TOPICS OF THE DAY.
WHAT THE GOVERNMENT SHOULD DO.
WE are much more concerned with what Mr. Balfour did not say in his speech at Manchester than with what he did say. The mistakes and mis- understandings that preceded the war have become matter for the historian, and must not now be allowed to cloud our minds with futile complaints or angry recriminations. What we have to deal with is not the past, but the present. We have to do two things. We have to keep our troops in the field supplied with the munitions of war, and we have to organise at home such a Navy and such an Army that the Continental Powers shall have no possible excuse—and, what is more, no temptation—to intervene, and that, if fresh complications arise elsewhere, we shall be prepared to meet them. As we have said before, we do not believe that any foreign Government is in the least anxious to try conclusions with our Fleet, or is desirous of attacking us ; but we must not be content with that. We must place the European Governments in the position of being able to say that the thing is too dangerous, if, as might happen, they were to be urged by their peoples to attack the wounded lion. Now on these insurance preparations, as we may call them, Mr. Balfour was, we regret to say, silent. We did not, of course, want him to indulge in rhetoric about the wonderful things the Government and the nation could and would do, but we did expect from him a positive and specific assurance that certain things were being done.
- We have already said generally what we think the Government should do. We propose to deal with the matter specifically and in detail. To begin with the Navy. We do not want the Government to give any sensational order to mobilise the Fleet—that might be deemed provoca- tive—but we do want to see them give orders to all our naval departments of a kind which will at once make our ships in reserve ready for sea, and which in six months' time will add very greatly to our naval resources both in ships and guns. We may admit that foreign pressure and intervention are not at the moment within the range of practical diplomacy, but they may very possibly be so in six months' time, and the way to make that possibility an impossibility is to go "full steam ahead" with our naval preparations just as if a great naval war were an absolute certainty within the next six months. It takes time to build torpedo-destroyers and to make big guns ? Exactly so. That is the very reason why we should at once work double shifts in every Government arsenal and shipyard, and why orders should be placed at once with every private firm here, and with every private firm abroad to which it would be prudent to entrust orders. If our present difficulties have passed away before the orders are executed we shall have suffered no loss except that of a certain amount of money, which is immaterial. If they are still existent, or have increased, in six months' time, we shall be devoutly thank- ful that we were not stopped by the thought that the building of new ships and the making of new guns would Lake too long to make it worth while to begin them. Let those responsible for our national safety think what position they will find themselves in if in six months' time we are out of supplies ivhich, if ordered now, would then be ready for use. The country forgives, and rightly forgives, the want of preparations of six months ago, for we were all living in a fool's paradise then. It will not forgive if naval preparations are now neglected. It is not enough to give the Admiralty carte blanche The Prime Minister and Mr. Balfour, as First Lord of the Treasury, must see to it that the Admiralty avails itself of the order to spend freely, and to do everything that money, and still more, ceaseless care and vigilance, can do to add to our naval resources,—especially in the matter of providing a proper supply of engineers, officers, and men. When there is a crisis in the nousehold the wise householder does not merely tell his servants to make this or that preparation, but he sees to it himself that the preparations are made. Perhaps we shall be told that such naval preparations will appear threatening, and will make the Powers of Europe imagine that we have some designs against them, and that therefore we must show our good faith and good intentions by not arming. There is only one thing which need be said on this head, but it is absolutely conclusive. We refrained from preparations against the Boers in. order to show them that we had no sinister intentions. Did our refraining from preparations stop the invasion of Natal ? Instead, it precipitated it. Let us remember this if we want to avoid foreign complications. We invite them, not avoid them, by not being ready. Foreign intervention is not likely, even now ; but it can be made impossible by timely armaments en the element where we are as much feared, and so respected, as we ever were. Surely it is worth while to spend a couple of millions to obtain a security which would be absolute ?
