THE BELGIAN TREATY.
THE country has received the announcement of the Ministerial policy with respect to Belgium with a con- tent which has in it something of surprise. It had believed that the Cabinet would, in the end, be true to itself and to the national character, but it had not expected either such deci- sion or such foresight. Reflecting on Mr. Gladstone's consci- entious horror of war and intellectual loathing of expense ; on the reluctance, not to say the weakness, he displayed in the Crimean campaign ; on his obvious unwillingness to give Par- liamentary pledges ; on Mr. Bright's presence in the Cabinet, and his great influence with its head ; on the traditional dislike of English politicians to Continental embroilments, and on the absence of readiness in the military department, the country doubted whether the Ministry would at once master the situation,—whether it would not rather drift into war in the vain hope of averting action. The doubt, though natural, was unjust. The Government, though reticent, as we think over-reticent, in Parliament, spoke clearly enough in its despatches. If England was left in doubt, the two or three men who just now are moving armies were in no doubt at all. The French and German Governments knew clearly that for either of them to invade Belgium would be to declare war on the United Kingdom, and knew it through a despatch which gave to neither of them, if innocent of such design, any just cause of offence. The British Government, carefully avoiding all menace and all braggadocio, and all uncertain forms of expression, in- formed them, says Lord Granville, that it received with pleasure assurances of the intention to respect the neutrality of Belgium; that it confided in those assurances, but that it considered themin one particular incomplete. If one belligerent invaded Belgium, the other would be at liberty to do likewise. The Government of Great Britain did not intend Belgium to be invaded at all, on any pretext ; and begged to submit to both belligerents impartially, and to the other neutral Powers concerned in the original guarantee, a new Treaty, operative for twelve months after the conclusion of peace. By this Treaty the signataries would bind themselves anew, but separately, and to Great Britain alone, to maintain the independence of Belgium,—thus disposing of the arguments otherwise sure to be advanced, that the Treaty of 1839 had ceased to be of any benefit to Europe, or of any meaning in the altered circum- stances of the world, and, that the guarantee being collective, the War had terminated all individual responsibilities,—and also to co-operate with Great Britain in resisting such invasion by force. In plainer words, Germany and France in accepting the Treaty pledge themselves to leave Belgium alone, and if either break the pledge the other will aid Great Britain in attacking him. This Treaty was accepted almost at once by Germany, which has no interest in attacking Belgium ; and after a certain hesitation by Napoleon, who, whatever his original policy may have been, now finds in the neutrality of Belgium, as his Journal Oficiel admits, a "protection for his Northern frontier." The Treaty has also been accepted in principle by Austria, and the total result of a hurried negotiation has been this,—Great Britain has announced, in a method more emphatic than any Parliamentary speech, a method which binds the Government as well as the individual orator, that she will defend the independence of Belgium by force of arms. She has secured the aid in that heavy task of at least one great Continental army, the army of the belligerent who does not invade. And she has put an end to the dreaded and dreadful possibility of an alliance between France and Germany for the purpose of despoiling Belgium. Napoleon and Bismarck may be capable of anything, but neither France nor Germany would follow them in striking up a dishonourable
peace in order to violate at the expense of a friendly nation a Treaty of which the ink was not yet dry. No Government. which made such a proposal to Germany could endure a week, and the "awkward situation" at which Lord Granville has se repeatedly hinted—a situation in which the alternative would have been to fight Europe or submit disgracefully—may be considered to be finally averted. We cannot have to fight for Belgium against a continent in arms. We cannot have to fight for Belgium in utter isolation. We cannot be forced to endure the humiliation of seeing Belgium absorbed in derision of our engagements, our interests, and our threats. Our danger is reduced to this,—that in the event of either belligerent so far winning the game as to be able and willing to overrun Belgium, we shall be compelled to place ourselves in line with his opponent, and fight by his side until our little ally is once more free. In a history not very rich in diplomatic triumphs, we cannot recall one so sudden or so complete ; and we con- gratulate both the Ministry and the country on a Foreign Secretary who knows how to give to English despatches all the force of acts, who can protect an ally without a threat, and. arrest a dangerous policy without putting an army in the field.
Only two serious objections have been raised to the Treaty,. and both of them, as we think, admit of easy answers. It ia alleged by Lord Cairns and Mr. Disraeli, that in the event of an invasion of Belgium our refusal to co-operate with our ally- in the general operations of the war would be utterly worthless, We could not, for example, fight France in alliance with Prussia without aiding Prussia, or without resisting France at any point at which she might attack. That is true, but then we could not fight France alone without aiding Prussia also. The use of the stipulation is to enable us to retire when the- object is accomplished, to limit the object of the war, and to exonerate us from any necessity of securing advantages for any power other than ourselves and Belgium. That the limi- tations would very speedily disappear is not improbable, but their existence in the Treaty leaves us very much more free to act, especially when we come to consider the ultimate terms of peace. Again, it is insinuated, and greatly to our surprise, by' the Times, that Belgium may not like the Treaty, may think that it admits a doubtful or ambitious Power into her terri- tory, and gives her no security that he will gn away again.. She has just as much security for that as she has at present, namely, her own strength, and the British guarantee that she shall not be conquered. Belgium, it is asserted, was not asked. to agree to the new arrangement. Surely all that is hyper- criticism. The wishes and objects and policy of the Belgian Government are as well known to the Foreign Office as the- decisions of our own ; the Belgian Embassy in London is always. in special relations with the British Court, and even if no formal assent has been recorded, we may be perfectly certain that King Leopold II. was cognizant of every detail of the- negotiations. The result has been received in Brussels with a transport of joy and gratitude, and if it had not been, there has been no pressure placed upon the Belgian Government, which is now, as at all times, at liberty to decline any English or other assistance. We certainly are not about to fight for- Belgium against her will.
Recent events and Lord Granville's diplomatic skill would seem to have removed the danger which only a week ago ap- peared so terrible, but we trust the Government will continue its military preparations. "There are vast ambitions abroad in Europe," as Mr. Disraeli says, and this is no time to be- weak. We may yet be compelled to intervene actively in favour of moderation, or to forbid intrigues to the Eastward which would threaten our imperial interests. We do not yet. know what a Provisional Government in Paris might attempt, what a victorious Hohenzollern might demand, at what pricer Russian quiescence has been purchased, or what, if the contest last, may be demanded of neutral Powers. It is better to be strong than weak, and although with a fleet like ours there is no necessity for panic, or even for excitement, we hope still to see the Mediterranean Squadron in the Channel, the army at home raised to 100,000 men, the armament of the Militia completed, the Volunteers supplied with breech-loaders, the artillery equip- ped for service, and the transport and commissariat departments as prepared as if the Ministry expected war within the twenty-
four hours. A million or so expended in preparations is but a small sum to pay for the right to claim an effec- tive voice in a settlement of Europe which may last for a. generation.
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