LETTERS TO THE EDITOR
REFORM OF THE LORDS
Stit,—Both you and your correspondents are agreed that a Second Chamber is desirable. Lord Bryce's Committee set out four functions of such a body. In practice the present House of Lords discharges two—discussion and legislation. As far as discussion is concerned, its performances have been generally approved. They have been marked by expert knowledge, clothed in clear and sometimes eloquent language. That is because its membership includes experts on every topic of public interest, who are compelled to express themselves in a way that ordinary educated individuals —normal citizens—will be able to understand. It is this combination of experts with non-experts that makes the Lords' debates so valuable, and it would be a great pity to destroy it. I suggest, therefore, that for purposes of discussion no important change should be made in the composition of the House. True, it involves the use of the hereditary principle in order to obtain the non-expert element. But for that purpose the principle works well and does no harm. '
Its legislative functions are another matter. It has no longer the power of veto; and no one wants to restore it. All it can do is to delay a proposal where there is a doubt whether the electorate approves it. Under the Parliament Act of 1911, the delay cannot exceed two years. By an unforeseen use of the powers conferred on the House of Commons, this delay is to be cut down to one year. Use of the same procedure by a future Government could abolish the delay altogether, and that is the openly expressed wish of the section of the Government supporters which insisted on the present Bill. It is manifest that this power of delay is important. It gives the public time to think and to express its considered opinion, either by voting at an election or by agitation. If the revolutionary atmosphere of Europe spread to this 4tuntry, the second thoughts of the electorate would be a great safeguard. • Just because of its importance, the power to insist on delay ought only to be exercised by a body directly representative of the considered views of the electors. Above all, it must not include a majority attached permanently to either political party. That is the vice of the present House. It is predominantly Conservative. Even if it consisted solely of life peers there is every ground for thinking that the Conservative bias would remain. It can only be prevented by some form of periodical election.
It is suggested that the legislative function should be separated from the other duties of the House and should be exercised by persons nominated for the purpose. They would be peers, and might be chosen from the present peerage if desired. The simplest plan would be for each House of Commons, as soon as elected, to nominate half of the legislative body by proportional representation to sit for two Parliaments, so that the whole of the body would be indirectly selected by two general elections. They would voice the considered views of the electorate—the sovereign body in our Constitution—though they could not do more than is permitted by the Parliament Act of 1911 or any amendment thereof. The effect of this arrangement would be that you would have the House of Lords shorn, perhaps, of those members who have shown by their non- attendance that they do not desire to be members of the Second Chamber, and strengthened by life peers, as it is now. They would sit and speak and vote as at present, except that, when it came to actual legislation, though they could speak and even move amendments, they would not be able to vote unless they had been nominated by the House of Commons as legislative members. If you assume a body of two hundred legislative peers, I should expect that most of the present Conservative peers who take an actual part in our debates would be nominated. So would most, if not all, of the present Labour peers. But additional nominees from the Left would also be required. The House so reconstituted would carry on the traditions of the present House without being exposed to the reproach that in legislative decisions it treated Left and Right measures
on party lines.—Yours faithfully, CECIL. Chelwood House, Haywards Heath, Sussex.
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