FOOD AND RAW MATERIALS IN TIME OF WAR. [TO TUX
EDITOR or TIM " SPROTATOR."1 Sin,—The article in your issue of 16th ult. on the Navy Estimates will, if I mistake not, greatly appeal to ship- owners in its important reference to the above subject.
When war breaks out, as you rightly observe, "even though the chances of capture are not very great, they will be sufficient to make owners lay up their shipping or to defer their voyages till better times. But this may prove a most terrible evil hero owing to the resultant rise in the price of food." This puts the case in a nutshell. We go drifting on, after our fashion, and nobody does anything. There are those who say, " Well, wo are advocating an all- powerful Navy, and this is the best national guarantee we can have." They fail, however, to realize that command of the sea cannot exist at the outset of hostilities ; that it can only be demonstrated by conflict ; and that even after its demon- stration our food supplies will be made the special object of attack. But it is, no doubt, the first commencement of hostilities which most urgently demands prevision and provi- sion. People do not realize what it means. Of food, drink, and tobacco we import about 250 millions annually, which I
make to be £685,000 a day, £28,500 an hour, £475 a minute, always flowing in in a steady stream. Imagine the effect of a sudden checking of the stream occurring at the moment when everybody is rushing to the markets to swum reserve supplies 1
Let us suppose a sudden outbreak of war and its effect on the food-stream. Every ship at her loading port, every ship at her coaling port or calling port, will be instantaneously held up, while many or most ships learning the news at sea will make for the nearest Imperial or neutral port. The captains of all these vessels will cable home to their owners for instructions. What reply will they get? Will it not almost certainly be, " Remain where you are till receipt of our further instructions "P At the recent annual dinner of the Chamber of Shipping a leading shipowner said, "How many owners, in the event of our being at war, were likely to risk their property by sending their ships to sea P A few, of course, would do so, but a larger number, who were trustees for other people, would not, he thought, dare to move their vessels out of port, provided that they were in a safe position." He spoke an obvious truth, and we shall do well to recognize it now, and be ready for all it means.
And now comes in the question of national guarantee, whether indemnity or insurance need not be here discussed.
The Royal Commission on Food Supplies plainly favoured it, but the subsequent Treasury Commission, to which the subject was referred, found against it—largely because of the conflict of the views of the witnesses—and they threw out the
various schemes, my own amongst them. And there we are. Shipowners are continually pressing for a scheme, but it is a chose juges ; they appeal in vain. Now, national guarantee
can be considered from two aspects. First, a general and permanent scheme such as you, Sir, and I (if I may venture so to bracket myself) and the shipowners generally demand; and, second, an emergency scheme specially to meet the case of the vessels held up on the way by the news of war ; a scheme which will put owners in a position to cable in reply to their captains, " Proceed at once full speed to -- [port or rendezvous], steering a wide course to avoid enemies." When the time comes, this scheme will certainly be forced on us if the other be not already in existence. For otherwise the stream of our indispensable food supplies will cease to flow to us.
Now, the solution of the held-up-ship difficulty seems simple enough; people who do not appreciate the facts may say indeed, " Well, when the time comes we can proceed accord- ingly; till then, why worry P " But nothing of the kind can be done except on a basis carefully thought out in advance. The Government has to be in a position to issue a proclama- tion to shipowners and cargo owners calling on them to order resumption of voyage, the Government promising indemnity against loss in the event of capture or against loss occurring
during deviation in pursuance of the owners' cabled instruc- tions. Let us take a concrete case. Assume the case of a
ship which would have sold just before the war for £90,000, or would fetch now, war having broken out, £80,000, and is insured for £100,000 or £110,000. What is to be the money basis of the Government's indemnity-290,000, £80,000, or
the sum insured P This is essentially the crux, and it applies, if in a less degree, to the cargo also. The
further difficulty —amongst others — may be raised. that the Government should not relieve the underwriters of a risk which the latter have already been paid a possibly large sum specially to undertake. I am expressing no opinion as to how these crucial matters should be dealt with. My object rather is to urge that unless and until they have been dealt with, and dealt with to the satisfaction of those who may be concerned, everything, when the dire emergency arises, will be all at sixes and sevens; there will be a complete deadlock ; the proclamation, even if it should be issued, must needs fall flat. "Fur want of a nail the shoe was lost, for want of a shoe the horse was lost."
I have a huge respect for the ability and resourcefulness of naval officers, but a naval or strategic training, however highly placed the officer, is one thing and a knowledge of where and how the commercial shoe will pinch in war is quite another. But just as trade is nowadays the most potent cause of war, so when war occurs must there be an adequate knowledge of the needs and difficulties of commerce. " The God of War is the man of business." It cannot, therefore, be too strongly insisted that the subject so ably referred to in your remarks, and all--not impossibly till now unthought of—that lies behind it, should be considered as if it were, as indeed it so truly is, a problem of the first importance in any scheme of national defence.—I am, Sir, [We hope our correspondent will get the Chambers of Commerce and the Chamber of Shipping to take this matter up and press its consideration on the Ministry. The question bow the national guarantee is to be applied is not, we think, so difficult as our correspondent imagines. To begin with, we would not make it apply to any ship or cargo not already insured against perils of the sea in the usual way. (Arrange- ments could easily be made to meet the case of companies which insure their own ships.) But if this were done, if a ship and cargo were taken, or sunk, or burnt, there would be no more—or shall we say no less P—difficulty in regard to the amount to be paid by an insuring Government than by an insuring company or group of underwriters at Lloyd's. The Government would endorse the perils-of-the-sea policy with a war policy. That is our proposal in a nutshell—ED. Spectator.]
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