TOPICS OF THE DAY.
THE WAR AND ITS CONSEQUENCES.
TN spite of the proverbial warning against dividing the lion's skin before the lion is dead, men are naturally beginning to consider what are likely to be the consequences of the war, and what changes will be made on the map of Europe when it is over. Such inquiries may not be very fruitful for the public in general, but undoubtedly it behoves the statesmen of Europe to give them their very best attention. And for this plain reason. The real danger to the peace of the world, paradoxical as it may seem, is most likely to occur when the actual fighting in the Balkans is over, or nearly over. It is the post-bellum settlement of the European provinces of Turkey and their disposition among the various claimants—in which unfor- tunately Austria-Hungary must be included—which will cause the trouble and may set the world on fire. If Austria-Hungary's claims cannot be ignored, no more can Russia's susceptibilities, and if a real clash of interests takes place between these two Powers, even though at the moment they seem in a conciliatory mood, it is difficult to see how their European backers can keep out of the fray. In opposition to what we have just said it may be urged that we are assuming that Turkey will be beaten, and that our pessimistic vision vanishes if, on the contrary, we assume that the Turks will hold their own or actually beat the Balkan League. In that case all will be as before, and there will be no need to divide or otherwise deal with Turkey in Europe. Those who argue thus will, we are certain, prove mistaken. Whatever happens, the status quo cannot be restored. It is this fact which, in the last resort, makes the future so dark and precarious. If we assume a Turkish victory, does anyone really imagine that the Turks, who, before the victory, have in effect refused to grant bond-fide reforms in Macedonia or to allow their Christian subjects those rights of self-government which would free them from Turkish oppression and misrule, will, when flushed with victory, agree to set up a system of self-government in Macedonia, Old Servia, and the rest of European Turkey which will prevent massacre and misrule ? Unquestionably they will do nothing of the kind. Even if the Turkish Government desired to do so, it could not, in view of the pressure of Mohammedan public opinion, excited and hardened by triumphs over the giaour. In the event of a Turkish victory the Turks will say : " We have vindicated our right and our power to rule by beating in the field those treacherous ' former serfs of ours' [the expression was used only the other day in a Turkish news- paper], and also those traitorous and disloyal subjects who tried to stab us in the back while we were engaged in fighting our enemies on the frontier. Instead of granting them so-called reforms, which would mean the weakening of our rule, we intend to found our rule on a basis which will make disloyalty and traffic with the Christian States of the Balkans impossible in future." Now, however strong may be the annoyance which the Great Powers at the moment feel with Bulgaria, Servia, Montenegro, and Greece, it is inconceivable that they could endorse the attitude towards the Christians of the Balkan Peninsula which we have just described. To begin with, if at the end of the war Austria-Hungary were to assent to the status quo being restored in this sense, she would risk such a ferment arising in her Slavonic provinces as would seriously endanger her domestic equilibrium. Again, is it likely that Russian opinion, deeply excited by the war, would tolerate such a result ?
But even if these difficulties could be got over, would not the Powers realize that they were only preparing fresh troubles for themselves by allowing the Turks to re-settle themselves as the overlords of the Christians ? Surely they would say : " If the war ends in this way it can only mean that for the next four or five years we shall be perpetually troubled by new attempts at insurrection in Macedonia, which will be put down by the usual Turkish methods and give rise to trouble of all sorts. Remember, too, that the Balkan States, if beaten, will not acquiesce in their beating, but will begin once more to prepare for the day of emancipation. In fact, nothing will have been settled but only preparation for troubles to come. Therefore," they will argue, " we had better, either through a Conference or some other means, try to place things in the Balkans on a surer foundation." Such a conference could hardly result in the recommendation of less than virtual autonomy for Macedonia. Yet against such a recommendation the Turks would set their faces like flint, for once again we must remember that if Turkey wins in the war she will not lightly give up the advantages of victory. Therefore a Turkish victory must mean that the Powers would either have to sit down under a. complete defiance from Turkey or coerce her themselves. The status quo, once broken as it is now broken, cannot be restored. A Turkish victory must then mean a situation of the greatest possible difficulty for Europe. The policy of jogging on, on the old lines of massacre tempered by Notes and Pourparlers, has gone for ever. That is the fact, and Europe must accept the conse- quences, whether agreeable or disagreeable.
If we turn to the other hypothesis and presume a victory for the Balkan States, the prospect, though dark and difficult, is, it must be admitted, less black. If we can imagine the Bulgarians as able to defeat the Turks and turn them out of Adrianople and the greater part of Thrace ; if Servia, gets possession of Old Servia, and if Montenegro overruns the Province of Scutari ; and if at the same time Turkish rule, partly by the pressure of arms and partly by internal revolts, becomes destroyed through- out Macedonia and a part of Albania, the Turks would probably be brought to consent to a peace something of the nature of that of San Stefano. Then, no doubt, history would repeat itself, and the Powers, backed by Roumania, whose troops would be standing to arms on the Bulgarian frontier ready to claim compensation, would be able to insist on a Congress similar to the Congress of Berlin, at which a. division of the spoil would be considered de novo. How such division should be made it is not for us to attempt to say, but in all probability the Powers would find the road of least resistance in some system of very wide autonomy under nominal Turkish suzerainty. This, though no doubt only a halfway-house to inde- pendence, would be the easier way. We may imagine, then, an autonomous Macedonia, an autonomous Albania, and possibly an autonomous Thrace, which would in fact, if not in name, leave Turkey nothing in Europe except Constantinople. Curiously enough, it looks as though the Constantinople problem would turn out the least difficult of all the points to be adjusted. We do not suppose that either Greece, Bulgaria, or Servia dreams of getting hold of the city for herself. The task is too big and too dangerous. It would probably suit all of them best that the Turks, for the time at any rate, should remain in possession of Constantinople and of the country within a radius of, say, some ten or twelve miles. Possibly indeed the whole of the European shores of the Sea of Marmora and of the Bosporus and Dardanelles might go with Constantinople. Turkey would thus become in fact though not in name an Asiatic Empire, but with a capital situated geographically though not morally in Europe.
We are, however, travelling too far in such speculations as these, interesting as they are. For the present all we want to do is to get the public to disabuse their minds of the idea that it will be possible to have a big Balkan war and then go back to the place from which we started. No doubt the solution will be different according to whether Turkey wins or Turkey loses, or, again, if there is a drawn game; but in no case is it possible to return to the statics quo ante under which the Turks oppressed the Christian provinces, sometimes a little more, sometimes a. little less, while the Great Powers looked on and said " How sad ! how terrible ! " but did nothing to prevent the misrule, and even may be said to have encouraged it by periodically warning the Balkan States that if they moved to help their co-religionists they would be very severely dealt with. That is a chapter which is closed for ever.
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