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AFTER THE PLAGUE
Alas, his overthrow, while much to be applauded, is not the end of the affair. Rumania faces in particularly acute form the problem that all of Eastern Europe now faces: how to transform a totalitarian society into a democratic one, using admi- nistrators whose only experience is that of communism.
There were three million members of the Rumanian Communist Party, and while it is unlikely that many of them believed in communism in any theoretical sense, old work habits die hard, profound change as every conservative knows — is always Painful, and few people consent to lose their privileges gracefully. The problem is compounded by the undoubted fact that, with the exception of a few outstandingly brave dissidents, almost everyone com- promised with the old regime, for eminent- ly understandable reasons. Hence the di- viding line between guilt and innocence is blurred beyond recognition, and while this could favour reconciliation, it could also favour mistrust. Few are the Rumanian fathers who will be able to answer their children with complete frankness when they ask, 'What did you do during Ceausescu's time, Daddy?' As if this were not enough, one has to remember that one is dealing with a doctrine, Marxism-Leninism, which de- fines morality and truth itself as that which conduces to the power of a political priest- hood, so that any lie, any deception, any act whatsoever, is justified so long as it leads to that end. How, then, is anyone now to distinguish between a democrat and a Marxist-Leninist pretending for tactical reasons to be a democrat?
It is a fundamental axiom of conservat- ism that no society can re-order itself according to an abstract blueprint as though it had no previous history. This, of course, applies as much to formerly com- munist societies as to others — perhaps more so, since practically all independent elements of civil society are deliberately destroyed by communists.
In these circumstances, what can or should the West do to help? The sight of tyranny after tyranny being toppled in Eastern Europe is so moving, especially to those who have experienced such tyranny even for a week, that the first impulse is towards indiscriminate generosity. No pla- gue ever wreaked such destruction as communism, and an immense task of reconstruction lies ahead which is almost certainly beyond the capital and human resources of these countries to undertake.
Yet caution is as necessary as generosity. It is still far from decided what kind of politics the countries of Eastern Europe will establish. Furthermore, loans to or investment in Eastern European econo- mies that remain fundamentally dirigiste will not merely fail to improve matters, but will make them worse, insofar as they add to the burden of foreign debt while tem- porarily reducing the need and impetus for change.
It is a common misconception in foreign policy that strong countries can always influence weak ones in the direction they desire. There is a danger of triumphalism in our relations with Eastern Europe: Western ideals have been thoroughly vindicated, and it is tempting to imagine that the European Community has only to prescribe for Eastern Europe to recover.
This is not so. The apparatchiks of the old regime will no doubt launch a strong, if passive, rearguard action, and there is still widespread talk of socialism with a human face. And even if parliamentary democracy were established in these countries, it might delay rather than facilitate the hard but necessary decisions about the ending of subsidies, the freeing of prices, the bank- ruptcy of enterprises, and the permissibil- ity of unemployment. Everyone can see the need for sacrifices, providing they are made by someone else. Finally, there remain uncertainties about the Soviet Un- ion: it is a brave man who would put his last penny on the success of the reforms there and the impossibility of a change to a less liberal policy towards Eastern Europe. Despite our justified pleasure over the events in Eastern Europe, then, the time is not right for grandiloquent gestures. Our financial support should be on a commer- cial basis, except in emergencies such as followed the fighting in Rumania. Com- mercial viability is not an infallible guide, but it is the best we have. For the slow progress of genuine commerce will do more for freedom than large official loans or grants to governments of uncertain provenance.
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