THE FUTURE OF THE CUBA QUESTION.
THE papers relating to the subject of Cuba and the projects of an- nexation touching that island, which the House of Commons asked of the Crown early in the session now closing have just been pre- sented to the House of Commons, and issued to the public four months after date.* The correspondence is of an amount that in most newspaper establishments might be got up in the course of twenty-four hours ; but it takes four months for the State clerks and the State printers to bring forth copies of a correspond- ence which might go into twenty columns of the Times. As usual, this delay gives us a knowledge of the case after it is closed ; but it does not happen to matter so much in this instance, since the question is for the present laid at rest ; and the documents serve a useful purpose in letting us know how the affair stands for the future, which is by far the more important consideration.
The papers do not supply any decidedly fresh information. By the scraps which we had before, we knew that the Spanish Go- vernment was seriously alarmed; we knew that a correspondence, extending back to 1822, between American diplomatic officials, disclosed an imaginary English intrigue to obtain possession of Cuba or part of it; we knew that the American Government had made overtures of that kind in 1848 on its own account; and we knew generally the terms on which the proposed guarantee of Cuba to Spain by the Governments of France, Great Britain, and the United States, had been declined by the last. But the papers fill up more than one hiatus in the case, and in several respects prove the question to have been of a much more serious character than it appeared to bear at the last time of its agitation. In say- ing this, we do not include the supposed English intrigue, which was to have converted the guarantee for a loan into the means of territorial aggrandizement ; for the American papers alone are suf- ficient to show that the facts do not warrant the extravagant con- clusions based upon them.
One important point established by these papers, is the great anxiety of the Spanish Government. Not only does the Marquis Miraflores receive with a Southern fervour of gratitude the English proposal for a tripartite guarantee, but, at a later date, he goes so far as to suggest that the English and French Governments should join in a declaration, that if the United States "should not adhere to the proposition of a tripartite convention, they never would allow any other power, whether European or American, to possess itself of the island of Cuba, either by cession, conquest, or insur- rection of the same." The reply to this does not appear ; but when we find, by the general tone of the correspondence, that the British • Correspondence between the United States, Spain, and France, concern- ing alleged projects of Conquest and Annexation of the Island of Cuba. Presented to the House of Commons by Command of her Majesty, in pur- suance of their Address of April 11, 1863. [English Ministers also take part in this correspondence, although not mentioned in the title.]
Government had to a great extent permitted itself to fall into a position counter to that of the United States, and siding with Spain, we are startled to find how nearly this country had been dragged into an obligation to insure Spain against the consequences of her own weakness towards foreign powers, or of bad govern- ment towards her own subjects. Spain might appeal to her own recent history for precedents, but they are bad precedents ; and if the public were informed during the progress of negotiations like the present, there would be additional security against the chance that official people, laying their heads together with foreign diplomatists, should betray the country into so false a position.
Another important fact is the pertinacity with which American statesmen, from Mr. Adams to Mr. Marcy, have adhered to the policy of declaring that no other European power save Spain shall take possession of Cuba, and have refused to close against the United States the probable annexation of that island. Mr. Everett's letter of the 1st December 1852 has been published as a resume of this policy. He shows, by the progress of terri- torial expansion in the United States, by the gradual cession of Spanish dominions on the other side of the Atlantic, by the im- proved commercial condition of countries which have joined the Union, by the geographical position of Cuba, the comparative waste of its resources under Spanish misgovernment, and many other circumstances, that the island is destined to become a State of the Great Republic. It is the settled policy of the United States Government not to bind itself in alliances ; and the Government of one day cannot bind its successors. Such were the reasons why. the Government at Washington declined to enter into the tripar- tite guarantee. Comparing the past, twenty years ago, before Louisiana was added to the Union, and not long after Florida was sold by Spain, with the totally altered state of affairs at present, Mr. Everett assumes that twenty years hence no country in Eu- rope would probably desire the union of Cuba with his own country. It is evident from the correspondence that these opinions of Mr. Everett represent views to which the great majority of Ameri- can statesmen have adhered ; the views both of the late Govern- ment and of the present Government at Washington. In 1848, a movement was made by the United States to purchase Cuba from the Government of Spain. It went very little further than talk between Mr. Romulus M. Saunders and the Marquis de Miraflores ; but the satisfaction which Mr. Saunders discovered in the manner of Beier Mirafiores proved at once the doubt which the Spanish Government entertains of its own power to retain the, colony, and the probability that the Spanish administration will not be sorry some day to " realize " on Cuba in _a commercial transaction with the United States.
All the proposals for tripartite treaties, declarations, and so forth, fell to the ground. The last communications reported in this set of papers consists of a conversation which Mr. Crompton, accompanied by M. de Sartiges, the French representative at Washington, had with the new Secretary of State, Mr. Marcy. The nature of the talk was such that the French and English diplomatists considered the discussion of the subject to be closed. Mr. Marcy was conciliatory, and hoped that no misunderstanding would arise with the great maritime powers, but adhered to the views which we have already described. The subject therefore is shelved ; and should it be reopened everything must be commenced de novo. The position of the United States Government is that of with- holding its countenance from piratical attempts upon the island, but of keeping open its right to obtain possession of Cuba either by purchase or by conquest, should war arise on a legitimate oc- casion. The Governments of France and England have expressed wishes, opinions, intentions to stand by Spain ; but by this correspondence they are pledged to nothing. Risks were run of becoming entangled in very embarrassing pledges to follow Spain in all the fortunes of her decline, her mistaken di- plomacy, or her bad government, and to fall into contest with the -United States upon a subject which at present is theoretical and prospective. Should the question again arise, the disposal of Cuba must be judged by the circumstances of the time ; and the use of this correspondence is to show how necessary it is that our repre- sentatives should limit themselves to practical considerations, and should abstain from indorsing or protesting without necessity.
Some of the daily papers publish a letter, dated May 7, by an officer in the Queen's ship Hermes, attached to Sir George Bonham 's mission to Shanghai. The writer has had interviews with the insurgents, and adds several particulars ; more or less rambling, more or less inaccurate perhaps, as being derived partly from subordinates, and repeated without delibe- rate discrimination. He confirms the idea of their general morality— their strictness and professed purity. They are iconoclasts ; they profess to be "followers of Jesus," though he only saw parts of the Old Testament in their possession; have no ordained priests distinct from the laity. They separate the sexes, lest there be impropriety; they include opium- smoking in the prohibition of the seventh commandment, and punish it by beheading. They call each other brethren, the English "foreign brethren"; and they are very frank in their manners. They admit, with indifferelice, the denial that their chief is descended from the last Chinese dynasty, that of Ming. The writer ascribes to them a shocking slaughter of Mantchous- 20,000 men, women, and children ; but says that an equal number are slain yearly under a tyrannical code of Mantchou law. [This passage is of very dubious accuracy.] He at last identifies the leader as really the pupil of a missionary- " On inquiry here I find that the •Lobosen ' spoken of with such respect is the Reverend Mr. Roberts at Canton; and he states that the Tae-Ping-Wang,' (' Prince of Universal Peace ') was a student of his, and applied for baptism some years since. Lye, who was the chief with whom we were most in correspondence, was a member of theBaptist mission at Canton, used to preach at Hongkong. and was a teacher to Roberts. He told me that he was ersonally acquainted with Lobosen,' and he was &scribed to me at Hongkong by one of the clergymen of this mission. There could be little doubt of his identity, as hie e surname agreed, and he had a double chin, with a somewhat remarkable scar on
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