TOPICS OF THE DAY.
PRESIDENT WILSON'S ANSWER. IF any one on first reading President Wilson's answer to the German peace proposal felt a tinge of disappointment that it did not fulfil the general expectation that it would return a crushing refusal to the proposal, that person must have revised his feelings when he came to examine the answer in all its bearings. The answer is probably a wiser one than any other statesman among the Allies would have given in the same circumstances. In its directness, its simplicity, its searching relevance, it brings the new German Chancellor to a test which he cannot possibly evade. If he tries to evade it by shamblings and wrigglings, he will have proved himself as dishonest as all German rulers have hitherto proved them- selves in this war. We shall then know exactly where we are and how to proceed. President Wilson is in the position of an experienced dispenser of charities who, in pidging whether the applicant for alma or favours is genuine and deserving, always reaches his conclusions by means of ques- tions. There is nothing like questions for discovering honesty where it exists or exposing dishonesty. President Wilson, in fact, puts the German Chancellor in such a quandary that one feels that the most elaborate and highly calculated subtlety could not possibly have poised an opponent upon a more exquisite point. Yet President Wilson's questions are not really subtle, but are just the quintessence of pertinence. They not only transfix the Chancellor, but rally and unite the very dissklents at home.
A critical and momentous event like a proposal of peace by the enemy is bound to become quickly wrapped up in so much rumour, and to suffer from so many various interpre- tations, that the issue in a few days or even hours may seem to be much more complicated, than it really is. The issue is not complicated. It is quite simple. It is the same issue that has existed from the first day of the war. Are the Germans willing to satisfy the triple conditions of Restitution, Reparation, and Security for the world ? In a very short time we shall know what the German answer is, and whether we have to go on much longer with the war. But at this int it is necessary to mention, what indeed no one can in danger of forgetting, that as every day adds a new victory to the Allies the Germans will be acting under the force of circumstances. They may rapidly accept what they know they cannot afford to refuse, but they may accept it solely for that reason, and not because there has been any change of heart or conviction. The military triumphs of the Allies are, in fine, the governing factor. Let us take President Wilson's questions in order. His first question is whether Prince Max of Baden means that the German Government have accepted the demands laid down by President Wilson in his address to Congress on January 8th of this year and in subsequent addresses. Is the object of Germany only to agree upon "the practical details" of applying these American terms ? Well might the President ask this question. For the statement made by the German Chancellor to the Reichstag, his message to President Wilson, and the resolutions of the Reichstag Majority on which the Chancellor professes to base himself are by no means in harmony. For example, in his message to President Wilson the Chancellor accepts President Wilson's programme of January 8th as "a basis for peace negotiations." It will be remembered that on January 8th President Wilson insisted that Belgium must be "restored "—that is to say, compensa- tion must be paid by Germany. In his speech to the Reichstag, however, the Chancellor spoke most vaguely on the subject of compensating Belgium about "an effort to reach an under- standing." Agam, President Wilson has always taken a particularly strong line about the restoration of Russia. But the Reichstag Majority have flagrantly violated their avowed principle of" no annexations." The Chancellor spoke all too vaguely once more about the invaded parts of Russia being prepared for liberty and self-determination, apparently under German control. There is of course no approximation what- ever between these points of view. Yet again, President Wilson has insisted upon "righting the wrong" that was done to France when Germany annexed Alsace-Lorraine. Neither the Reichstag Majority nor the Chancellor has ever done more than suggest that Alsace-Lorraine might be granted powers of self-government within the German Empire. Perhaps the worst omission of all in the Chancellor's speech is in respect of Poland.. Here only ambiguous phrases are offered, though President Wilson spoke very strongly about the necessity of erecting "an independent Poland." There is very little encouragement, then, to believe that the new German Chancellor is anywhere near accepting President Wilson's ideas of his own free will, though, as we have said, we are convinced that he will be forced to accept them very soon. President Wilson's terms mean nothing less than the evacuation of all territory invaded by the Germans, including Russia ; the complete rehabilitation and indem- nification of Belgium, Serbia, Rumania, and Montenegro ; the territorial recognition of the claims of Italian nationality ; the complete freedom of the subject races of Austria-Hungary —this point has been added by President Wilson in speeches delivered since January 8th—and the creation of a free Poland.
With regard to President Wilson's treatment of an armistice we need say very little. He does not, as will be seen by any careful reader, promise an armistice • but he says that he could not think of even mentioning the subject to his Allies till the Germans had retired from all the invaded territories. But that retirement would not by any means satisfy the conditions on which there could be "a cessation of arms." Of course President Wilson sees as clearly as any one possibly could that the Germans would like nothing better than a breathing-space afforded by an armistice. Instead of fighting their way back to a shorter line, exhausted, hard pressed, and bleeding at every pore as they go, the Germans would be able to establish themselves on chosen positions without any impediment. That would be making the Germans a present of a great military advantage. It has long been prophesied that Germany would propose an armistice when she found herself in great military difficulties, and now that the prophecy has been fulfilled it is ridiculous to suppose that the appeal could be granted except upon the fulfilment of the whole of President Wilson's conditions.
President Wilson asks whether the German Chancellor is speaking " merely " for the German rulers who have hitherto conducted the war. This question brings us to what has been called President Wilson's "fifteenth point." In his address on January 8th he laid down fourteen points, but on September 27th in the famous speech in which he argued that the issues must now be settled by no compromise or• adjustment, but definitely and once for all," he added that the Allies could not "come to terms" with the Central Empires, "for they are without honour and accept no principle but their own interest." Theite words mean no peace with the Hohenzollerns. The German Chancellor is now inviting the world to believe that, because the Kaiser promised democratic reforms in a letter to Count von Herding, there has been something in the nature of a popular revolution in Germany. It is interesting to speculate whether the Kaiser and his supporters really think that the world is so childlike as to believe this. There could be no revolution transferring authority genuinely to popular representatives in Germany without a change of the Constitution. A mere remark in a letter by the Kaiser is no such Constitutional change. The Kaiser seems already to have forgotten what he promised, and he interlards his messages to the Army and to the people with the autocratic "I," "I," "I." This question whether the Chancellor speaks, or will soon be enabled to speak, genuinely on behalf of the German people, and not on behalf of the infamous, but now discredited, militaristic bureaucratic autocracy, is essential.
To sum up, President Wilson's amazingly well-weighed words bring Germany to the necessity of a sharp decision. She must at once confess herself beaten, or go on fighting long enough for it not to matter in the least whether she confesses herself beaten or not. In either case the peace terms of the Allies will prevail in their entirety. They must be imposed upon Germany. To repeat President Wilson's words again," the issues must now be settled by no compromise or adjustment, but definitely and once for all." When it comes to a bargain the Americans are not temperamentally easy bargainers. They are very shrewd bargainers, and they never have had a better right to be so than in this case where they are making a bargain for humanity. It is regrettable that the Allies should not have prepared their peace terms in detail and been in a position now to say : These are our terms ; take them or leave them." We have continually pointed out that the German peace proposal would come suddenly, out of the blue, and that we ought to be well prepared for it. It is a piece of luck for the Allies that the proposal was sent to President Wilson and has been answered SS he has answered it. But now that the Allies are no doubt discussing the exact terms they will grant, we earnestly hope that they will at last agree upon the principle that the longer Germany postpones the inevitable day of surrender the harder the terms will be for her.
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