SPAIN AND THE UNITED STATES.
CONGRESS, without a dissentient voice, has voted the Executive a sum of £10,000,000 to be spent in defensive preparations, naval and military. The scene in the Senate was most impressive. The vote was given in complete silence, and the whole proceedings did not take half an hour. As we have explained else- where, we believe that preparation is generally the surest way of avoiding war, because it prevents that misunder- standing of national intentions which is the very stuff out cf which wars are made. But though we hold that this proposition is most true for such a situation as that in which England finds herself at this moment, we do not think that it is true in regard to the United States. There the circumstances which are slowly but steadily tending towards intervention in Cuban affairs will not be altered by any amount of preparation. We do not, of cours mean to suggest that the activity in the American dock- yards will make war more inevitable. It will not do that, but it will not make it less so. The reason is plain. If Spain were doing something which she could desist from doing if she knew America was really in earnest, she would doubtless have her policy affected by the knowledge that the States are clearing the decks for action. But Spain, it must be admitted, is not t least in this situation. She is merely proving day by day her incapacity to deal with the Cuban problem. Yet this incapacity is the very basis of the American claim to intervene. America, in effect, tells the Spanish Government that she must put an end to the rebellion or else grant Cuba independence. But Spain cannot do the one and will not do the other. The result is a condition of anarchy, in an island only a few hours' journey from the coast of the United States, which is almost without parallel in modern history. There is thus no reason to hope that the now clearly expressed intention of America to insist on a change in the state of things in Cuba will have any influence on Spanish policy.
Let us look for a moment at the real facts of the situa- tion. The Spanish Government consider themselves bound, both on grounds of policy and of national honour, to keep their hold on Cuba, and not to yield to the demands for independence made by the rebels. The Spanish Government know that if they lost Cuba except as the direct result of war waged with a stronger Power, the present Monarchy would cease to exist. It is thus not merely the Ministry of the day, but the whole constitu- tional fabric in Spain, which is at stake. The dread of complications at home makes it absolutely impossible for the Spanish Government to give up Cuba,—vShich is the logical outcome of America's demands. The only course, then, open to the Spaniards is to try, either by war or by conciliation, to put an end to the rebellion. But neither of these policies seems to offer any reasonable prospect of success. In spite of the fact that Spain has sent two hundred and fifty thousand soldiers to Cuba, and that perhaps half of them have died of fever, starvation, and misery, the island is still unconquered and the rebels as strong as ever ; nor does it seem at all likely that any greater successes will be gained in the future than in the past. The policy of conciliation seems even more fruitless. The rebels have made it clear that they will accept nothing short of inde- pendence, and independence the Spaniards will not, or rather, as we have said, cannot, grant. The Spanish sense of honour and Spanish pride and ignorance demand that Spain shall cling to Cuba, even if the result be national ruin. The Americans are gradually coming to realise that this is the real state of the case. They began by making diplomatic protests and by taking up an attitude which, if the Spaniards had been a common-sense people, would possibly have resulted in independence for Cuba. The Americans expected Spain to say: 'We cannot fight both the United States and our own rebels, and therefore we will yield.' The Spaniards have said nothing of the kind, but instead 1 ave deter- mined that they would fight not only the Union but the whole world rather than yield. This has gradually brought the American people—we mean by "the Ameri- can people" not merely the Jingoes and the cranks but the mass of quieter citizens—to see that diplomacy can do nothing, and that they must take one of two courses. Either they must allow Spain to go on in Cuba, in the future as she has gone on in the past, or else they must intervene by means of war. There is no third course possible, for half-measures only mean letting Spain have a free hand in Cuba. Which course will the Americans choose ? Will they allow an island which is- not very much further from Florida than Jersey is from Hampshire to be turned into a permanent hell-upon-earth Or will they go to war to secure some amelioration of the situation ? In our opinion, they will reluctantly, and with many hesitations and misgivings, come to the con- clusion that Spain must cease to reign in Cuba, and that they must take action to produce this result. The likeli- hood of such a decision being taken before long is in- creased by the fact that the Government of the United States has now received a series of Consular reports as to- the state of the unhappy island. These reports are said to show that the effects of Spanish rule in Cuba have been- like nothing that the world has seen in recent times. housands of the peaceful inhabitants who have only desired to stand neutral, have been driven from their homes into the towns lest their presence on the land should give succour to the rebels, and in the towns they have died of disease and starvation. Mean- time the starving and ill-disciplined soldiers have been far more formidable and more dangerous to the- loyalists than to the enemy. In fact the Consular eports will show, it is alleged, a condition of things which is pitiable beyond words. The island is being utterly ruined, and the life led there seems to be as full of human misery as it is possible to conceive. Possibly, if these reports had appeared a year ago, they would not have been much noticed. Now they will be read everywhere, for the destruction of the 'Maine' has advertised the existence of the Cuban horror, and made every American realise that there is such a place as Cuba. The destruction. of the 'Maine,' though recognised as an accident, has made Cuba visible to America.
Under these circumstances we cannot hold that the American preparations make war less likely. They will not, we believe, alter the situation for the worse, but with- out them that situation had become critical in the extreme. As we have said, America has come to the meeting of the ways, and must decide whether she will allow Spain to do what she will with her own, or whether she will resolve that the reign of misery and wrong resting on ineptitude and pride shall cease in Cuba. In our belief, America will not allow Cuban anarchy to continue, and in spite of the very grave reasons which exist for non-intervention, she will before long take naval and military action. As Mr. Kipling has said, the Americans are very irresolute and very full of doubts up to the point when they wake- " The drumming guns that have no doubts."
After that there is no more irresolution till the last shot is fired.
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