T HE state of tension with Russia has not been eased
appreciably during the past week : it may even be said to have been aggravated by the kind of answer to our demands which finds publication in the Russian Press ; but the serious questions are slowly dissociating themselves from the minor issues. We have four grievances against Russia : first, the passage of the Dardanelles by her volunteer cruisers ; second, the seizure of the Malacca' ; third, the sinking of the Knight Commander' ; and lastly, the definition of contraband which she is endeavouring to force upon the mercantile world. The first is a question of policy, in which we act along with the Powers of Europe ; our rights are Treaty rights, and the question of enforcing a strict interpretation of them is a diplomatic affair which concerns the chancelleries of Europe rather than the ordinary citizen. The second has been met by an apology and a promise of compensation, and the incident may be considered at an end. The third is a glaring breach of international practice, as we understand it. An ex post facto judgment of a Vladivostok prize-court cannot legalise the sinking of a neutral ship, whatever its cargo, which did not resist capture. Such " Jeddart justice ' is the nullification of all international law, but the case is so flagrant, and our position is so clear, that we may hope for an early settle- ment. The fourth grievance, however, goes far deeper. Russia has defined contraband of war in such a way as to place neutral shipping under the gravest risks, and to set all the great maritime nations of the world in arms against a doctrine which has no justification either in authority or common-sense.
What is Russia's case She affirms that contraband is something absolute in nature, whatever the destination of the goods. All things which may possibly be of use to belligerent forces are contraband if consigned to any port in the belligerent country ; and as there are few things in the world which may not be of use to an army, from tobacco to coffee-mills, the result is that all neutral commerce with a belligerent State is open to confiscation. No definition at international law is perfectly clear and comprehensive, and the question of contraband is not without its obscurities ; but at the same time certain broad distinctions are abundantly established, and it is these that Russia is treating with contempt. Some articles are useful only in war, such as arms ; these are always contraband. Some are useless in war, like books and pictures, and are consequently never contraband. Some are ancipitis vsus, useful in both peace and war, and their character depends upon their destination and the circum- stances of their transit. This is the established doctrine, as old as Grotius, and never substantially departed from. Lord Stowell in the Jonge Margaretha' case has excel- lently laid down the principle :—
" The most important distinction is, whether the articles are destined for the ordinary uses of life or for military use. The nature and quality of the port to Rhich the articles were going is a test of the matter of fact to which the distinction is to be applied. If the port is a general commercial port, it shall be understood that the articles were going for civil use, although occasionally a frigate or other ships of war may be constructed in that port. On the contrary, if the great predominant character of a port be that of a port of naval equipment, it shall be intended that the articles were going for military use, although merchant
ships resort to the same place for, it being impossible to ascertain the final application of an article ancipitis us-us, it is not an injurious rule which deduces both ways the final use from the immediate destination."
This is the doctrine of " relative contraband," which has always been the creed of Great Britain, a nation which cannot be suspected of any excessive tenderness towards neutral shipping, and it certainly marks the extreme limit of the restriction of neutral rights. The United States have frequently protested against it. Coal, to take one instance, was not treated by the French Government as contraband at all during the war with Germany, and Bismarck made a famous protest against its exportation from England to France. Russia herself in 1884 protested against the inclusion of coal among the list of goods even relatively contraband. But on the whole the distinction is clear and well-established. All foodstuffs, and such raw materials of life as coal, timber, oil, &c., as well as certain kinds of manufactured articles, are con- traband if destined for belligerent forces, but not contra- band if consigned to civilians in unblockaded ports of a belligerent country. The burden of proof, in the case of such consignments, rests upon the captor. One attempt, it is true, has been made to declare food absolutely con- traband,—when France in 1885 announced that she proposed so to treat rice bound for the open Chinese ports. The British Government protested, and the conclusion of peace prevented the question coming to a decision. We may add that the whole history of French procedure, and the authority of her lawyers, apart from this isolated instance, have been in favour of the British view.
If this, like so many international problems, had only an academic interest, we should not trouble to argue it. But it is a matter of the gravest practical importance to British shipping. We have, of course, informed the Russian Government that we do not agree with their view of con- traband as far as regards food ; while Mr. Hay, on behalf of the United States, has added coal, fuel, and raw cotton to the list of things only relatively contraband.. But some- thing more is needed than a mild intimation of disagree- ment. As the foremost mercantile nation in the world, we must inform Russia that we cannot submit to her dictation on a matter of such grave importance to ourselves. We must give our views the emphasis which attends the opinions of those who are prepared to follow them up by vigorous action, and in such a course we believe that we should have the support of the world. As the strongest naval Power, we have least interest in defending the rights of neutrals, and it is the cause of the smaller countries and the nations least powerful at sea that we are advo- cating. At the same time, we have our own Far Eastern trade to think of, and it is clear that this is suffering seriously from the Russian action. Since anything for Japan may be held contraband, the principal liners have had to withdraw from the Japanese trade. War risks, which a month ago were insured against at 5s. per cent., are now underwritten at 60s. Meanwhile, there is every reason to believe that the German companies are accepting the consignments which we are compelled to refuse, and if by some means which we do not know they have secured an indemnity which is not granted to our- selves, there is a serious risk of a transference of trade. We are convinced that the Government are fully cognisant of the great risks of the present situation, and are not suffering such subsidiary matters as the Dardanelles to distract their attention from our most vital grievance against Russia. We should be the last to desire to force the pace in what is in the first instance a matter of diplo- matic representation ; but the country has a right to be assured that in a matter which concerns British trade so deeply its statesmen are alive to the gravity of the case and resolute to make good its claims.
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