E urope and The Bomb Alastair Buchan S harp-Shooters Hardie Redfern, Roger
Windle l'ilkington A. D. Whannel. .Vlartrice Butterworth.
Henry Adler
PiaOng it Dirty tan .Sainsbury, Jeffrey Blyth,
Charles Adeane
Vevtushenko Victor Litvin RR Blues Cyril Ray Unclean I B. A. Ayres heath Camp Poems Paul Casimir EUROPE AND THE BOMB null's I comment on one aspect of Mr. Hedley Zuli's interesting article on 'Europe and The Bomb.' British central thesis, that the impetus behind the uritish and French nuclear forces has been largely Political ambition and that strategic arguments have been employed largely to give these ambitions the appearance of necessity, is indisputable and is not often disputed. But from this base he then takes an orbital leap to assert that strategic arguments are Irrelevant, and that the United States, in pointing out the strategic pitfalls of small nuclear forces in countries that do not enjoy her geographic advan- t2ges, is governed solely by a desire to retain a inonopoly of long-range weapons. He can only do pis, however, by accepting as valid the arguments of _rench strategists (and their British counterparts) for their force de frappe, white asserting that the argu- Ments of American strategic analysts of greater experience are mere rationalisations of political ainbition. Either strategic arguments are important ur they are not : it cannot be true that some people's are important while others are not. The article also contains several factual Inaccuracies. (I) Mr. McNamara's Ann Arbor speech did not constitute 'a revolutionary change in American strategic doctrine.' SAC has been progressively committed to a counter-force role since 1958 or artier. What is new is the Kennedy Administra- li211's determination in the event of war to use iarnerican retaliatory power in a highly controlled kurin rather than releasing it all in one spasm. This ..."'d been made increasingly clear in a series of offi- qai statements and inspired articles for over a year. (2) Britain and France are not 'an actual political utrinaunity.' It will surely be some time before they achieve a greater community of interest than Britain bas with the United States. Why the problem of i-ontrol and decision-making should be easier in a aroPean political community than in NATO is not Made clear. ts(3)
t The co-ordination between RAF Bomber
rurimand and SAC extends to far more than targets. includes the protection of a common warning system, technological exchange, joint training and now virtually a common (American) weapons tech- i:108.V. To deny the concept of `centralised control' war is to increase the risks to the smaller countries : as a visit to any modern operational Cntrol centre would convince Mr. Bull. It is also a abrogate any hopes of minimising the damage of a:Melear exchange or of averting it by diplomatic ervention and bargaining between adversaries.
ALASTAIR BUCHAN
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