HOW TO SECURE PEACE, O UR readers know the attitude which
we hold that this country should adopt towards France in regard to the West African dispute,—one of firmness and fearless- ness. In another column we have explained fully what we hold ought to be our policy in regard to the Russian advance in Northern China,—one which shall have nothing in it either of unreasonable prejudice or of the dog in the manger. But though we believe that this attitude and this policy if carried into effect will have the result of pro- ducing peace, we cannot disguise from ourselves that the situation is at present most critical, and that any act of weakness, or what may be considered an act of weakness, may end in our drifting into a position from which war will be the inevitable outcome. On the whole, we incline to the belief that our difficulties in the Far East will be solved without war. But though this is our belief, and though we hold that our chief danger lies in the dispute with France, the need for taking those precautions which we recommended last week has been increased, not diminished. There is still an urgent need for making France under- stand that we are in earnest about West Africa. At pre- sent no one in France takes the question of West Africa seriously. That small section of the French people who give the matter a thought, sincerely believe that John Bull is only making his usual fuss, and that if he is properly handled at the Quai d'Orsay, there is not the very slightest doubt that he will give way. The notion that war could arise over the Lagos Hinterland never enters the minds of Frenchmen. They scout the idea as preposterous and absurd,—a piece of British bin gue which is not going to take them in. As we said last week, the problem, then, is, how are we to make the French realise that we are in earnest ? We believe that the best way of all would be to mobilise a very powerful Special Service Squadron, and either to send it to reinforce the Mediterranean Squadron, or else keep it in our own home waters. Needless to say, this Special Service Squadron would not be officially commissioned to act either against Russia or France. It would be like the former Special Service Squadron—that fitted out in January, 1896—a general defensive measure.
No doubt we shall be told that such action would be criminally dangerous, and that it might bring about the very thing we wish to avoid,—a war with France. People will say that the French must, or at any rate would, reply by immediately mobilising their naval forces, and that when both fleets had been put into fighting trim, the difficulty of avoiding a fight would be extremely great, —nay, impossible. We venture to doubt the force of such arguments. To begin with, we ought to remember that the fitting out of the Special Service Squadron in January, 1896, had no such provocative effect. We fitted out that squadron, but we never intimated by word or deed for what destination it was intended, and we were never asked by any Power to explain the meaning of our action. Yet at that moment we had complications with two Great Powers just as we have now,—i.e., then with Germany over the Emperor's telegram and with America over the Venezuela question, as now with France over West Africa and Russia over China. The Powers in great matters are not so foolish as they seem. The German Emperor may be self-willed and sensitive, but he was wise enough not to ask us whether we bit our thumb at him. The only result of the so-called menace produced by the fitting out of the Special Service Squadron was a very great relief of the situation. The Germans saw that we meant business and were really in earnest, and instantly all the talk about landing ME_Ines at Delagoa Bay and helping the Trans- vaal to protect its rights died away and was no more heard of. They did not mobilise their fleets or their armies, and they have borne us no special grudge since, for they admitted, no doubt, that we had a right to make our own Admiralty arrangements without reference to any other Power. The advantage of such political action as that afforded by the fitting out of a Special Service Squadron is that the "face" of the nation which we wish to convince of the earnestness and reality of our intentions is saved. Germany's "face" was not spoiled by the Special Service Squadron, and yet she received the strongest possible notice that she must give up her pretensions in regard to South Africa. In all probability we should in the same way find France more, not less, easy to deal with if we put our Fleet in readiness than if we abstained from doing so merely out of a desire to appear friendly. We should not do any injury to the " face " of France by taking the course we suggest, and we should do a great deal towards making France understand that our dispute in West Africa is not one which can be settled offhand by the optimistic formula of our neighbours. "There must be no fighting over a swamp in West Africa."
A word on the suggestion that if we fit out a. Special Service Squadron France will mobilise her Fleet. In the first place, we do not believe that she would do anything of the kind. Such action would instantly awaken the mass of French public opinion to the danger of a war with England,—a danger of which it is now entirely oblivious. But France, though doubtless not afraid of England, does not at this moment want to go to war with her in the very least. There is nothing which the ordinary Frenchman would think more dis- agreeable than a war with England. The Army, again, if war comes, does not want it to be a naval war,— and so one in which it could get little or no glory. At present neither the non-political Frenchman nor the Army interferes in the matter of West Africa, for they either ignore it or believe it to be a matter for the diplomatists. 'When, however, it came to mobilising the French Fleet they would want to know what was happening. The Ministry, too, would not care to mobilise the Fleet unless they really intended war, which we are convinced they do not,—and for two reasons. In the first place, it would cost a great deal of money, and France, though rich, has no surplur. Next, mobilisation would almost certainly display certain deficiencies in the French Navy which, even if not essentially serious, would bring down a shower of criticisms and accusations on the heads of the French Admiralty and the Ministry generally, criticisms and accusations which it would be by no means pleasant to hear during the elections. But even if France did mobilise her Fleet, we do not believe that the risk of war would be in- creased. The fleets would not be more in contact than they are now. When two armies take the field their outposts very soon come into physical contact, and then collision is almost certain. We are not more likely, however, to get into collision with France when we have a large fleet in the Mediterranean than when we have a small one. Indeed, we are less likely. A small fleet in the Mediterranean offers a certain temptation to France to effect a coup de main. A large one affords no opportunity for snatching a victory by an act of daring. On all these grounds, then, we hold that the fitting out of a Special Service Squadron would be a safe, and not a dangerous, way of making France realise that this time we are in earnest, and that it will not be safe for her to argue that, because we gave way in Siam, in Madagascar, and in Tunis, therefore we shall certainly give way in West Africa,—be the merits what they may.
Before we leave the hateful subject of war, we may make a suggestion which is very timely just now. If war comes, as through a failure on our part to make the French realise that we are in earnest it may, it is to be hoped that one of he first acts of our Government will be to declare that it insures all British shipping against war risks. Unless this is done, our ship-owners may find it impossible for them to trade successfully unless they transfer their ships to a foreign flag. Even though we keep complete command of the sea, we shall be un- able to prevent the casual depredations of hostile cruisers. There may not be many such cruisers afloat, and they may catch in reality very few vessels, but every vessel will in theory run the risk of capture. The result will be that the rates of insurance for British vessels will rise to a figure which will make it economically advisable to transfer British ships to a neutral flag. But as the Americans found, shipping once transferred to another flag does not return. A. declaration insuring all vessels against war risks would prevent transfers, for it would prevent war placing any extra disability on our commerce. The burden on the nation would not be very great, for, as we have said, the captures would not be numerous,—especially as war would not be likely to last long. But even if the Government had to pay £10,000,000 in claims, it would be far better than losing our carrying trade. The money lost in compensating traders could not be better employed than in enabling our mercantile marine to keep its place on the high seas..
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