13 FEBRUARY 1847, Page 12

TOPICS OF THE DAY

POLITICAL PROGRESS OF PRUSSIA.

KING Frederick William has at last given his subjects a hold on the real handle of power—the purse-strings. He has not yielded them up completely, but the Prussians have the tip-end in their bands ;and by combining discretion, firmness, and adroitness, they will attain the rest. In order that they may fully understand what is latent in the germ of power so tardily bestowed, and may develop it as perfectly and felicitously as possible, it becomes im- portant for them to consider what they can do—what it is within their power to dispose of, and what should be the next step that they take. Speaking as fellow citizens in the community of free Eu- rope, with active practical experience in the working of a mo- narchy limited by popular representation, Englishmen may ven- ture to suggest a hint for the use of the youngest in the number of free countries.

There is one institution among us that has been established by no charter, which subsists entirely by usage and the approval of the nation, and yet which forms so essential a complement of limited monarchy, that it may be accounted the only effectual means of reconciling the institution of royalty with popular representation. It is "Ministerial responsibility." A foreign politician, acquainted with English politics only through litera- ture, and not in their practical working, may not be fully aware of the nature of this unchartered institution of ours ; and as we write at this moment for German readers, we may be excused a few words of explanation. With us the Sovereign chooses his Ministers. Parliament deals, not with the Sovereign directly, except to exchange com- pliments of form, but with the Sovereign's Ministers. The Min- isters may be treated with a freedom which would be embarrass- ing if not hazardous in the case of the Sovereign. To obtain the concurrence of Parliament, notably to obtain funds, the Ministers chosen by the Sovereign must sally the Parliament. This is Ministerial responsibility ; and, however simple the institution may be in its nature and in its tenure, it has the most important results. It reconciles the utmost freedom of popular action with the sacred character and safety of the sovereignty. It shields the Monarch from all collision ; guards him not only from the consequences of his own mistakes, but even prevents him from making mistakes. As long as he finds Ministers to do his behest, as long as they induce Parliament to fulfil their plans of action, all goes well. If Parliament dissents from a plan proposed, its refusal is made, not to the Sovereign, but to the Ministers. If the project be really practicable, the King finds abler Ministers, who reconcile Parliament to it. If it be im- practicable, the Sovereign discovers his mistake by the fact that he can find no Ministers to undertake the task of urging it. Hence the paradoxical maxim of our constitution, that "the King can do no wrong." He may contemplate wrong—of that Parliament can know nothing ; but if wrong is done, there must have been Ministers to do it, and they are the wrongdoers. Theoretically they are responsible with their heads ; but in prac- tice such a gage of responsibility is quite obsolete : the refusal of Parliament to concur in carrying on the Government is suffi- cient enforcement of responsibility ; so effectual, indeed, that no Ministry ever awaits the actual occurrence of such a refusal, but voluntarily ceases to exist on the first signs of it. This institu- tion will be seen to act as a perfect shield for the Sovereign : had it been complete in the days of Charles the First of England, he would not have lost his head ; were it now thoroughly under- stood and observed in France, much embarrassment and hazard would be saved to all the estates of that realm.

It permits, with perfect safety to all other institutions, full free- dom of popular action. When public opinion in this country is matured on any particular measure, the nation is always able to accomplish its purpose, by refusing, through its elected Parlia- ment, to concur in carrying on the government with any Minis- ters except those who are prepared to comply with the national opinion. Such a process, of course, is totally incompatible with changes that are sudden or conceived on a partial impulse : how- ever the newspapers may talk about faction, aristocratic or demo- cratic, it is by itself positively impotent in this country. But the process is so suitable to deliberately-matured improvements, that the constitution of the Representative Chamber was thoroughly remodelled by the Reform Bill, with readjustments also of the relation between that Chamber and other parts of the Government; and further movements affecting the national polity and consti- tution are now going on in deference to the national opinion and in anticipation of the more tardy but clearly foreseen national ac- tion. Such, indeed, is the tendency of modern politics in Eng- land—to avoid all violence and contest by accommodating the con- duct of public affairs to the growth of public opinion. In no other country are changes so effectually accomplished with so little waste of exertion—with so much sparing of loss, or even mortification, to any class—with such perfect safety. Now, this Ministerial responsibility, which is the key to all these beneficial combinations, is a thing quite within the reach of any people possessing a hold on the purse-strings. The national re- presentatives have simply to intimate, gently but firmly, gradually but progressively, that they will concur in carrying on the go- vernment only with those Ministers that act to the satisfaction of the national council, and the institution that completes repre- sentative government is ipso fto established.