TOPICS OF THE DAY.
THE POSSIBILITY OF WAR THIS YEAR.
THE real danger of war in Europe, and we believe it is very real, arises from the character, the history, and the position of M. Thiers, and not from any policy of the German leaders. There is, we know, strong reason to believe that the Military party in Berlin, which is immensely powerful with the Emperor and with the Regular Army, doubts whether France is yet sufficiently beaten, expects another war, and is more than half inclined to embrace any pretext for making it a speedy one. If France, they say, is to be fought, she should be fought while still unready, still under the influence of despond- ency, still above all, without any formidable ally. Any change in the politics of St. Petersburg might double her offensive strength. It is under this impression that they have declined all offers for, the speedy evacuation of French territory, believing the posi- tions they hold to be more valuable than the decrease in French hostility which would follow on their departure. This party has apparently forwarded to the Daily Telegraph assurances which, if they mean anything, mean that the revival of France will be arrested by menaces, by some demand, such, for instance, as a reduction of the Army, which could not be accepted, yet could not be refused without a war, to be waged without further parley. M. Thiers could not make such a concession without stepping down from his chair, nor could it be demanded except in the expectation and the hope that it would be refused. It is also true that the Catholic party throughout Europe expects, or possibly desires, an early renewal of the contest ; that Italy has been sounded, that Russia is placing her Treasury in order in view of the possibility of a catastrophe. Neverthe- less, Germany is governed by statesmen, and it is nearly impossible to believe that statesmen should in the present position of affairs provoke another war, should wilfully encounter its enormous risks, should destroy at a blow the rising and splendid prosperity of their country. They would lose at first setting-off almost as much as they have gained. Their war-chest no doubt is full, and their military discipline perfect ; bat to suspend all industry, to call upon a nation for a war of invasion, to draw out once more the whole strength of Germany when Germany lies secure behind her fortresses, is an effort which will demand all Prince Bismarck's courage, and if his courage is limitless will require the fullest justification of success. Private soldiers just out of a campaign are not so fond of battle, and the soldiers at all events do not believe that France is a powerless foe. In spite therefore of the de- clarations published in the Telegraph, and intended of course as informal warnings to France, and in spite of the provoca- tions given in Lorraine and described in another column, we are unable to believe that Germany, unless challenged, will wilfully recommence the war. We are the less able, because even if victorious she could gain so very little. She does not want to hamper herself with a Poland ; or to see the Commune rise, as it would rise, to power ; or by increasing the enormous fine already levied, to tempt France in a fit of despair to render fines impossible by repudiating her Debt. She might by possibility, if Europe held aloof, break up France ; but she would gain little by that, her danger from a cycle of insurrection being at least as great as her danger from any war.
But our confidence in the preservation of peace diminishes when we study the policy of M. Thiers. That eminent per- son, amidst many changes of attitude and some few changes of political conviction, has throughout his career displayed one dominant quality, which may be described by his friends as courage and by his enemies as conceit, and is probably com- pounded of both, but which always tempts men to transmute opinion into action. He is the most self-reliant of mankind, never shrinks from trusting himself in action as well as counsel, and he has two selves—the President of the Republic and France —and is equally confident in both. He is known to believe that the result of the last war was due to mismanagement, that France under good guidance could not be beaten, and that his own guidance must necessarily be good. He has therefore directed his efforts from the first to the reinvigora- tion of the Army on such a system that success should come speedily, in time for him to employ the weapon he has re- forged. He has discouraged every scheme of universal service because it would take time, has redisciplined the troops wholesale by forcing them to endure life
in camps, and has refilled the ranks by large levies made in the old way. He has made no attempt to reform the officers because that would demand time, but he has filled up or is filling up every gap which could be supplied either by energy or by a large expenditure of means. His expenditure on materiel, for instance, amounts to millions. That he desires or expects war this year is improbable, but he feels already the security and hopefulness resulting from his pre- parations, and is anxious to communicate his feeling to France, which, as he knows, always requires the stimulus of a little intellectual champagne. It is difficult to believe that he, a master- of words, did not foresee the interpretation which would be put upon his recent speech, or that with a state of siege in Paris he would quietly tolerate the journalists' warlike interpretation without so much as an official denial. The only explanatioa of his conduct in those utterances is that he thought the advantage to be gained from admitting France to his counsels greater than the risk to be incurred by inspiring the Germans. with alarm. And from his point of view he is right. If he is really Count Moltke's equal as a strategist, and if the old Army was equal to the German Army, and if the secret of defeat was the Emperor's incapacity for military enterprise, then he is already prepared, for he has the French Army back again, he has selected his own officers, and he has all the powers necessary to give him the general control. The risk in- volved in all these 'ifs' seems to outsiders enormous, so enormous as to give an impression of the ridiculous ; but it does not seem so to M. Thiers himself, whose mind, though theatric, is not of the falsely theatrical kind ; who honestly does believe in himself, and is as prepared to act on his mili- tary opinions, as on his opinions about finance. That he will precipitate matters if he can help it may be improbable— though a man of his age has not much time to lose—but that he will press forward steadily and confidently to his end, and that his end is the liberation of the two provinces, we have no more doubt than we have that M. Gambetta, his new ally, said so at Angers, and meant most heartily what he said. And it must not be forgotten that M. Thiers, however much he may be distrusted by foreigners, mast seem to himself and to his countrymen to have some ground for his self-con- fidence. After eighteen months of power he is more com- pletely the necessary man than ever. He may be, as the English correspondents say, a conceited little man ; but he- has done what he said he would do,—has maintained order, has rebuilt an Army, has filled the Treasury, has, above- all, infused his own irrepressible hopefulness and buoyancy into a depressed and defeated people. His methods have seemed to Englishmen unwise, hasty, or unnecessarily ex- haustive; but no one can say that his efforts have been sterile, that he has wasted time, or that, except in forming alliances, he has evidently failed. When a man naturally buoyant has succeeded so well, it is natural that he should think greater success still possible, should grow less and less fearful of the future, should at last feel as if his success were nearly miraculous,—as if he, the locksmith's. son in the position of a Sovereign, must be destined to some great work. Add that M. Thiers is now, as Ewer, patriot, that Sedan probably impressed him with more humiliation than it impressed the Emperor, that the loss of the provinces. is to him a personal grief, and the decay in the position of France a personal wrong, and we shall see a man not unlikely to be carried away by an enthusiasm for the revindication of his country. How far this enthusiasm disturbs his judgment we do- not know, for we do not know how far his data are accurate, how far, that is, France is capable of renewing the contest ; but we do- know that our countrymen judge habitually too much by re- • salt, are too much impressed by victory, too ready to believer that none bat Teutons can possess the quality of tenacity.. Of all great wars ever waged that of 1870 was probably the most costly, but of all great wars ever waged it probably pro- duced the least of physical exhaustion. After 1870 France had lost her savings, but after 1815 she had lost her youth. And she survived 1815.
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