The Watch on the Weser
By JULIAN CRITCHLEY, MP
THE British Army of the Rhine is very much in the news. This is as it should be; the only Pity is that what it does or does not do during the week is rather more important than what it gets up to on Saturday nights. BAOR is one of four army corps that make up the Northern ',troll Group that is commanded by General Sir 'allies Cassels. There is a German, a Dutch and a,. Belgian corps besides the 1st, 2nd and 4th divisions that make up the British con- tribution. The largest corps within the Army Group is the German (the Bundeswehr, which now numbers ten divisions, is divided between the Northern and Central Army Groups), then the Belgians, who number around 64,000, then the 51,000 British and finally the Dutch. It appears likely that a German general will eventu- allY succeed Sir James Cassels as Army Group Commander.
The three British divisions (seven brigades and a Canadian brigade) are backed up by 3 Division that is presently the Strategic Reserve in Britain. Rhine Army, which has over a third of the army's total strength, has the greater part of our armoured forces, for besides what armour there PlaY be in Britain, there is, other than Germany, °IllY a single squadron of tanks in Aden. There die at present 51,000 men in BAOR, of whom 40 ,4300 are effectives. Mr. Watkinson has under- aKen to raise numbers to 55,000, a move that j expected to be completed before Christmas.
Much for the numbers. What of the quality of the Group as a whole? There are some doubts about the Bundeswehr. "hilst their equipment is good—it is American
for the quality of the individual soldier is high, kft3r the Germans can pick and choose through a experienced of selective service, there is a shortage of army NCOs and junior officers. It is an w`,11.1Y of the very young and the rather old, and is'olst there is no doubt as to its spirit, there ,stline as to its effectiveness if called upon to fight. The Dutch are mainly a territorial force, they are stationed well back behind the Dutch 'order, and are not, one gathers, too highly e °11sidered. The Belgians, who are also far back iti Leaves Cologne, are probably somewhat better. This waves the British Army of the Rhine. In many qaYs this is the most efficient force stationed in t:tinany. The quality of its officers is high (the atinlPetition to command a brigade is very fierce) soici,the training, experience and morale of the allied Compare favourably with any of the is forces. But good though the British army ba. It is severely, possily een disastrously, dicaPped. Its equipmebnt isv poor, and it is 110c Yet strong enough to fulfil its role in a
ear strategy, let alone be in a position to make a `forward strategy,' as advocated by General Norstad and now accepted in principle by Mr. Watkinson, a reality. This is the private view of practically everyone with whom I spoke during my recent visit to Germany.
It is true that not all of them were in agree- ment with the Norstad doctrine of the 'pause,' but the fact is that the Rhine Army must presently reject the 'pause,' not simply because it is believed to be militarily or politically un- sound, but because it is not strong enough to adopt such a policy even if it were believed to be correct. There is only one division which has the requisite number of units, although some of the units themselves are below strength. A tattalion of the King's Shropshire Light In- fantry, which should be approaching 900 strong, has just over 300 men. The shortage of men is widespread and is not confined to either fighting or specialist units. There are still, despite some recent improvements, serious deficiencies in equipment. The Signals have received much that is new, and the Sappers are not badly off. The weakest arm of the Service is undoubtedly the artillery. On the nuclear side there are the Corporals (that are to be replaced by Blue Water), Honest Johns and the eight-inch dual- purpose howitzer that is unsatisfactory when used as a conventional weapon. Besides them there are two Second World War guns, the 155-mm. and the 25-pounder, neither of which has the range, mobility or power to begin to compete against Russian artillery. Some of the 25-pounders are clapped out, and were described to me as a hazard to those who are called upon to fire them. The present guns are to be replaced `some time next year' with the self-propelled 105-mm. `Abbott.' Until then the army has nothing with which to match the enemy. There is a similar weakness in anti-tank artillery. At present there is the Mobat, which is heavy and cumbersome, and the Vigilant man-portable guided anti-tank rocket is eagerly awaited. There is as yet no proper armoured personnel carrier—this, too, is due next year; in the meantime the army is making do with an armoured version of the Humber one-tonner.
