Spectator October 12, 1974
Labour had between them a quota of academics and lawyers which won popular appeal in a country where standards of education and affluence had, ironically, progressed by leaps and bounds under the rule and administration of the traditionally Republican Fianna Fail Party. The control of Fianna Fail, both internal and external, was severely dented by the onset of violence in Northern Ireland. Mr Lynch had Considerable trouble in trying to maintain a moderate path and at one stage, in 1969, had to sack two of his most prominent and able Ministers for alleged gun-running. That both Ministers were later acquitted in court didn't help his leadership.
It was, therefore, in an atmosphere of worry and tension that Liam Cosgrave took over the reins of office. His was a law-and-order Government. The crackdown on the IRA would not only intensify but would be seen to. The Border would be policed more carefully than ever before — subversion would meet no romantic or sentimental blind eye. It was the right approach at the right time. Mr Cosgrave found in Mr Heath a willing ally in his Conscientious efforts to find a way, a genuine and lasting way, out of. the mess that was Ireland. North-South relations would be re-defined, a tripartite cousinship was conceived with, as its maturity, a Council of Ireland. It is, I think, safe to say that Liam Cosgrave and Edward Heath are not too dissimilar as persons. In personality Cosgrave is diffident, a man who likes the company of the few far more than that of the many, a man whose private pursuits require attention and thought. He Would not, for example, be at home on the eighteenth green or at the nineteenth hole with President Ford; in Dr Castro's basketball court he would rightly feel ridiculous; of Mr Pierre Trudeau's trampoline he would observe in his dry way that a politician had enough ups and downs in his professional life without adding to them as a matter of recreation. He keeps his private views to himself and when they do become known he tends to enjoy the resultant Spectacle as in the recent vote on whether to Permit the sale of contraceptives in Eire. Then Mr Cosgrave, in a free vote, joined the OPPosition lobbies and voted against his own government's Bill.
Politically Mr Cosgrave is tigerish. He can be ruthless when it comes to discipline within his Cabinet and even though there are loud squeals of protest from Opposition benches when Ministers seem to speak out of turn on such a Major issue as Northern Ireland, it will eventually be seen that where discipline has to be applied, if talking out of turn there has been, then the discipline will be clearly seen. A good barometer of the Cosgrave style is his first-ever lob of Cabinet making. In what can only be described as a cross-referencing he appointed Labour Ministers to such areas as Industry and Commerce and Labour, he made them respon,sible for the implementation of all the reforms advocated in their own manifesto and ensured that they would have enough political contention to cope with within their ministerial tasks. In yet another neat piece of political application he made Patrick Cooney, his only Clearly visible, rival for eventual leadership Within the Party, Minister for Justice, in the sure knowledge that this was the currently most sensitive and difficult of Ministries. It is literally impossible to be Minister of Justice in Eire at present and not be discomfited. And Mr Cooney has been discomfited many times, by helicopter escapes, by Mr Kenneth Littlejohn and by a mass break-out from the country's top-security prison. Further, Mr Cosgrave in his formation of a new administration paved no Paths for any likely future successors. if there are dauphins they will have to be self-appointed and, indeed, self-elected. They will certainly not hang about the chair of office waiting for the green telephone to ring. • Such a man, then, is the man who 'faced Edward Heath across the hall of Number 10, 'Downing Street. Together they made consider able progress. The feeling, unstated of, course, in Dublin at the time was that one knew where one stood with Heath, that if he said he was going to do something he did it. And thus was the Sunningdale Agreement with its Council of Ireland offspring, born. It was revolutionary if looked at in the context and history of Anglo-Irish relations. It practically joined the spirits of the two nations together. It contained all the ingredients for a successful answer to the plaguing question of Ulster. And incredibly it was fashioned in association with a Tory leader and a Tory government, the type of administration thought to be. most in support of Unionism. The friendship between Dublin and Westminster so faltering and secondhand between Mr Lynch and Mr Heath took — and held — an upward turn.
The minority Labour government brought about a totally new state of affairs in the relationship between Mr Cosgrave and the Westminster administration. The Dublin Taoiseach had met Mr Wilson frequently but had never actually traded with him. Merlyn Rees was unknown in Eire as an administrative quantity. Where William Whitelaw was argua bly the most important Englishman in Ireland since Crbmwell — for, thank Heaven, entirely different reasons — Merlyn Rees could hardly be expected to have the same amount of knowledge that Whitelaw had amassed. (Francis Pym had not been in the job of Northern Secretary for long enough to permit a realistic assessment; it was, however, felt in Dublin that any man who had come up through the Gehenna of the Tory Whips' office must have some steel in him.) The minority Labour government was soon tested and with the collapse of the Northern Executive it became clear in Dublin that the kissing had stopped. The Council of Ireland was stillborn, Sunningdale was a friendly meeting last winter, the hopes for the future enhance ment of solid political relations between Britain and Eire were again remote. Dublin was understandably bitter. It was felt that the control which Edward Heath and William Whitelaw had exercised over the further shores of 'Loyalism' was gone, that Harold Wilson had not a clue as to how to deal with Ulstermen. If, it was argued, an allegedly small proportion of Ulster workers could wreck such a carefullybuilt political structure then what hope was there ever going to be of Dublin lending a real voice in the proceedings regarding the province of Ulster?
What, then, of the future? Unquestionably Dublin will prefer a Tory government with its 'Northern Ireland policy to a Labour government with a non-policy, with a system of governing Ulster by event and circumstance rather than by initiative and creation. Conservative thinking is something which Liam Cosgrave understands — his own style of government runs along quite similar lines. For
confusion Dublin would find it considerably more difficult to deal with any kind of coalition
in Britain. If there has to be coalition it would most likely take a considerable length of time to establish paths of negotiation and discussion and British coalitions are not noted for their longevity, either in thought or practice.
But whoever is elected in Britain, be it single-party or coalition, it will be pointed out
to them from the quiet fastnesses of Mr Cosgrave's office in Merrion Street that Ulster
is pressing, the urgency has gained in impetus,
the situation is getting more crucial by the day. And when this is pointed out it will then be
incumbent upon the then incumbent to give say to a clear and undevitating policy on Northern Ireland, one that can be expressed and understood. Because Mr Cosgrave in Dublin will want nothing else. Neither will his Cabinet and they will say so because by now they know and appreciate the Cosgrave style.
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