T HE regrets felt by so many Army reformers when Mr.
Arnold-Forster introduced his scheme three weeks ago have been deepened by the debate of Monday. That debate showed not only that the more the scheme is explained and discussed, the graver become the objections to it, but also that, even if the scheme taken as a whole were a wise one, there is not enough motive power in the present Government or the present Parliament to drive it through. To make a great and comprehensive scheme of Army Reform a reality, it is essential not only that the Scheme should have been carefully thought out and sub- mitted to a critical survey from many and different points orview, and should have won the assent and sympathy of the best opinion in the country, but also that its carrying out should be placed in the hands of a Secretary of State for War who can feel that he has got three or four years before him in which he can fully work out the details and apply the abstract principles to the facts. Cardwell, the greatest of Army. reformers, was in that position, and therefore his reforms succeeded. After weighing every objection, canvassing every alternative, and enlisting on his side the best brains among the military experts of his time, he decided on a definite scheme. Next, he was a Member of a Cabinet which had recently come into office, and of a Cabinet which enjoyed in a very special degree the support of the nation and had also for its chief the dominating personality of Mr. Gladstone. Mr. Cardwell, possessed of the complete confidence of his chief and his colleagues, oould therefore look forward with certainty to carrying out his military revolution. Contrast this position with that occupied by Mr. Arnold-Forster. To begin with, his scheme has been prepared, if not in a hurry, at any rate under severe pressure. Secondly, it is obvious from the words used by Sir Neville Lyttelton in a recent speech that it has not won the assent or the sympathy of the chief military advisers of the Secretary of State. They may not be prepared to condemn it, but it is evident that they are not enthusiastic about it, and are perturbed rather than satisfied by the prospects of change opened out before them. Thirdly, it is very doubtful whether Mr. Arnold-Forster has the whole- hearted support of his chief. Mr. Balfour displayed no great zeal in the cause when Mr. Arnold-Forster first ex- plained his scheme, although, as we know, military ques- tions greatly interest him, and in the debate of Monday Mr. Balfour took no part. Considering the power and ability of the attacks made on the scheme, this fact is very significant. One would have expected the Prime Minister to come to the rescue of his colleague when so heavily under fire, and to bring all his heaviest guns to bear in the work of defence. Instead, he may not unfairly be said to have abandoned the War Minister to his fate. But if Mr. Balfour's support of Mr. Arnold-Forster's scheme is uncertain, there can be no doubt as to the hostility of other 'members of the Cabinet. Lord Lansdowne and Mr. Brodrick with equal clearness, though in ways varying with their personal temperaments, have shotin the* dislike of the scheme, and unless rumour is greatly'. at fault, Mr. George Wyndham is also opposed to the military revolution. In other words, Mr. Arnold-Forster, instead of having a united Cabinet behind him, has a Cabinet in which two or three of the principal memberit are actually hostile. In the House of Conimons the lack of support shown to Mr. Arnold-Forster is quite as marked. One would have expected that a coasidera,b10 number of the rank and file of his party would have shown zeal and interest on his side. Instead, the Unionist criticism was far stronger than that offered by the Liberals, and only a solitary voice was raised in support-of the scheme,—that of Sir F. Came Rasch. Never, indeed, did a scheme of the first moment, put forward by a Secretary of State on behalf, or at any rate nominally on behalf, of the Government, receive so cold and dreary a reception.
It will perhaps be argued, however, that in face of all this, Mr. Arnold-Forster's strength of will, knowledge •of his subject, and deep sincerity of purpose—all which -high qualities we most gladly acknowledge to be his—will-be able to carry him through, and that in spite of a timid or indifferent chief, hostile colleagues, and an unresponsive House of Commons, he will be able to reform the Army in accordance with his own plans. We should be the last to deny that a man with a purpose may often win against heavy odds, but in the present case the force of air? cumstances is, we think, certain to prove too heavy for Mr. Arnold-Forster. He wants at the very least three years clear before him in which to complete his scheme, or rather to carry it into administrative action, and he has not in all probability as much as nine months. It is idle to pretend that the present Ministry can hope to last in office for another year; and even if it lasts as long as nine months, its position will be so perplexed and distracted as to make serious administrative work impossible in any Department. The most that any Minister in this Government can hope to do is to " carry on." This insecurity of tenure, this inability to look forward for eyed a year of office as a reasonable certainty, takes all reality out of Mr. Arnold-Forster's great military revolution. It is essentially a paper scheme. It is only operative indeed, in unsettling men's minds, and in making them ask whether it is worth while to trouble about such threatened institutions as the Militia and Yeomanry. There is, in a word, in Mr. Arnold-Forster's plan time enough for destruc- tive action, for destruction is a rapid process, but none for constructive work.
It may be asked, however, whether the considerations we have thus urged do not suggest a condition of official paralysis for a Minister in Mr. Arnold-Forster's position; and whether we really mean to condemn him to inaction; though so much needs to be done at the War Office: Assuredly not. Though we think that it was most unwise to launch a great and far-reaching scheme under existing conditions, we by no means desire that nothing should be done. On the contrary, we think that if Mr. Arnold-Forster had been content to take up one or two specific reforms, he might have been able to carry them through, and so have done a real service to the country. The reform suggested by Lord George Hamilton —i.e., the placing of the defence of naval stations in the hands of the Admiralty—is one of very great importance, and one which might have been carried through even by a Ministry situated like the present. The recruiting question, again, is an urgent matter which might perfectly well have been taken up without the inaugu-. ration of a military revolution. In fine, what Mr. Arnold-Forster should have done was to have kept back his great scheme for a more auspicious moment, while applying his energies to such matters as we have just enumerated. He should have left sweeping changes alone, and have occupied himself with moderate and practical reforms. It is impossible not to be genuinely sorry for Mr. Arnold-Forster's failure to realise the nature of the situation. His keenness for reform and his willingness to sacrifice himself demand, and should receive, full acknow, ledgment. Unfortunately, too, Mr. Arnold-Forster's appointment is not the only ground for regret. It is impossible to deny that a great deal of injury has been done to the Militia and the Volunteers by the mere pro- mulgation of his plans. In both forces an unrest and anxiety have set in among officers and men which bode ill for efficiency. The man in supreme command cannot publicly denounce portions of certain forces as redundant and inefficient without making the members of those forces feel that they are useless, and without infusing into them a spirit the very opposite to that which wise men desire to infuse into military bodies. Thus, though the pledges of the Government may for the present protect the Militia and Volunteers from actual destruction, the seeds of decay have, we fear, been planted in them. Teach men to feel that their efforts are unnecessary, and that in all proba- bility the majority of them will not be in existence next year, and all the heart goes out of them. A heavy blow has, in fact, been dealt at both the Militia and the so-called redundant Volunteers ; and it will, we fear, take Mr. Arnold-Forster's successor some time and trouble to efface the unfortunate impression in regard to these forces created by the promulgation of the present scheme. The fact that the scheme is still-born has by no means robbed it of its powers of harm.
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