to the Poor-law Board, states very clearly the nature of the remedy in the sub- joined portion of a recent address, which is at this time deserving of peculiar "I am not going to undertake any review of the past session, otherwise there would be much to comment upon in its eventful course. I must, how- ever, say one word about the Corrupt Practices at Elections Bill,' because it involves principles bearing no less upon Local and Municipal than upon Parliamentary Elections.
"Independent of the grosser evils of actual bribery, treating, and inti- midation, the opposite dangers to be guarded against in all Elections consist in the tendency, on the one hand, to practical self-disfranchisement among a large proportion of the constituency; on the other to an expense practically prohibitory to all but rich candidates—burdensome even to them, and unwholesome (to say the least) in its influence both upon them and upon their constituents. The first of these dangers is at once the most insidious, and the most difficult of removal. How often has a small clique, active, be- cause stimulated by strong personal interests, been seen to wrest and keep the management of affairs out of the hands of the inert, because disinterested, mass of the constituency. We may inveigh against the want of public spirit among electors, requiring the expensive organization of a canvass to excite, and of conveyances to tempt them to vote ; but we must look at men, not merely as they ought to be, but as they are ; and therefore, if we want those whom we enfranchise for the public good to exercise that right, or ra- ther to fulfil that duty, we should take care to impose upon its performance
as slight a tax as possible of time and trouble The simple remedy, both for the expensiveness of contests and the extensive self-disfranchisement of electors, consists in sending the few round to the many—the vote collec- tors to the vote givers—instead of trying to make the many go to the few, the voters to the poll clerks. This system, even as now practised under the new Poor-law, without the commonest precautions against carelessness or fraud, is still found to afford a fuller and fairer representation of the rate- payers than the system of polling did. With the aid of very obvious and inexpensive precautions, it would, I feel confident, afford all reasonable se- curity for the validity of each vote, while immensely increasing the total number given, besides diminishing the temptation to bribery and intimidation. We may say of representation as of the Thames, that we want it pure, but we also want it full. Fear of a possible admixture of taint should not lead as to exclude from either what is requisite to keep each up to the proper level, and to 'prevent it from shrinking, the one below its just, the other be- low its natural proportions."
Previous page
