GERMANY, RUSSIA, AND SPAIN.
"IN vain is the net spread in the sight of any bird," especi- ally if the bird be as keen-eyed as Prince Bismarck. The Carlist attempts to irritate Germany into intervention,—whether by firing on her gunboats, or, as report says, attempting to take prisoners the German and Austrian representatives to Madrid in the course of their railway journey, or by any other means,— have been, and will be, failures. Prince Bismarck knows as well as anybody that nothing would give so effectual a spur to the Carlist cause as a German intervention against it, and we may therefore well believe his organ, when it tells us that nothing so wild as the project of landing German troops In Spain was ever contemplated by him. Prince Bismarck was wise enough, even during the war with France, when the German power was already in possession, and was on the spot, to avoid anything like taking a part between the different ,political factions into which France was divided. Is it ,reasonable to suppose that after keeping so carefully out of the net with which his feet were almost in contact in France, he would allow himself to be entangled in it in Spain ? The real danger on. the Franco-Spanish frontier is not of a German intervention in Spain, but of jealousies growing up between Germany and France so keen as to render a renewal of the war all but inevitable. No doubt that would suit Prince Bismarck's book much better than a barren intervention in Spain. No doubt his agents are not particularly deli- cate in their modes of insisting that France shall cut off all supplies from the Carlist forces, and in indirectly reminding 'Frenchmen of the difference between their position now, when they are kept to their international duties towards Spain by the watchful eye of Germany, and their position four years ago, when they made the mere suggestion of a German candidate for the throne of Spain a ground of affront, and ultimately a cause of war. We do not suppose that Prince Bismarck wishes for another big war, and all the new odium it would bring on the victor, but if it must *come, no doubt he would like it to come soon. It was a good notion of his to pose as the protector of the regency of 'Marshal Serrano in Spain, and so win an ally South of the Pyrenees, as well as South of the Alps. But in spite of his no doubt sincere wish to see Ultra- montanism defeated in the defeat of Don Carlos, it is pretty certain that his Spanish policy is studied much more with a view to crippling France, than with ,a view to crippling 'Rome.
There is indeed something encouraging in the clear evidence afforded, both by Prince Bismarck's and by Prince Gortschakoff's policy in regard to Spain,—though these policies are different, —that even the least teachable of the great European Powers have learned the lesson that interventions for the purpose of settling the internal disputes of any great nation are the silliest of mistakes. Germany-has recognised, and has probably per- suaded various other great Powers to recognise the Government of Madrid, while Russia declines to recognise it; but even Russia carefully explains that her reason for holding back is not any wish to strengthen the hopes of the Carlist insurrec- tion, brit rather an even greater delicacy than that shown by the other Powers for the free choice.of the'Spanish nation, and a reluctance therefore to enter into formal relations with a Government which, since General Pavia's coup d'gtat, has had no sanction from the will of the people. No doubt one may fairly smile at the reason given, when it comes from the Minister of Russia. No doubt it is quite natural to suspect that other motives mingle with the refusal,—the dislike to follow im- plicitly German lead,—the -uneasiness lest the example of Spain should be eventually pleaded for republican institu- tions; but even though it be so, the fact remains that Russia offers an almost pedantically constitutional reason for refusing to acknowledge as yet the Government of Marshal Serrano, and wishes to be understood as setting an example of even greater delicacy and greater deference to the wishes of the -Spanish nation than either ,Great Britain or France. No doubt Russia has pushed the doctrine to an extreme, if she has allowed her deference to the wishes of the Spanish people to pre- vent her from recognising a Government the continuance of which she would think a great safeguard to the peace of Europe. In point of fact, Russia, in all probability, holds no such opinion. The Greek Church is too well established and too popular in Russia to make it a matter of any account to her whether the new Government of Spain be Ultramontane or otherwise, while it can never be a matter of absolute indifference to the Czar of Russia whether another European people throws off the monarchy or not. If Don Carlos were to succeed, at least the Republican current of events would be reversed for a time. But whether the success of Marshal Serrano will mean a Republic or a Throne for Spain is a matter extremely doubtful. On the other hand, to neither Germany, nor England, nor Italy can it fail to be a matter of some interest whether or not a new stimulus or a new cheek is to be applied to 1Titramontane zeal. And as regards France, the Government of Marshal MacMahon has a very difficult problem to solve. Doubtless the Extreme Right, ahd with the Extreme Right the whole Sacerdotal party, would prefer to see Don Carlos suceeed, since such a success would be a new, ground of hope for Henri V. and the White Flag. But then Marshal MacMahon has been obliged to quarrel with the Extreme Right, who make light of his Septennate, and affect to treat him as a mere locum, tenens for the coming King. Hence it is essential for him to secure a certain amount of moderate Liberal support, and the regency of Marshal Serrano is so very homogeneous a kind of power to his own,—namely, a mere excuse for delay,—that he can hardly fail to feel a certain sympathy with its position. Add to this the extreme desira- bility of conceding to Germany all that can be conceded while the fears of quarrel and the occasions of quarrel are still so numerous, and we do not doubt that a very wise decision has been taken, even in the interest of the Government itself, in recognising the defacto Government of Madrid. On the whole, we regard it as a very satisfactory evidence of the progress made in mastering elementary constitutional ideas, even by the most despotic Powers, that all the great Powers alike repudiate intervention in Spain, and use even their fair privilege of giving a sort of moral support to that one of the rival Governments which they think best calculated to maintain the peace of Europe, with great reserve and moderation. The day of Holy Alliances to mould the internal institutions of refractory countries is now, at last, probably past, and with these, the day of some of the most mischievous European combinations which the world has ever seen.
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