TOPICS OF THE DAY.
BRITAIN'S TRUE POLICY. DURING the Easter Recess the very able publicist who often writes on foreign as well as on military affairs in the leading columns of the Horning Post has been stating at length what he regards as the true view of the foreign policy of the United Kingdom. With one portion of his remarks, that which describes the way in which the problems of foreign policy should be approached, we are in the heartiest accord. With the other,, that which prescribes the particular policy to be adopted, we are in the strongest possible disagreement. Let us take, first, our point of agreement. He is absolutely in the right when he pleads for a clear and intelligible national policy. He desires that our statesmen, instead of merely acting from hand to mouth, should take stock of the position of the Empire and its needs, and should then make up their minds as to what is the policy best suited to serve those needs. They must first know what their ends are, then consider how to attain those ends, and finally put their plan for attaining them into operation. That this is the only possible way of achieving successful action is quite clear. No business really prospers unless those who con- trol it place before themselves certain definite aims, and also certain definite—we do not, of course, say permanent and unalterable, but definite—plans for their accomplishment. The writer in the Morn* Post notes, also, that the need for knowing what we want and• having a clear plan to get it is made the more imperative by the fact that foreign nations have all definite policies by which their actions are governed. If a man's competitors in business all "muddle along anyhow," it may be safe for him to do so, but if they all have clear aims while he alone does not know what he wants or how he means to get it, he is certain to go. under in the fierce competition to which he is exposed. In other words, in public as in private affairs a general vague desire to do well and prosper and keep ahead of your rivals is not enough. It is necessary in order to make the best of one's resources t, understand where one wants to go and to use the shortest and easiest route to get there.
With this demand for a careful study of our national needs on the part of our leading statesmen we are, as we have said, in entire aereement. When, however, the writer in the Morning Post propounds the main item in what he considers should be our national policy, it must, we hold, be condemned as completely mistaken and as derived from a blind and mistaken view of our national needs. Our national policy as propounded by the writer in the Morning Post comes to something very like the simple formula, "Withstand Russia." As he conceives the end to which our national policy should be directed,-it is—Keep Russia down, prevent her territorial expansion hold her in check at all points and at all costs. For example, the leading article in the Morning Post of Tuesday, while dealing with the crisis in China, boldly asks that we should inspire and lead the opposition against Russia. What should be our policy is thus set forth :— " The crisis consists in this, that all the Powers except one would gladly set a limit to the aggrandisement of Russia in Asia, but that none of them cares to take on itself the championship of the common interest. They are like a group of separate sticks, each of which might bend or break under pressure, but which, if tied together, would be strong enough to resist any strain that could be brought to bear on them. The difficulty is that the initiative in bringing the Powers into a combination can come only from Great Britain, and Great Britain will not move." The writer then goes on to show how-neither Japan nor the United States can be expected to bell the cat, and how it is equally unreasonable that the Triple Alliance should take the initiative. "They cannot invite other Powers to join them in setting barriers to Russia in Asia, because such an invitation, though it might be rejected, would be likely to be resented by Russia, and might expose the central Powers to attack from Russia and her ally in the West. A European war between the Triple and the Dual Alliance would be a misfortune for all the five Powers, and would exhaust them all to little or no purpose. But Great Britain, if, as is commonly _ supposed, and as all her Ministries have ever declared, she has a Navy equal to her needs, has nothing to fear by way of direct. reprisals from the Dual Alliance, and can supply to the Triple Alliance and Japan the kind of assistance which would be of the greatest service." In fact, the other Powers are represented as acting very much like the mob of little animals in "Alice in Wonderland." Somebody has got to do the job, and they all think it had better be Bill.' "The general situation," we are told, "here described calling for a British initiative has existed almost in the precise form now indicated for about seven years ; but twice only has it been crystallised into a special oppor- tunity; the first time at the close of the Chinese-Japanese War, and the second time now, when Japan is considering whether her struggle for existence against Russia can be further postponed. We are thus in effect told that we should now take the initiative by making an arrangement for controlling Russia which would have the Triple Alliance. Japan, and the United States behind it, and would at the same time apparently detach France from the Dual Alliance, and so produce a good understanding between her and Great Britain and Germany.