The same general arguments apply, of course, to vigorous Army preparations. To make them is to avoid their being actually employed. The military preparations which we hold to be necessary are,—(1) the obtaining of field artillery in large quantities ; (2) the embodiment of the whole of the Militia ; (3) the taking of such measures as will at once place the Volunteer battalions on a war footing ; (4) the organisation at once of a special Terri- torial Army out of the trained men in the country ; (6) the enlistment in the ordinary way of a large number of recruits on special terms. The fourth of our propositions requires to be specially dealt with : the others require no explanation or elaboration. What we mean by the organisation of a Territorial Army is this. We would inquire in every parish or ward in the towns and in every rural parish in England, Scotland, and Ireland, what men still physically fit, be their age what it might if it was below sixty-five, resided there who had acquired military training (drill and the use of the rifle),—(a) in the regular Army ; (b) in the Militia or Yeomanry ; (c) in the Volun- teers; (d) in the Navy as Marines or bluejackets ; (e) in the Police ; and (f) in any other foreign or Colonial military force. To such drilled and trained men a patriotic appeal should be made to inscribe themselves upon the lists of regiments to be raised in each town and county in the three kingdoms,—the big counties and big cities would, of course, have two or three, or even four, battalions to each regiment. The men thus inscribing themselves should be given a retaining fee to begin with, and a weekly fee afterwards, and should accept conditions of service which should be, as we have suggested before, something of this kind. Unless the force were to be embodied in case of actual invasion, nothing more would be required of the men than a weekly muster and drill, say on Saturdays, and as much rifle practice as possible. The men, that is, would remain in their homes, and they would not be required to leave work or to take the field except far the great emergency arising for which they were raised,—i.e., to defend their country. Care should, of course, be taken not to harass unduly such a force by insisting on the minutia) of drill. It would be enough to ensure that they would be able to execute the very simple movements required in modern war. What would be insisted on would be the handling of the rifle, and for this the men must be taken by train or omnibus to the butts. The general organisation of the regiments being for work and not for show, the pipe-clay part of soldiering would not be attended to. Men, that is, would be allowed to dress as they liked, though, in case they actually. took the field, a uniform Norfolk jacket of stout serge and a great-coat should be issued to them in order to ensure them the full rights of combatants. As to officers. These should be for the most part supplied by men now on the retired Est, who had served the Queen either with com- missions or as non-commissioned officers. No class dis- tinctions should be made, and men originally inscribed is privates who showed military keenness and intelligence, provided it was evident that they would command the con- fidence of the men they would lead, should be at once raised from the ranks. At first the force would possibly be somewhat under-officered, but if only a wise and ju,dicious choice were made of the commanding officer he would soon be able to obtain what extra officers he needed out of the ranks, by asking the men to elect officers, —subject to his veto. Such regiments of veterans, though homely in appearance, would certainly not be wanting in valour, and need not, be wanting in esprit de corps. In each regiment companies might be forniea according to the various sources from which the men drew their original instruction,--a Regular company, a Militia company, a Police company, and. so forth. How many trained men could be raised in this way it is impossible for us to say, but supposing that owing to the formation of Lord., Wemyss's Volun- teer. Reserve no Volunteers joined, we should imagine that at least three hundred thoasand men might be obtained, provided that they were properly ap- pealed to and properly treated,--i.e., made to feel that they were doing a patriotic service which the nation would know how to reward, not that they were going back to a rigid barrack discipline which, if it suited young men, would not suit them now they were old. Of course, there must be strict discipline in the essential sense, but not in the way of worrying about clothes-buttons. We shall be told, no doubt, that all this is talk, and that the War Office could not bother itself even to consider so fantastic a scheme. It is too busy over far more important things. That we admit, and therefore we suggest that the Government should not ask the War Office to undertake the werk, but should delegate it to a special set of Com- missioners, to whom a perfectly free band should be given to take the necessary steps for raising a Territorial Army for home defence. Such Commissioners should include men of various experience. A man like Lord Wa.ntage might represent the Regulars and the Militia, while Lord Wemyss and a couple or so of the most active Volunteer Colonels could supply the latest knowledge of citizen soldiering. Mr. Arnold-Forster—if he were not wanted elsewhere—might be asked. to bring to the work his clear head and his intimate knowledge of things military, and one or two great employers of labour, and, if possible, one or two leading working men possessed of organising ability, should. also be asked to serve. Such a Commis- sion, empowered. to use the authority of the War Office on the one hand, and on the other to act like a private business firm—i.e., to act when, where, and how it best could, and not by red-tape regulations would, we believe, be able to produce practical results of the greatest im- portance.
If the Government will not listen to any such scheme, and makes no effort to deal with the problem of how to utilise the trained men in the nation, we would appeal to voluntary effort, and would sug- gest that in every city and in every county Parish Committees should get to work to hunt up and. get into a list by means of a. house-to-house canvass, the names of the men in their parishes who are trained to arms, and to ask those men without pledging themselves finally whether, if proper arrangements were made, they would. join a Territorial Army for home defence. Such a thing is net in any sense impossible. A canvass of that kind is constantly made by both political parties when a Parliamentary division is being organised. Even if a house-to-house canvass were not possible, a reply post- card sent to every man on the Parliamentary Register would suffice. The card. might run : "(1) Have you had a military training ? . (2) If so, would. you serve in a Territorial Army for home defence under fair and reasonable conditions ? If the answer is 'Yes' merely drop this card as it is into the pillar-box." Probably such e canvass would get replies from half the available and willing men. But even if only that result were achieved, what a useful foundation would be laid. There would. be a register of, perhaps, two hundred thousand trained men in existence. Of course we admit that in a case of this kind voluntary effort would in many ways be unable to accomplish what Government could accomplish through a Commission, but if Govern- ment will not act and remains spellbound, voluntary effort might still accomplish a great deal, and prepare against the day when the spell 'than be broken and. the Government shall realise that, without encouraging panic or showing any unwise alarm, they can, and. ought to banish all thought of foreign interference, and to set all our regular troops free for service abroad, by preparing an efficient system of home defence.
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