GOVERNMENT AND PUBLIC OPINION.
MR. BALFOUR'S speech at Manchester passed at one point from the region of explanation of particular mishaps into that of general politics. He does not ques- tion—no one, indeed, can (j uestion—that we might have made very much more effective preparation for the war in South Africa, but he denies that the absence of this preparation involves any reflection on the wisdom of the Government. It is not, in his opinion, material whether the Government did or did not see that war was inevitable,—whether, in common with "the great mass, not only of public opinion, but of that portion of public opinion which knew moat of South African affairs," they thought up to the last moment that peace was within reach, or whether they had come to the conclusion before the prorogation of Parliament that the Boer leaders had determined to send. an ultimatum the moment that they were ready. In either case Ministers would have done, and must have done, precisely what they did. They can now see clearly enough that a different policy might have averted our recent disasters. But this lifting of the veil does not alter the fact that for the Government to have attempted then what we now see it would have been well to attempt, would have been a policy• of insanity,—the policy of men blind to all the conditions under which English statesmen have to work. To think otherwise is to forget the necessary defects of English institutions, and the insepsrable connection which links those defects to the merits which have made England what she is. The defect in which our recent reverses have their origin is the denial of sufficient rapidity to the Executive Government. The merit with which this defect is associated is the inability of a Government to act "unless it has the support of those who sit behind it," or, as Mr. Balfour seems rather to mean, unless it has the support in matters of national importance of those who sit opposite to it as well. It was worth anything to go into this struggle a united people ; whereas if the Government had made in August the preparations they have had to make since they would have gone into it at most a united party.
It is not necessary to inquire how far this is a true description of our constitutional system, since we may admit all that Mr. Balfour says, and yet not admit its relevance to the particular purpose for which he says it. The Government, as be regards it, is simply the creature of public opinion. The Executive dogs not exist to carry out a policy conceived by itself ; it is simply a waiter upon Providence, and its Providence is the man in the street. When he has been stimulated by his favourite newspaper to demand that the Govern- ment shall do this or that, and when enough news- papers have brought their readers to demand that the Government shall do this rather than that, then, but not till then, Ministers can venture to give effect to what they know to be sound policy. But this is a .process which needs time for its working out. The normal position of English Ministers is that of sailors waiting for a wind. However well they may know in what direction the prow of the vessel ought to be pointed, their knowledge is valueless so long as the sails flap idly against the mast. A good deal might be urged against the morality of this doctrine, if it were necessary for our present purpose to urge it. We might point out that, supposing Mr. Balfour's picture to be a true one, it owes • its truth in a great measure to the timidity, congenital or inherited, of English politicians. Probably no English Minister of equal ability and position has ever eared less for office than the present Leader of the House of Commons, yet here we have him defending a thesis which, if it means anything, means that office has an intrinsic value over and above the opportunities which it affords its possessor of giving effect to his convictions. We do not for a moment believe that Mr. Balfour thinks any- thing of the kind. We are sure that no man better appreciates the unimportance of office except as a means to something better. So far as the present conflict is con- cerned, the position of a politician who had resigned his -post in the summer rather than be a party to postponing the work of preparation any longer, would have been far preferable to that of a Minister who had consented to do nothing until the measures he thought necessary were demanded of him by public opinion.
There is no need, however, to dwell further upon this point, because even if we concede the inability of an .English Minister to do anything in advance of public opinion, we must still hold that Mr. Balfour has left out one most important qualification of that inability. • -Let it be granted that "it was worth anything to us to go into this great struggle a united people," it will still remain to be asked what steps the Government took towards bringing about the union they justly think so invaluable. The action of Ministers themselves is often the niost important factor in the creation of public opinion. The charge which the Government will have to meet is not so much that they waited for a wind • as that they did not whistle for it while they waited. All through the early summer events in South Africa excited little interest in England, because the speeches ot Ministers left the impression either that peace would be maintained or that the chief sufferers from wat would be the Boers. Very possibly this was the im- pression which the knowledge Ministers then possessed conveyed to themselves. There is no need to express an opinion on that point. What we are dealing with is Mr. Balfour's hypothetical contention that even if Ministers ." had come to the conclusion that all these negotiations were a sham and a snare, that the Boer leaders and the Orange Free State leaders were deter- mined to precipitate a war," still, in the absence of a stronger public opinion than then existed, they "could not with advantage to the country have taken other steps" than those which they actually did take.. To say this is to assume that public opinion is a mysterious force with the generation of which Ministers have nothing to do, and for this we can see no warrant. whatever. On the contrary, such a view ignores, as it seems to us, one of the most important—in certain cases the most impor- tant—of the influences that go to the making of public opinion. Can Mr. Balfour mean that a strong Govern- ment, with a large majority behind it and a divided Opposition in front of it, stands no chance of being listened to by the nation when it speaks on matters vital, if not to national existence, at least to national prosperity ? It seems impossible that he should mean this, yet if he does not mean it how are we to under- stand his words ? For ourselves, we are persuaded that if at any point of the negotiations Ministers had warned the country that their failure was extremely probable, that if they did fail it would be owing to the determination of the Boers to precipitate a war, and that for this war, if it came, large and costly prepara- tions ought at once to be made, they would have secured a measure of popular support very nearly, if not quite, as large as that which was accorded them when war had actually broken out. We doubt whether a single member of the Opposition Front Bench would have felt himself warranted in opposing war prepara- tions undertaken in consequence of such a warning. What happened afterwards would only have happened earlier. Criticism on the conduct of the negotiations would to a great extent have been silenced by the opening out of so serious a military prospect. Im- perialist Liberals like Sir Henry Fowler, Sir Edward Grey, or Mr. Asquith would have declared that io view of the statements made by the Prime Minister and the Leader of the House of Commons they had no choice but to support the Government. The Liberal leaders who dissented from this view would have stated their reasons for thinking that Ministers over- estimated the danger, but they would have been no more willing than the others to take the responsibility of trying to withhold what the Government declared to be indispensable. And the solitary division would have been challenged, as in the event it was chal- lenged, by a few extreme Radicals. In other words, the public opinion for evidence of which Mr. Balfour says that Ministers were waiting, would have sprung into life at their word, and have supported them• in making in advance the preparations which, in fact, it supported them in making after the urgent need of them had become apparent. It is more than likely that there may have been other reasons which prevented the Government from taking this course,—reasons which, whether adequate or not, were at least intelligible and honourable. But as Mr. Balfour has chosen to put forward the unprepared- ness of public opinion as the sole explanation, we have no choice but to insist on the fact that Ministers did nothing to make it better prepared.
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