Vottng for Br i ta i n • • •
tactically
F.1. "4 been the most dispiriting and boring British general • -•ction this L_ s campaign since the war; and parts of it have been not a den. disgraceful as well. The disgraceful parts have been evi mainly in relation to the effort of all three campaigns by the leaders to imply that the conclusion in their manifestos—that een`dn in Was facing, was in the middle of, an unprecedented wo2irnie crisis—was wrong, and that their own return to office ihe'" Provide peace, quiet, and a modest hope of advancement. ennf°111Y honest campaign would be one in which political leaders sug essed the likelihood of extreme hardship, and simply suersted means by which they would attempt to alleviate it. But presefootlingly dishonest tricks as that employed by Mr HealeY in dent nting his now notoriously unsuccessful inflation graph better lied democratic electioneering; and Mr Heath was not much he „ the way in which he followed almost every assertion that withwas determined not to indulge in personal attacks on his rivals Just such attacks. In every general election of recent years, save that of 1959 — when the present Shadow Secretary of State for Northern Ireland, and Chairman of the Conservative Research Department, Mr Ian Gilmour, owned and edited the paper — we have advised our readers to vote Conservative; occasionally, as in February of this year, with reservations, but usually wholeheartedly. In weighing our decision this month it was necessary, however, to compare the recent records in power of the two parties; to consider the immediate difficulties the nation faces; and to analyse the relative strengths of Mr Wilson and Mr Heath. When, in February, we recommended a Tory vote we did so out of loyalty as much as, if not more than, out of judgement: The Spectator had taken Mr Heath severely to task several times since 1970 for the muddle, the inconsistency and the — sometimes — barefaced dishonesty of his policies. We, and his many other critics in the party, had every reason to expect that, once the February defeat had signalled the rejection by the electorate of what he then represented himself as standing for, some serious rethinking of policy would take place; and Mr Heath and his advisers have, indeed, asserted that it has.
Rut there is no real evidence that any such rethink has taken place. Ce. rtainly, in some important if peripheral areas — in housing and industrial relations policy—matters have changed. But on major issues of economic management Mr Heath stands exactly where he ,stood in February; and he, Sir Geoffrey Howe and Mr Whitelaw nave all, under pressure, insisted that, even in the coalition government which the Conservative leader has said he will try to create, these will be mainly non-negotiable matters. Thus, to take but one example, that of the ruinous Industry Act — the greatest !ingle engine of inflation any government has ever created, which has been the instrument of every single one of Mr WedgwoodRenn's nationalisation efforts — the Secretary of State has again and again gloated over the fact that the Tories left him with such an excellent instrument that he had little need to nationalise through fresh legislation; yet it remains an Ark of the Covenant to Ildr Heath and those who support him. We accept fully Mr Heath's argument that from 1972 onwards he sought to avoid confrontation with the unions, but that he was eventually forced into it. But .the fact of the matter is that any government pursuing highly mflationary policies is bound to incite the stronger unions to militant action in defence of their members, and this in turn is °ound to lead to confrontation. If returned to power with a working majority Mr Heath would doubtless seek to create a coalition, but any elements or individuals whom he managed to Persuade to join it would have but the weight of straw against his settled determination to continue on the same road as before.
But then, on considering the matter, one has to face the dangers of a.. large Labour majority. The Labour Cabinet is far less extreme than many of its critics would have us suppose, but it has the enormous advantage of being now certain to offer the electorate ant, ()Pen choice on whether or not Britain should remain within the Lur.013ean Economic Community. Mr Heath, who was again and ?gain offered by his critics within the Conservative PartY the Lri.onourable course of accepting a referendum without abandoning ,u1s own intense feelings about British membership of the "Minunity, again and again refused such a course, thus betraying again the impenetrable stubborness that has so damaged himself ,Land his party. The forces within the Labour movement opposing .„1-ne ..EC are, however, now so strong that a referendum cannot be uemed them, and if there is no choice between the major parties on ,ecunornic policy, or even if — as many would judge — the ,1-onservatives show inferior promise in this field, then anti-MarReteers must vote Labour.
