Turning to submarines, Lord Selborne stated that the Admiralty were
convinced of their value for defensive pur- poses as well as for offensive defence, and that the risk of navigating them did not differ substantially in kind or degree from the risks of navigating torpedo-boats or destroyers. Their safety depended on the nerve and skill of the officers ; all proper precautions would always be used, but manoeuvres must continue. As regards boilers, the Admiralty were convinced that, while the water-tube principle was the best, the Belleville pattern was too delicate and too costly to be continued. He admitted that the cost of naval works was most serious, but the present war proved the paramount im- portance, not only of ships and men, but of possessing all the means of repairing and renovating ships. The war had taught them three great lessons : first, that officers and men were of even more importance than ships; second, that a margin of strength was indispensable; third, that so far from battleships being rendered obsolete by torpedoes and mines, no Power could command the seas without them.