Granted that it ought to be the end of our foreign policy to oppose Russia, we admit that the writer in the Morning Post has reason on the side of his proposals. If our national interests really demand that Russia is to be kept down, then no doubt we ought not to missany reasonable chance of rallying the Powers against her, and of inducing them to join with us in dealing her a heavy diplomatic blow. But before we discuss the conclusions we must ask leave to discuss the premises. Why. is it the chief national need of Great Britain, and so the essen- tial foundation of our foreign policy, to withstand Russia and to take every possible opportunity of flying at her throat ? If it is our chief national need to fly at her throat whenever we can, then by all means let us do so, and with all the power at our command, for nothing, we agree, is so dangerous as barking without biting ; but let us be sure before we adopt this policy of checking Russia at all points that the game is really worth while. We can readily understand that it is an important national need on Germany's side, and in a less degree on Austria's also, that we should fly at Russia's throat, but what we want to know is, is it worth our while, is it our essential national need ? ' We agree that it is essential for us to protect India from a Russian invasion, and we would spend our last shilling in defending India, but do we protect India by checking Russia first in the Near East and now in the Far East ? We should have thought that a better way of protecting India was by allowing Russia to come into the Mediterranean in the Near East, and so get herself involved in the vortex of Mediterranean politics ; and in the Far East to welcome her to the open water, where she comes not only under the fire of our guns, but meets with potential opponents such as Japan, America, and Germany. As it is, we are in danger- of hurling Russia upon India because we have closed all other outlets to her expansive energy. If we ceased checking Russia everywhere and at all times, she would expand in places where she would come under other influences than ours. Take, for example, her last expansion at the expense of China. That has brought Russia not only the future enmity of the Chinese people, but the immediate enmity of Japan, and the potential enmity of the United States and of Germany. Of course, we can if we like step in and in effect say to those Powers : Don't trouble yourselves about Russia, we will bell the cat for you- you have only to keep quiet, and we will drive Russia balk to her snows.' But suppose we do not do this, it is extremely likely that the Powers in question will them- selves take action, for it is evident that they are very nervous about Russia. But it will be said, we suppose, that we dare not wait for. such an eventuality, and that the growth of Russia's power in China is so dangerous to us that we must take the initiative and check it at all costs. But why is it so dangerous?' Is it so certain, to begin with, that Russia can conquer China All Europe is in reality being defied by the Chinese Court, but yet all Europe refuses to run the risk of following the Chinese- Court inland. Even if Russia wanted to conquer all China, which is doubtful, she would find it a very tough morsel, for the Chinese people do not love Russians. "But will :tot Russia's occupation of Manchuria utterly destroy all British trade in those regions ? " We do not believe a Word of it. A Russian Governor, even armed with a • tariff, is not likely to throw half as many obstacles in the way of trade as a Chinese Mandarin. In truth, we can • see no reason why Russia, should be assumed to be our natural enemy,—the Power which we must check at all hazards. We see, however, plenty of reasons why Russia should not be our natural enemy. We are the great sea- Power, she the great land-Power. We are a great trading and capitalist nation; - she, with all her vast resources undeveloped, wants trade and capital. In truth, • there is no rivalry such as there was between us and France, and will be with Germany with her sea-power, her oversea Colonial Empire, and her industrial and commercial competition. We do not want to rank any Power as a natural enemy, for we believe there is room for all, and that competition is better than monopoly in Empire as in trade ; but if any Power must be classed as a natural enemy, it is Germany, not Russia.
But though we cannot admit that a calm and well-con- siaered view of our national needs can possibly discover "Withstand Russia" as our true national policy, we cannot disguise from ourselves the fact that we may be reaching a situation in Europe when a definite, even if mistaken, policy will be better than no policy at all. We -would infinitely rather come to terms with Russia, and make a clear understanding with her, than commit our- -selves to Japan and the Triple Alliance, but if our statesmen will not or cannot come to an understanding with Russia; we would rather stand in with• the Triple -Alliance than do what we appear to be doing now,—i.e., barking at Russia's heels, and giving her the impression that we are her deadliest foe, and yet making no arrange- ment with Russia's European and Far Eastern enemies. That is pure foolishness. We get all the odium of an anti-Russian policy, and yet get none of its advantages. We are hated and feared by Russia, and yet if the Dual Alliance attacked us we should have no support from the Triple Alliance. Rather than withstand Russia in our present feeble and futile way, we would withstand her boldly and strongly. It would be a bad and unintelligent policy, but anything is better than no policy at all.
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