LETTERS TO THE EDITOR.
WAR OFFICE REFORM AND THE CIVILIAN E LE MENT.
[To THE EDITOR OF THE "SPECTATOR."] Sill,—Your arguments in favour of the retention of civilians as heads of the military and naval departments no doubt have weight, but they leave untouched the principal weakness in the management of our Army and Navy,—namely, that the public, who have the deepest interest in them, have the greatest difficulty in finding out the material facts. It is as if a man with a good income, and disposed to do all that is prudent, were not allowed to arrange about his life insurance and fire insurance except through his solicitor, or to know what office he was insured in or to what amount, though he paid the premiums. When the British public, or some of them, "want to know," some insufficient information is usually given them, and they are told that the Secretary for War or the First Lord of the Admiralty is responsible, and, of course, would not risk the safety of the Empire. Consciously, perhaps, he would not ; but there are many things to warp his judgment, such as pressure from the Treasury through desire for a popular Budget, as well as that trust in "our luck" which the apparent lessons of our history have developed to a most dangerous extent. What- ever is the explanation of it, we know enough to see that this confidence in the statesmen of either party has been very im- perfectly justified. Within a few years we have known (1) quick-firing guns ordered without ammunition; (2) a Govern- ment which neglected to provide a proper supply of cordite ; (3) a ship (the 'Warrior '), dismantled, as I myself saw it, and as obsolete as the dodo, reckoned among our force of efficient ships, not to speak of the number that are so reckoned while they are armed with antiquated muzzle-loaders ; (4) the want of serious attention to the necessity of keeping up a supply of British seamen in British vessels, so that not merely our merchantmen but our trans- ports would be very largely manned by foreigners (with all that that involves) in a naval war. I purposely leave out what additional proofs are afforded by this war. Trust in this feeling of responsibility in the case of statesmen of both parties is evidently a broken reed, which will some day go into our hand and pierce it. We do not seem to have been able to find the men "of exceptional character and ability," who, you say, are required. Unless we can be certain of find- ing them (and from our experience I do not see how we can ensure this), it is hard to see what we gain by the " buffer " statesmen, and it would be better for the owners of the pro- perty to deal directly with the insurance offices. It would be worth something to have some chance of learning directly how we stand,.—the first step towards putting things right. It would be worth something to have men responsible for the Army and Navy who really understand them, and who are outside the temptations of party politics. As to favouritism, responsibility undivided and recognised is a great check on it;, no single man " jebs " like a committee. If Parliament
refused to vote necessary money, the nation's blood would be on its own head. But the pity of it is that the " owners " are ready, and even anxious, to do and to pay as much as ever their own safety requires, if they could be allowed to know what this is. The present unbusinesslike arrangement needs either mending or ending. In the meanwhile all patriotic Britons ought (1) to join the Navy League (13 Vic- toria Street), which has done much to make our position less dangerous, but wants more money and more public opinion at its back; (2) to form some permanent Emergency Committee or Society to take up the whole question of responsibility, to press for the formation of a Territorial Army, and, in general, to see that we are not ruined by faulty arrangements, procrastination, or a penny-wise, pound- foolish economy; (3) to help on, by personal effort or money, or both, the Volunteers, rifle clubs, and other undoubtedly useful projects which have been suggested for the national safety, which is certainly not secured at present. — I am,
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