Could Israel save Arafat?
David Lay
When PLO dissidents raised a rebel banner in the Beka's Valley of eastern Lebanon, who could have predicted that within six months, rival Palestinian forces would for the first time engage in all-out fratricidal strife — and at the ex- pense, too, of hundreds of civilian casualties? How many, indeed, believed Yasser Arafat's repeated warnings that, in the northern Lebanese port of Tripoli, he faced a Syrian-backed bid to 'liquidate' him?
The inescapable truth is, however, that the unthinkable (even by Levantine stan- dards of political cynicism) has become a terrible reality, and that — whatever the cost in innocent lives — President Assad of Syria is determined to bludgeon the PLO Chairman into submission (or worse still, into the grave), and so ensure that Damascus at last has control of the Palesti- nians' destiny.
For the first time, the PLO leader faces the fire-power of fellow Palestinians (even if they are supported by Syria), and so he is deprived of his own people's undivided sup- port. Secondly, the Arab world is itself in disarray. Egypt, more or less disqualified from Arab diplomacy on account of its peace treaty with Israel, is a spectator on the side-lines. Iraq, another of Syria's tradi- tional rivals, has its back turned in order to confront the non-Arab threat from Iran. So who, if anyone, is Arafat's potential saviour? Certainly not Nimeiri again. King Fahd? Possibly, but it seems the Saudi ring/paymaster may already have conclud- ed that Arafat is a spent force — and, in any case, it requires the sharpest of whip- cracks, or the meatiest of cheques, to tame a rampant Assad (whose adopted name means appropriately, `Lion'). Nevertheless, in mid-week, a delegation of Gulf ministers knocked on the door of the Lion's den and pleaded with the Syrians to hold their fire in Tripoli, at least to spare the lives of its Lebanese citizens.
Like all Leos, the Syrian leader is harsh with rivals to his power and prestige. In Arafat's case — ever since, indeed, Assad (as Syrian Defence Minister) intervened to save the then unknown guerrilla com- mander from the gallows in 1966 — there is the added belief that the PLO leader has an obligation to discharge: since in those days it was the Syrian army that provided the muscle for Al-Fatah, and set it on course to wrest control of the PLO from Egypt. In- stead, in Assad's view, Arafat's ingratitude (in refusing to honour his 'debt' to Damascus) has compounded the error of his ways in denying Syrian dominion.
The battle for Tripoli, in fact, brings to a climax not only a personality clash but also a fundamental issue of principle — whether the PLO should be free to go its Own way, or whether it should harness itself firmly to the Syrian wagon. President Assad, for his part, has an unshakeable conviction that regional peace can stem only from Arab solidarity and military might; otherwise — if Jordan and/or the PLO were to follow the Egyptian and Lebanese precedents in coming to separate arrangements with Israel — Syria may alone be left empty- handed, with the Golan Heights (captured by Israel in 1967) lost for ever. Mr Arafat, on the other hand, has resisted putting all his eggs in Syria's Ba'athist basket — not least because he strongly suspected that Assad would have little compunction in purloining them.
In the 1970s — when the PLO's 'state- within-a-state' moved from Jordan to Lebanon and, at the same time, moderate Palestinians (Arafat himself included) began to entertain the idea of a compromise with Israel — the inherent Assad-Arafat tension, slid towards antagonism. In 1976, when the PLO and its leftist allies had gain- ed the upper hand in the Lebanese civil war, President Assad intervened decisively ro save the right-wing Christian militias from defeat — and so, for the first time, came to blows with Mr Arafat. The message to the PLO was as direct as it was painful: Syria, at any cost, would preserve for its own ex- clusive use the keys to war and peace wall Israel.
Arafat — bloodied, but not bowed in 1976 — refused, however, to accept the role of junior partner; and, having waged mini- wars with Israel in 1978 and 1981, the PLO leader challenged Syria's strategic interests head-on by linking up with Saudi Arabia in a joint offensive for peace. The eight-point plan, which indirectly recognised the state of Israel, came to be known as the `Fahd proposals'. But Syria learned — to its fury — that, in effect, Arafat was the author. To Damascus, this amounted to no less than treachery: and not only did Assad veto the initiative by boycotting an Arab summit, but also Syrian agents tried at least twice in the autumn of 1981 to assassinate the PLO Chairman.
Admirable though this commitment to independence may have been in the past, it became dangerously unrealistic after the PLO fighters' evacuation from Beirut the following summer. The PLO's world had changed dramatically, but Arafat himself — delivering a deliberate snub to Damascus — set sail for Tunisia, by way of Greece. The siege, he insisted, had been a 'victory'. And now, as a head-of-state-in-waiting, he would explore with his old enemy King Hussein of Jordan the limited prospects of- fered by yet another peace plan — pro- mulgated, this time, by President Reagan. Arafat, for once, had miscalculated badly: and the longer the United States pre- varicated, the more exposed he became to Syria's wrath.
In a Damascus basement office, where Plans for the assault on Tripoli were being finalised, a Libyan-funded Palestinian 'pro- gressive' declared that it would take a 'miracle' to save Arafat from the fate in store for him. Considering the condition of the Arab world — so seriously at sixes and sevens — it is hard to perceive the source of a. miracle. But wait. In the Levantine tangle always ask: Who stands to gain? Who, for instance, apart from the otherwise-engaged Egypt and Iraq, has a strong incentive to challenge Syria's aspirations to regional Pre-eminence? And who is it has an interest in keeping intra-Palestinian feuds on the boil?
Israel, by baring its fists in 1970, dissuad- ed Syria from pressing home its pro-PLO intervention in Jordan, and so helped to preserie the Hashemite throne. Could Israel today, perhaps supported by the US Sixth Fleet, come indirectly to Arafat's rescue by attacking Syria — or its Lebanese and Palestinian surrogates — in revenge not only for the massacre of American marines in Beirut, but also Israel's own dead in last Week's explosion in Tyre? Wittingly or un- wittingly — as both Israel and Syria brace themselves for possible conflict — could Prime Minister Shamir, once a ruthless leader of the Jewish underground, inter- cede, 'rnirabile dictu', as Mr Arafat's guar- dian angel? Or will the PLO leader, if he is going to survive, simply slip free of the Tripoli trap by departing the way he came in — by sea, under the gaze of Israeli gun- boats?
Whatever the outcome, the Lion of Damascus will growl contentedly.
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