Thus the picture is rather a dismal one. It is of a fine army forced to adopt a strategy that i, at variance with its allies through lack of numbers and still inadequate equipment. It is believed that General Norstad was unable to allow the Central Army Group (American, French and German) to take up a forward strategy owing to its Commander's belief that his flank would be turned owing to the weakness of the Northern Army Group on his left. How soon will the Rhine Army be in a position to move for- ward? A reasonable estimate would be between three and four years. At present it would be
deployed to defend the line of the River Weser, a river some one hundred miles west of the Iron Curtain, and which, whilst providing a natural obstacle of sorts, would be no barrier to a deter- mined attack.
But we are now committed to take up posi- tions farther forward. There are two ways in which this can be done. One is to build an arti- bcial barrier, for the country is open, and deploy along such a line or, as is the current American doctrine, to station mobile armoured columns well up forward. If it is to be three or four years before this be possible, for it will take that long for an all-Regular army to build up to 180,000, should not BAOR be made strong enough now to hold the line of the Weser? This could be done in one of two ways. If there were a Russian conventional attack in Central Europe it would be likely to come over the North German plain; that is, into the territory of the Northern Army Group. Yet the Central Army Group under General Freeman is the stronger. Not only has it more divisions, but the terrain over which it will operate is more suited to the defence. In this case it would be sensible to extend the front held by the Central Army Group to the north, thus compressing the northern divisions into a smaller area. (The three British divisions are now each responsible for an area of 10,000 square miles.) Such a decision is believed to be imminent. The other possibility is to bring 3 Division over from the UK and station it permanently in Germany. This would mean doubling up in all barracks, something that the Bundeswehr is already doing. The arrival of a fourth British division would at least give BAOR a better chance of doing its present job.
It is difficult to know what should be done about the families in BAOR, for there are more British women and children in Germany than there are soldiers. If Rhine Army were ever to be deployed, it is understood that dependants would be evacuated at the same time. The con- fusion caused by the army moving east to take up their positions, whilst the families retreat westward, can be well imagined. It may well be wiser to have no families at all in BAOR, but to shuffle units of the army between the UK and Germany more frequently than once every three years.
There is danger that BAOR will in the mean- time remain over-dependent on the battlefield nuclear weapon, not so much from inclination as from necessity. Mr. Antony Verrier, writing
'I get headaches, fowl-pest and hard pad.'
in the Royal United Service Journal, has analysed the Operatic n Spearpoint exercise that was held last October by Rhine Army. In that exercise Redland attacked Blueland, using only her superior conventional forces. Blueland, whilst assuming no restraint upon her first use of nuclears, did not in fact introduce them until the third day. The reason for this seemingly uncharacteristic delay was that 'it was necessary in order to justify the stated exercise aims.' Red- land, using her superior forces skilfully, had very much the better of the first three days, but even when Blueland began to use nuclears the results were judged to be surprisingly disap- pointing. Redland spearheads had moved faster and farther than had been expected, and the nuclears were invariably fifty miles behind or to the side of the armoured columns. The terri- iory on which they landed had undoubtedly been invaded, but was empty.
Thus it would seem that if Rhine Army is to have any chance it must saturate the enemy with nuclears immediately. This it surely will not be allowed to do, for it is not our commanders who will decide when nuclears are to be used but General Norstad. Rhine Army is the prisoner of its own strategy. Are we now to wait four years until we can offer a flexible, more rational response to aggression? The Government, by doing away with National Service at the time that it did, and by its refusal to consider selective service, is taking a calculated risk. It is gambling from a position of weakness, trusting that its weakness will neither be exploited by the enemy nor too greatly resented by our allies. I only hope that the Government pulls it off.
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