large Labour majority would, however, give enormous power to e extremely powerful socialistic elements within the movement, rnt on a radical restructuring of British society. And to counsel a tabour vote in all circumstances would, further, have the highly ,taldesirable consequence of being a betrayal of many admirable, °rave and true Tories, many of whom have been ignored or made to suffer calumny by Mr Heath and his henchmen; and these men and wt, omen will be badly needed for the reconstruction of the party ,srl, at will have to follow the departure of Mr Heath. in certain 1-Ircumstances, however, one can hesitatingly recommend. a vote tor Labour, and this recommendation would apply especially in otland and Wales. In both countries the Nationalist parties are elY to take votes from the Tories, but can take seats mostly from bo ur.
iactical voting was prominent in Britain in February, when a very _Large number of Labour voters undoubtedly supported a Liberal Indidate to keep the Tory out; and many of them will undoubtedly Eci SO again. There are, however, almost no circumstances — Mr Hooson's constituency would be an exception — where the "uatural Tory or uncommitted voter would be well-advised to vote _beral. There are a large number of seats — seats with anti-Market 7 0cli. dates, and with candidates who support the economic views Sir Keith Joseph — where the Tory should vote Tory. It is, however, impossible to counsel the electorate on exactly how each individual voter should act to ensure what would be the best result —a Labour government with a very small overall majority — or the second best result, a Tory government with exactly the same sort of majority. The consequences of either result may, however, be spelt out.
If the Tories are returned with a very small overall majority there is at least a real, if slender, chance of a change in the leadership. It is not, in our view, likely that Mr Heath would then stand down, but it is right to record that some of his closest allies have suggested that he would, if his return to office immediately precipitated another confrontation. Under fresh leadership the Conservative Party could begin, even under the pressures of office, to reconstruct the heritage which he left behind. They would not be sailing in uncharted seas, for both the philosophy of 1970 and the doctrines of Sir Keith Joseph are ready to hand, and fully developed: they would be even more speedily and effectively implemented if Sir Keith became leader of the Party in succession to Mr Heath. Nonetheless, to hope for a small Tory majority would be a remarkable act of faith, considering the events of recent years; and to hope for a large Tory majority under Mr Heath would be to court disaster.
A small Labour majority would encourage moderation in Labour politics. The more disastrous and expensive socialistic schemes of Mr Benn would be impossible anyway, in the economic circumstances which now face us. And the more iniquitous and hateful expressions of socialist envy — like the proposed wealth tax — almost certainly could not be passed through the House of Commons if the Labour Party were not in possession of a comfortable margin of support over the other parties. Moreover, as Britain enters what will certainly be a most trying winter, such a Labour government would be far from secure in its tenure of power: nothing like a reign of five years would lie before it, and there might well have to be yet another election next year. We can sense immediately the groans of boredom and irritation at such a prospect, but, after all our troubles of recent years, the British people must expect that the restoration of this country to true parliamentary democracy and good government under that system is going to be a difficult, trying and taxing business.
Perhaps the greatest positive advantage should Labour return, besides the reconsideration of the European commitment would, however, be the possibilities thus opened for the renewal and rejuvenation of the Conservative Party. Being a natural governing party the Tories have often equated the national good with the occupation of office by themselves; but it is not always so. It is hardly impossible to exaggerate the damage which Mr Heath's leadership has done to both party and country — the casual and wilful abandonment of pledges, the incompetent administration, the crude propaganda and the bullying manner, the intolerance of dissent or disagreement, the turning more and more to the bureaucracy of Whitehall or Brussels for answers to problems which they could not give and should not have attempted to give, the sheer intolerability of the situation which he, assisted only by an unfortunate lack of will on the part of members of his Cabinet who knew better, created —all this has materially helped to reduce Britain to her present parlous position.
Yet the Conservative Party, which has demonstrated again and again its astonishing vitality in the face of adversity, its astonishing endurance throughout history, and its astonishing capacity to be ready when the nation needs it, can recover even from the disasters of recent years, and assume its true and rightful role at the helm of the state. But it can only do this if it purges itself of the Heath heritage, of the reckless commitments to printing money and to destructive foreign entanglements which have been the mark of his unhappy stewardship. The return of a Labour government with a small majority would ensure the continuance of the Conservative stay in the wilderness: but that stay need not be for long, and it may serve the party, and ultimately the country, well.
Previous page
